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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-35219: Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist

highCVSS 4.0 7.1GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7

Summary Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using node-fetch directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when BLACKLISTIPS is not configured.

Published Aug 14, 2026

Affected packages

@budibase/server

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
< 3.41.3
Fixed in
3.41.3
Check
npm ls @budibase/server

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using node-fetch directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when BLACKLIST_IPS is not configured.

Vulnerable Code

Automation Steps (No Blacklist)

All automation steps use fetch() directly without any IP validation:

`packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` line 69:

const response = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check

`packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts` line 34:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

`packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts` line 53:

response = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check

`packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts` line 20:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

`packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts` line 29:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)

`packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts` line 684:

if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {
  throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.")
}

But BLACKLIST_IPS env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:

`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts` lines 39-45:

if (blackListArray?.length === 0) {
  return false  // Always passes when no IPs configured
}

Impact

  • Automation steps: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module
  • REST API: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection.
  • Cloud metadata: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ accessible via any automation step
  • Internal services: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs

Remediation

  1. Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps
  2. Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
  3. Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct fetch() calls
  4. SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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