CVE-2026-50136: Budibase: Unauthenticated S3 signed upload URL generation allows arbitrary writes with stored datasource credentials
The application server exposes an unauthenticated endpoint that generates S3 PutObject presigned URLs using credentials stored in a workspace datasource. The route is protected only by the recaptcha middleware and does not require authentication, table permission, datasource permission, or builder access.
Published Jun 22, 2026 · Updated Jul 17, 2026
Affected packages
@budibase/server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 3.39.2
- Fixed in
- 3.39.2
- Check
npm ls @budibase/server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
The application server exposes an unauthenticated endpoint that generates S3 PutObject presigned URLs using credentials stored in a workspace datasource. The route is protected only by the recaptcha middleware and does not require authentication, table permission, datasource permission, or builder access. A public caller who knows a workspace ID and S3 datasource ID can request a signed upload URL for attacker-controlled bucket and key values.
Details
The static route registers the signed upload URL endpoint with only recaptcha before the controller:
packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:44-48
44: .post(
45: "/api/attachments/:datasourceId/url",
46: recaptcha,
47: controller.getSignedUploadURL
48: )The controller loads the datasource by datasourceId with enriched secret values:
packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:590-598
590:export const getSignedUploadURL = async function (
591: ctx: Ctx<GetSignedUploadUrlRequest, GetSignedUploadUrlResponse>
592:) {
593: // Ensure datasource is valid
594: let datasource
595: try {
596: const { datasourceId } = ctx.params
597: datasource = await sdk.datasources.get(datasourceId, { enriched: true })
598: if (!datasource) {The request body controls bucket and key, and the server signs a PUT URL using the stored datasource credentials:
packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:609-629
609: if (datasource?.source === "S3") {
610: const { bucket, key } = ctx.request.body || {}
611: if (!bucket || !key) {
612: ctx.throw(400, "bucket and key values are required")
613: }
614: try {
615: let endpoint = datasource?.config?.endpoint
616: if (endpoint && !utils.urlHasProtocol(endpoint)) {
617: endpoint = `https://${endpoint}`
618: }
619: const s3 = new S3({
620: region: awsRegion,
621: endpoint: endpoint,
622: credentials: {
623: accessKeyId: datasource?.config?.accessKeyId as string,
624: secretAccessKey: datasource?.config?.secretAccessKey as string,
625: },
626: })
627: const params = { Bucket: bucket, Key: key }
628: signedUrl = await getSignedUrl(s3, new PutObjectCommand(params))
629: if (endpoint) {The endpoint returns the signed URL and public URL to the caller:
packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:630-639
630: publicUrl = `${endpoint}/${bucket}/${key}`
631: } else {
632: publicUrl = `https://${bucket}.s3.${awsRegion}.amazonaws.com/${key}`
633: }
634: } catch (error: any) {
635: ctx.throw(400, error)
636: }
637: }
638:
639: ctx.body = { signedUrl, publicUrl }Because no authorization middleware is applied, the API trusts public input to choose where the stored S3 credentials will write.
PoC
Non-destructive validation approach:
- Create or identify a workspace with an S3 datasource.
- Obtain the production workspace ID and S3 datasource ID.
- Send an unauthenticated request with the workspace ID header and attacker-controlled bucket/key:
POST /api/attachments/<datasourceId>/url HTTP/1.1
x-budibase-app-id: app_<workspace-id>
content-type: application/json
{"bucket":"attacker-controlled-or-permitted-bucket","key":"poc/budibase.txt"}- Observe that the response contains a signed PUT URL.
- Upload harmless content to the returned
signedUrland confirm the object is created using the datasource's stored S3 credentials.
Impact
This allows unauthenticated arbitrary object writes wherever the stored S3 datasource credentials have PutObject access. Depending on the datasource permissions, this can corrupt application data, overwrite public assets, place attacker-controlled objects in trusted buckets, consume storage, or abuse an organization's cloud credentials.
Credited to liyander, Amayyas.
References
- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh
- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18774
- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/d9dbb7f6105373cc88ecacdbcab70c776f7dd6a1
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50136
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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