GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr: esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows
Summary The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from servedir. Due to the use of path.Clean() (which only normalizes forward-slash / separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (\) that bypass the intended directory containment logic.
Published Jun 12, 2026
Affected packages
esbuild
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 0.27.3, < 0.28.1
- Fixed in
- 0.28.1
- Check
npm ls esbuild
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from servedir.
Due to the use of path.Clean() (which only normalizes forward-slash / separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (\) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured servedir root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem. This issue affects Windows environments only.
Details
The request path is sanitized using:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]However:
path.Clean()is POSIX-style and only understands/(docs:https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean)- On Windows,
\is a valid path separator path.Clean()does not treat\as a separator
Later, the server constructs the absolute path:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)If queryPath contains sequences such as:
..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.inipath.Clean() will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret \ as directory separators when resolving absPath. Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within servedir, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory.
Vulnerable Code
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
....
// Check for a file in the "servedir" directory
if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry {
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath {
if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil {
if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry {
.... Steps to reproduce
npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild
echo "console.log(1)" > app.js
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version
0.27.3
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch
curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini"
<content of Windows\system.ini>Impact
- Arbitrary file read on Windows
- Exposure of sensitive files
Credited to dellalibera.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
