CVE-2026-53819: OpenClaw: Workspace .env could override Homebrew executable selection for skill install flows

OpenClaw's skill install flows call a Homebrew executable. Before the fix, the workspace .env was allowed to influence which executable was chosen. That is an untrusted search path problem (CWE-426): the choice of program to run came from a file inside a repository the operator merely opened.

The attack therefore needs a malicious or tampered repository plus an operator who opens it and runs a skill install from that workspace. The CVSS vector marks user interaction as required. The result is the execution of an attacker-chosen program with the operator's privileges, so a cloned repository can become code execution on the machine running OpenClaw.

The advisory limits its scope. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model, and it says practical impact depends on the configuration and on whether lower-trust input can reach that path. The sources do not name the exact .env variable or the function involved.

The npm package openclaw in all versions before 2026.5.27, when the skill install feature is enabled and reachable and the operator works in a workspace holding an untrusted .env.

npm ls openclaw

Use npm ls -g openclaw for a global install. A version below 2026.5.27 is affected.

Upgrade to [email protected], the first stable patched version:

npm install [email protected]

Until then, the advisory says to avoid running skill install flows from untrusted workspaces. As general hardening it advises narrow channel and tool allowlists, not sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disabling the affected feature when you do not need it.

Inspect .env files in workspaces where you ran skill installs, and look for entries that point to a Homebrew path or binary outside your normal Homebrew prefix. Check process history around skill setup for unexpected executables started by OpenClaw. The sources give no log line for this flaw. A cloned repository that ships a .env you did not write is the first thing to review.

Summary

Workspace .env could override Homebrew executable selection for skill install flows. In affected versions, a workspace .env in a repository opened by a trusted operator could override the Homebrew executable used by the install helper.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could run an unintended Homebrew-compatible executable during skill setup. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.5.27.

Mitigations

avoid running skill install flows from untrusted workspaces until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.