CVE-2026-45719: Budibase: CouchDB Reduce Injection via Unsanitized Calculation Parameter in V1 Views API
Security Advisory: CouchDB Reduce Injection via Unsanitized Calculation Parameter in V1 Views API Affected Software: Budibase Affected Component: packages/server/src/api/controllers/view/viewBuilder.ts, packages/server/src/api/routes/view.ts CWE: CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code) Discovery Date: 2026-03-24 --- Summary The V1 Views API (POST /api/views) accepts a calculation parameter from the request…
Published May 18, 2026 · Updated Jun 8, 2026
Affected packages
@budibase/server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 3.38.1
- Fixed in
- 3.38.1
- Check
npm ls @budibase/server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Security Advisory: CouchDB Reduce Injection via Unsanitized Calculation Parameter in V1 Views API
Affected Software: Budibase Affected Component: packages/server/src/api/controllers/view/viewBuilder.ts, packages/server/src/api/routes/view.ts CWE: CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code) Discovery Date: 2026-03-24
---
Summary
The V1 Views API (POST /api/views) accepts a calculation parameter from the request body that is interpolated directly into a CouchDB reduce function definition without validation. Although an internal SCHEMA_MAP object defines the valid calculation types (sum, count, stats), no actual validation is performed against this map before the value is used in string interpolation.
A user with Builder permissions can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that will be executed within the CouchDB JavaScript engine when the view is queried.
---
Affected Component
Route: POST /api/views (V1 legacy views endpoint) File: packages/server/src/api/routes/view.ts, line 45
.post("/api/views", viewController.v1.save)Note: This route has no Joi request body validator, unlike the V2 views endpoint which uses viewValidator().
Vulnerable code: packages/server/src/api/controllers/view/viewBuilder.ts, line 213
const reduction = field && calculation ? { reduce: `_${calculation}` } : {}
return {
meta: { field, tableId, groupBy, filters, schema, calculation, ... },
map: `function (doc) { ... }`,
...reduction, // <-- unvalidated calculation string becomes CouchDB reduce
}---
Vulnerability Detail
The viewBuilder function constructs a CouchDB design document view definition. It correctly sanitizes all inputs that flow into the map function string (using JSON.stringify for field names and a strict TOKEN_MAP allowlist for filter operators).
However, the calculation parameter follows a different path:
- User submits
calculationviaPOST /api/viewsrequest body - No Joi validator is present on this V1 route
viewBuilderreceivescalculationas a raw string- It is interpolated as: `
reduce:_${calculation}` - This reduce definition is saved to a CouchDB design document
- When the view is queried, CouchDB evaluates the reduce value
CouchDB's behavior for reduce functions:
- Values starting with
_followed by a known built-in (_sum,_count,_stats) are executed as native reducers - Any other value is treated as a JavaScript function string and executed in CouchDB's SpiderMonkey JS engine
The SCHEMA_MAP object in the same file defines sum, count, and stats as valid keys, but this map is only used for schema construction — it is never used as an input validator for the calculation parameter.
---
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites: Authenticated session with Builder role permissions.
1. Send a crafted view creation request:
curl -X POST https://<budibase-instance>/api/views \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Cookie: <builder-session-cookie>" \
-d '{
"name": "test_view",
"tableId": "<valid-table-id>",
"field": "amount",
"calculation": "stats\"); } function(keys,values,rereduce){ var data = \"\"; for(var i in this) { data += i + \"=\" + this[i] + \",\"; } return data; } //"
}'2. Query the created view:
curl https://<budibase-instance>/api/views/test_view?group=true \
-H "Cookie: <builder-session-cookie>"3. Expected result: The injected JavaScript function executes in CouchDB's JS context during reduce evaluation. The function can:
- Enumerate objects available in the CouchDB sandbox
- Access document data from the reduce
valuesparameter - Return arbitrary data in the view response
Simplified test: To verify the injection point without complex payloads:
{
"name": "calc_test",
"tableId": "<valid-table-id>",
"field": "amount",
"calculation": "INVALID_NOT_A_BUILTIN"
}This produces reduce: "_INVALID_NOT_A_BUILTIN". CouchDB will reject this as neither a valid built-in nor a valid function, confirming that arbitrary strings reach the reduce evaluator.
---
Impact
- Code execution: Arbitrary JavaScript runs in CouchDB's SpiderMonkey sandbox
- Data access: The reduce function receives all matching document values, allowing data exfiltration across the database
- Scope limitation: CouchDB's JS sandbox prevents filesystem or network access — this is not OS-level RCE
- Authentication required: Attacker must have Builder role, which already grants significant application access
- Persistence: The injected reduce function persists in the design document and executes on every view query
---
Recommended Fix
Add an allowlist validation in viewBuilder before the reduce interpolation:
const VALID_CALCULATIONS = ["sum", "count", "stats"];
if (calculation && !VALID_CALCULATIONS.includes(calculation)) {
throw new Error(`Invalid calculation type: ${calculation}`);
}
const reduction = field && calculation ? { reduce: `_${calculation}` } : {};Additionally, add a Joi validator to the V1 views route to match the V2 endpoint:
// In packages/server/src/api/routes/view.ts
.post("/api/views", v1ViewValidator(), viewController.v1.save)---
Additional Context
The V2 views API (POST /api/v2/views) uses viewValidator() with Joi schema validation and a separate calculation handling path. This finding is specific to the V1 legacy endpoint which lacks equivalent input validation.
The map function string in the same code is properly protected — all user inputs reaching it are escaped via JSON.stringify() or validated against a strict TOKEN_MAP allowlist. Only the reduce path is affected.
Credited to MerlijnW70.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesCVE-2026-122244
Budibase: Cross-privilege Stored XSS in the Budibase Builder via broken HTML-escaping in `jsonFormatter.format()` rendered through `{@html}` in the CSP-less Builder origin
high7.7No fixNov 20, 2026CVE-2026-122247
Budibase: Unauthenticated global-admin & database creation via tenant-confusion bypass of the one-time init guard (`POST /api/global/users/init`)
high8.2No fixNov 20, 2026CVE-2026-54356
Budibase authenticated arbitrary S3 signed upload URL issuance via `/api/attachments/:datasourceId/url`
high7.1No fixAug 26, 2026CVE-2026-35219
Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist
high7.1Aug 14, 2026CVE-2026-73300
Budibase: SQL Injection via `multipleStatements: true`
critical9.6No fixJul 24, 2026CVE-2026-73301
Budibase: Missing RBAC on GET /api/global/groups allows BASIC users to enumerate all tenant groups and role mappings
medium4.3No fixJul 24, 2026
