GHSA-wv26-j37q-2g7p: OpenClaw's Slack plugin approvals used the exec approver gate for plugin actions

OpenClaw can ask a human on Slack to approve risky actions. Operators may keep separate lists of who can approve exec commands and who can approve plugin actions. In affected versions, the Slack plugin approval flow used the exec approver check. Anyone on the exec list passed it, even if they were never meant to approve plugins (CWE-863). The advisory names no config key.

The attacker is an insider or a compromised Slack account that already holds exec approval rights. They can approve a plugin action outside the split the operator set up. The data has no CVSS score. The advisory rates the severity as medium. What the approved plugin action can do depends on which plugins you installed and what you let them request.

The advisory leaves OpenClaw's trusted-operator model unchanged. The flaw matters if your exec approvers and plugin approvers are different groups.

Affected: npm openclaw before 2026.5.12. You are exposed if you use Slack approvals and your exec approvers and plugin approvers are meant to be different people.

npm ls -g openclaw

Drop -g for a project install. Compare your Slack exec approver list with your intended plugin approver list.

Update to openclaw 2026.5.12, the first stable patched version.

npm install -g [email protected]

Until you can update, keep the approval allowlists aligned, so that exec approvers are people you also trust with plugin actions. Review Slack approval actions manually. The advisory also suggests narrow channel and tool allowlists, not sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disabling the feature if you do not need it.

The advisory gives no log line. Review the history of Slack approval actions for plugin approvals made by users who are on the exec approver list but not on a plugin approver list. Match each approval to the plugin action it released. Beam records agent shell commands, file access and MCP tool calls, which can help show what an approved action then did.

Summary

Slack plugin approvals used the exec approver gate for plugin actions. In affected versions, a Slack user authorized only for exec approvals could resolve a plugin approval through the exec approver gate.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could approve a plugin action outside the operator's intended approval split. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.5.12.

Mitigations

keep approval allowlists aligned and review Slack approval actions manually until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.