GHSA-3p34-w4f6-5xh2: better-helperjs Vulnerable to Directory Traversal via String Prefix Bypass in Static Server
Summary A directory traversal vulnerability exists in the production static file server of better-helperjs ( = 3.0.6 Proof of Concept To reproduce this locally on a vulnerable installation: 1. Assume the framework static configuration serves from a .dist/client directory. 2. Build the project and create an adjacent prefix secret simulating sensitive deployment structure: 3.
Published Jun 26, 2026
Affected packages
better-helperjs
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 3.0.5
- Fixed in
- 3.0.6
- Check
npm ls better-helperjs
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A directory traversal vulnerability exists in the production static file server of better-helperjs (<= 3.0.5). Attackers can read arbitrary files located in adjacent directory structures that share the same string prefix as the intended static root directory.
Details
The framework utilizes a custom static file server engine used when running in NODE_ENV=production (src/ssr/site-server.ts). Inside the safeStaticPath() method, the requested path is checked against the static root directory to prevent directory traversal out of the designated public folder.
However, the validation uses String.prototype.startsWith():
const root = path.resolve(rootDir);
const resolved = path.resolve(root, `.${decodedPath}`);
if (!resolved.startsWith(root)) {
return null;
}This is logically flawed because startsWith evaluates plain strings rather than structural directory paths. If the application's assigned rootDir is /app/dist/client, and an attacker tries to access /app/dist/client-secrets/database.sqlite, the string "/app/dist/client-secrets/database.sqlite" successfully starts with "/app/dist/client".
Because of this bypass, an attacker can read sensitive files stored inside any adjacent directory traversing through the parent, as long as the adjacent directory name begins with the exact same prefix as the target public directory.
Impact
- Severity: High (7.5)
- Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - Affected Versions:
<= 3.0.5 - Patched Version:
>= 3.0.6
Proof of Concept
To reproduce this locally on a vulnerable installation:
- Assume the framework static configuration serves from a
.dist/clientdirectory. - Build the project and create an adjacent prefix secret simulating sensitive deployment structure: ``
bash npm run build mkdir -p dist/client-secrets echo "EXPOSED_SECRET" > dist/client-secrets/secret.txt`` - Start the application in Production mode (
NODE_ENV=production tsx server.ts). - Using an HTTP client that doesn't pre-normalize
/../paths (e.g.,netcator raw sockets), send a GET request spanning into the prefix-sharing adjacent folder: ``http GET /%2e%2e%2fclient-secrets/secret.txt HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:4174 Connection: close`` - The server incorrectly validates the path and responds with
HTTP/1.1 200 OKexposingEXPOSED_SECRET.
*(Note: Developer environment npm run dev servers are immune as static requests are handled defensively by Vite's Dev Middlewares. This vulnerability only triggers upon production starts).*
Remediation / Patches
The path validation block has been updated to mandate exact path separation bounds by enforcing path.sep onto the evaluated traversal string.
// Enforces separator OR exact root matches preventing prefix extension
if (!resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep) && resolved !== root) {
return null;
}Workarounds
If upgrading is temporarily impossible, users can safeguard their environment by ensuring no sensitive directories are deployed adjacent to their static build client directories sharing the identical word-prefix string.
Credited to TurboRigby.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
