GHSA-68r5-9hpg-7qw9: OpenDJ unauthenticated SSRF, local file read and unbounded-read DoS in the DSMLv2 gateway
The DSMLv2 SOAP gateway (opendj-dsml-servlet) in OpenIdentityPlatform OpenDJ through 5.1.1 dereferences attacker-supplied xsd:anyURI values server-side without a scheme allowlist, egress filtering, or a size cap, and is reachable without authentication by default.
Published Jul 24, 2026
Affected packages
org.openidentityplatform.opendj:opendj-dsml-servlet
- Ecosystem
- Maven
- Affected
- <= 5.1.1
- Fixed in
- 5.1.2
- Check
mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=org.openidentityplatform.opendj:opendj-dsml-servlet
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
The DSMLv2 SOAP gateway (opendj-dsml-servlet) in OpenIdentityPlatform OpenDJ through 5.1.1 dereferences attacker-supplied xsd:anyURI values server-side without a scheme allowlist, egress filtering, or a size cap, and is reachable without authentication by default. A remote unauthenticated attacker can submit a DSML add/modify request whose value is a URI to (1) perform server-side request forgery against internal services and the cloud metadata endpoint (SSRF), (2) read local files via file: URIs, and (3) exhaust memory through an unbounded response read (DoS). Fixed in 5.1.2: anyURI dereferencing is disabled by default; when enabled it is limited to an http/https allowlist, rejects loopback/link-local/private/reserved targets, refuses HTTP redirects, and caps the bytes read. The gateway also now requires container-managed authentication by default.
Credited to manus-use.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
