CVE-2024-22202: phpMyFAQ User Removal Page Allows Spoofing Of User Details
Summary phpMyFAQ's user removal page allows an attacker to spoof another user's detail, and in turn make a compelling phishing case for removing another user's account. Details phpMyFAQ's user removal page allows an attacker to spoof another user's detail, and in turn make a compelling phishing case for removing another user's account.
Published Feb 5, 2024
Affected packages
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 3.2.5
- Fixed in
- 3.2.5
- Check
composer show phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
phpMyFAQ's user removal page allows an attacker to spoof another user's detail, and in turn make a compelling phishing case for removing another user's account.
Details
phpMyFAQ's user removal page allows an attacker to spoof another user's detail, and in turn make a compelling phishing case for removing another user's account. Whilst the front-end of this page doesn't allow changing the form details, an attacker can utilize a proxy to intercept this request and submit other data. Upon submitting this form, an email is sent to the administrator informing them that this user wants to delete their account. An administrator has no way of telling the difference between the actual user wishing to delete their account or the attacker issuing this for an account they do not control.
PoC
We are logged in as hacker and visit /user/request-removal. This brings us to the following page. We are not able to change the username, Your name and Your email address fields on this page. image
However, we intercept this request using a proxy tool such as BurpSuite. image
We can now edit the request before sending it. We change the fields mentioned above to the details of another user, and send the request. image
This results in the following email being sent to the administrator. For them, it looks like the victim wants to delete their account. image
Impact
The impact of this vulnerability is that administrators cannot trust the emails sent by the platform. An attacker can easily make a compelling case to perform phishing and get victim accounts deleted.
Credited to PinkDraconian.
References
- https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-6648-6g96-mg35
- https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/1348dcecdaec5a5714ad567c16429432417b534d
- https://www.phpmyfaq.de/security/advisory-2024-02-05
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22202
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6648-6g96-mg35
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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