CVE-2026-53832: OpenClaw: Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers

With trusted-proxy authentication, the Gateway reads the operator's identity from headers set by a reverse proxy. The Gateway should only believe those headers when they come from the proxy. In affected versions, a caller on the same host that could reach the proxy-facing port could send those headers itself and be given the identity they name.

The attacker needs local access to the machine and a route to that port. No privileges and no user interaction are needed, which is why the CVSS vector is local-vector with high confidentiality and integrity impact. The result is an operator session on the Gateway: control of an agent gateway, its channels and tools, as the forged operator.

The advisory notes that OpenClaw's trusted-operator model is unchanged, and that real impact depends on the configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach this path. Shared hosts, containers sharing a network namespace with the Gateway, and multi-user machines are the main concern. The sources do not name the header fields or the setting.

The npm package openclaw before 2026.5.18, only where the trusted-proxy feature is enabled and a same-host caller can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port directly rather than only through the real proxy.

npm ls openclaw

Use npm ls -g openclaw for a global install. Versions below 2026.5.18 are affected.

Upgrade to [email protected] or later, the first stable patched version:

npm install [email protected]

The advisory's mitigation: bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. It also advises narrow channel and tool allowlists, not sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disabling the trusted-proxy feature when you do not need it.

Compare the operator identities in Gateway logs and session history with the identities your proxy actually authenticated. Look for requests to the proxy-facing port that came from the loopback or local host address and not from the proxy process, and for operator actions by an identity that had no login at the proxy. The sources name no log string. On a shared host, check which local users and containers can open a connection to that port.

Summary

Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.5.18.

Mitigations

bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.