GHSA-8pqq-224h-x875: ogham-mcp had credentials embedded in published PyPI sdists -- Neon postgres URLs and Voyage API key
Summary Between 2026-02 and 2026-04-24 a total of 22 public PyPI sdists of ogham-mcp contained development credentials embedded in source files. All credentials have since been rotated on the respective providers. No known exploitation. Upgrade to v0.11.1 to get a clean release.
Published May 5, 2026
Affected packages
ogham-mcp
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- >= 0.6.3, < 0.11.1
- Fixed in
- 0.11.1
- Check
pip show ogham-mcp
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Between 2026-02 and 2026-04-24 a total of 22 public PyPI sdists of ogham-mcp contained development credentials embedded in source files. All credentials have since been rotated on the respective providers. No known exploitation. Upgrade to v0.11.1 to get a clean release.
What was leaked
| Credential | Location in sdist | Vulnerable range | Count | | 3x Neon postgres URLs with passwords (US / EU / AP development databases) | top-level `Makefile` (`NEON_US`, `NEON_EU`, `NEON_AP` vars) | `>=0.6.5, <0.11.0` | 21 sdists | | 1x Voyage AI API key (`pa-...`) | `tests/test_hooks.py::test_mask_secrets_key_value` -- test fixture that fed a real key into the redaction-function tester | `>=0.6.3, <0.11.1` | 22 sdists |
Impact
- Primary risk: any consumer of the affected sdists could have extracted the credentials and used them. The Neon URLs pointed at development databases; the Voyage key was a rate-limited API key.
- Observed exploitation: none detected. Audit logs on both providers were reviewed post-rotation.
- Remediation on our side:
- Neon passwords for all three regions rotated.
- Voyage API key rotated.
- All affected versions yanked from PyPI (v0.3.0 through v0.10.4 yanked on 2026-04-24; v0.11.0 pending yank after this advisory).
- v0.11.0 removed the Neon URLs and introduced
make publish-checkwhich scans every sdist for credential patterns before upload. - v0.11.1 scrubs the Voyage key from the test fixture and excludes
benchmarks/,docs/,research/,extras/, and**/*.env*from all future sdists via explicit hatchling sdist include/exclude inpyproject.toml.
Action for users
- If users installed any version from
v0.3.0throughv0.11.0, upgrade to v0.11.1 immediately: ``pip install --upgrade "ogham-mcp>=0.11.1"`` - Users do not need to rotate anything on their end. The leaked credentials were owned by the project maintainer, not by users.
Credit
Discovered during an internal pre-release audit on 2026-04-24 while preparing v0.11.1.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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