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Open-source package vulnerability · GitHub Actions

GHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9: pypi-publish action revocation of CA in the chain that Sigstore uses in Trusted Publishing and Digital Attestations for PyPI

criticalCVSS 4.0 9.3

The pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish GitHub Action, up to and including 1.14.2, ships a certifi TLS trust store that still contains the emSign root CA, which has been revoked. Sigstore uses that store for Trusted Publishing and Digital Attestations. Anyone who publishes to PyPI with this action should upgrade to 1.14.3, which removes the certificate.

Published Oct 30, 2026 · Analysis Oct 30, 2026

What an attacker can do

The action bundles Python's certifi trust store. Sigstore, which the action relies on for Trusted Publishing and Digital Attestations on PyPI, uses that store to validate TLS certificates. Older versions still trusted the emSign root CA. The advisory says this root is linked to an external compromise, tracked on a separate page, and does not describe the compromise in more detail.

The weakness is CWE-295, improper certificate validation. In practice, a publish workflow that trusts a revoked root could accept certificates chained to it. The advisory does not describe a working attack, and the CVSS 4.0 vector (network, no privileges, high confidentiality and integrity impact) is the maintainers' rating. The exposure sits in your release pipeline: the publish job holds the identity that uploads packages, so trust decisions there matter more than in an ordinary build step.

Who is affected

Affected: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish 1.14.2 and earlier. The advisory text says versions before 1.14.2, but the structured range includes 1.14.2, so treat 1.14.2 as affected. No CVE is assigned.

Check your workflow files for the action reference and its pin:

grep -rn "gh-action-pypi-publish" .github/workflows

A ref such as release/v1, a tag, or a commit SHA that points at 1.14.2 or older is affected. If you pin to a commit SHA, compare it with the 1.14.3 release.

pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish

Ecosystem
GitHub Actions
Affected
<= 1.14.2
Fixed in
1.14.3

How to fix it

Upgrade to 1.14.3. In each workflow, change the reference to the new version:

- uses: pypa/[email protected]

If you pin by commit SHA, update the SHA to the one for the 1.14.3 release. The advisory lists no workaround, so the upgrade is the fix.

How to tell if you were hit

The advisory gives no indicators of compromise. It points to an external page that tracks the related emSign compromise; read it for details. On your side, list the workflows that use the action at 1.14.2 or older, and review the publish runs made with them, especially the Trusted Publishing and attestation steps. Check that the packages and attestations on PyPI match what your pipeline built.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The [pypi-publish action][pypi-publish] versions before 1.14.2 used to bundle the emSign root CA trust store certificate through the certifi distribution. It has since been removed through the bundle and the new version no longer includes them.

[pypi-publish]: https://github.com/marketplace/actions/pypi-publish

Details

The certifi-provided TLS trust store is typically used by many projects in the Python ecosystem, including Sigstore that [pypi-publish] relies on for Trusted Publishing and Digital Attestations.

Related

The external compromise is being tracked at https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com

Questions

Is gh-action-pypi-publish 1.14.2 affected by GHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9?

Yes. The advisory description says versions before 1.14.2, but the affected range reads <= 1.14.2. Treat 1.14.2 as affected and move to 1.14.3.

Which version fixes the revoked emSign certificate issue?

Version 1.14.3. It no longer bundles the emSign root CA certificate through certifi. The advisory lists no workaround.

Does this advisory have a CVE?

No. It is a GitHub advisory only, rated critical with CVSS 4.0 score 9.3 and CWE-295. It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and the advisory does not say it is exploited.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

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