CVE-2026-53830: OpenClaw: Slack and Zalo webhook secrets could remain active after secrets.reload

Rotating a webhook secret is meant to cut off anyone who knows the old one. In affected versions the Slack and Zalo channel runtimes did not pick up the new value on secrets.reload. The old secret kept working for a while. The advisory does not say how long the window lasts or what ends it, and it names no code path.

The attacker must already hold the old secret. That may be a leaked or former credential, which is the usual reason to rotate. They also need network access to the webhook endpoint. They can then send events that OpenClaw treats as genuine Slack or Zalo traffic. The CVSS vector rates the integrity impact as high and confidentiality and availability as none, with low privileges required.

The advisory says the practical impact depends on your configuration and on whether lower-trust input can reach that path. If you rotated a secret because of a suspected leak, treat the period before you fixed or restarted as still exposed.

Affected: npm openclaw up to and including 2026.4.21. Only setups with the Slack or Zalo webhook feature enabled and reachable are exposed.

npm ls -g openclaw

Drop -g if OpenClaw is a project dependency. Check your Gateway configuration for Slack or Zalo webhook channels.

Update to openclaw 2026.4.22, the first stable patched version.

npm install -g [email protected]

Until you can update, restart the affected channel runtime after you rotate webhook secrets. The advisory also suggests narrow channel and tool allowlists, not sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disabling the feature if you do not need it.

The sources give no log line. If you rotated a Slack or Zalo webhook secret on a version up to 2026.4.21 without restarting the channel runtime, review webhook requests received after the rotation. Look for events that came from sources you do not expect, or that were signed with the old secret if your logs record that. Compare the timing of secrets.reload with when the old secret last worked.

Summary

Slack and Zalo webhook secrets could remain active after secrets.reload. In affected versions, a caller with an old webhook secret during the stale-secret window could keep accepting the previous secret after secrets.reload.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could deliver webhook events briefly after the operator expected revocation. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.4.22.

Mitigations

restart the affected channel runtime after rotating webhook secrets until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.