GHSA-5739-39v2-5754: PHP JWT Library: RSA1_5 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) decryption lacks implicit rejection, exposing a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle
Impact RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15() (used by the RSA15 key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v15 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing InvalidArgumentException as soon as the padding is malformed.
Published Jun 18, 2026 · Updated Aug 31, 2026
Affected packages
web-token/jwt-library
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 3.4.10
- Fixed in
- 3.4.10
- Check
composer show web-token/jwt-library
web-token/jwt-library
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7
- Fixed in
- 4.0.7
- Check
composer show web-token/jwt-library
web-token/jwt-library
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7
- Fixed in
- 4.1.7
- Check
composer show web-token/jwt-library
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15() (used by the RSA1_5 key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing InvalidArgumentException as soon as the padding is malformed. It does not implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).
From a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted encrypted_key values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though JWEDecrypter returns the same false in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.
Affected configurations
Applications that register RSA1_5 in their decryption AlgorithmManager and hold an RSA private key.
Patches
PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rejection: on invalid padding (or unexpected recovered length) it returns a random CEK of the expected size selected in constant time, so the full content-decryption (AEAD) step always runs and fails uniformly, removing the observable difference between padding-valid and padding-invalid ciphertexts. Users are still strongly encouraged to migrate to RSA-OAEP.
Workarounds
Prefer RSA-OAEP/RSA-OAEP-256; do not enable RSA1_5 for untrusted tokens.
References
- RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2
- Bleichenbacher (1998); Marvin attack
- CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy
Résolution
Un correctif a été préparé sur une branche dédiée basée sur 3.4.x, avec des tests anti-régression dédiés (fork privé temporaire de cette advisory, PR #1).
RSA1_5 — déchiffrement PKCS#1 v1.5 avec *implicit rejection* en temps constant (RFC 3447 §7.2.2) : un padding invalide n'est plus distinguable d'un padding valide, neutralisant l'oracle Bleichenbacher.
Validation : php -l OK, PHPUnit vert, aucune nouvelle erreur PHPStan introduite (différentiel nul vs 3.4.x), aucun commentaire ajouté dans le code source. Après merge, cascade prévue 3.4.x → 4.0.x → 4.1.x.
Credited to magnogaspar.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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