CVE-2026-53810: OpenClaw's marketplace runtime extension metadata could point at unscanned payloads

When an operator installs a plugin from the OpenClaw marketplace, the package is scanned. The scan looks at the reviewed package entry points. In affected versions, the runtime extension metadata inside the package could redirect loading to other files in the package, and those files were not scanned. So code that passed review is not necessarily the code that runs.

The attacker is a plugin author, or anyone who can get a package in front of an operator, and the operator has to choose to install it. The CVSS vector reflects this: no privileges, user interaction required. The result is plugin code running inside the Gateway with the Gateway's permissions, which is why the vendor rates confidentiality, integrity and availability impact as high.

The sources do not name the metadata fields or the scanner involved. They also state that operators and installed plugins are already trusted in OpenClaw's model, so the flaw matters where you rely on the marketplace scan to vet third-party plugins you do not control.

Affected: npm package openclaw before 2026.5.18, on Gateways that install plugins from the marketplace.

npm ls openclaw

List the plugins installed on your Gateway and note which came from the marketplace. Plugins installed before the fix were scanned only at their reviewed entry points.

Upgrade to openclaw 2026.5.18 or later, the first stable patched version.

npm install -g [email protected]

Until you upgrade, install only trusted plugins and keep the plugin allowlist explicit. The advisory also suggests narrow channel and tool allowlists, and no shared Gateway between mutually untrusted users. It does not describe the code change.

Compare the files a marketplace plugin loads at runtime with the entry points the scan reviewed. Look for plugin packages whose metadata names runtime files you cannot find in the reviewed entry points, and for unexpected child processes or outbound connections from the Gateway after a plugin install. The advisory gives no log strings.

Summary

Marketplace runtime extension metadata could point at unscanned payloads. In affected versions, a package selected for installation by a trusted operator could redirect runtime loading toward hidden package content that was not scanned as expected.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could load plugin code outside the reviewed package entry points. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.5.18.

Mitigations

Install only trusted plugins and keep plugin allowlists explicit until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.