CVE-2026-96633: AdminNeo SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion
In AdminNeo before 5.5.1, a logged-in SQLite user can delete any file the PHP process can write by posting a path in the db[] field of the database-list drop action. The path goes straight to unlink() with no extension check. Upgrade adminneo-org/adminneo to 5.5.1.
Published Oct 30, 2026 · Analysis Oct 31, 2026
What an attacker can do
The database-list page passes $_POST["db"] to drop_databases(). In the SQLite driver that function closes the connection and calls unlink() on every submitted value. The same driver guards create and rename with check_sqlite_name(), which only allows the extensions db, sdb and sqlite. The drop path has no such check, and it does not compare the value against the list of databases AdminNeo displays.
The attacker needs a valid SQLite-mode AdminNeo login and a live CSRF token. Then one POST with db[]=/var/www/html/poc-delete-target.txt&drop=Drop&token=... removes a non-database file. The advisory's test deleted a text file next to the SQLite database.
The damage is limited to what the PHP user can delete, but that often includes application files, configuration, .htaccess files and uploaded data in the web root. Deleting a protective file such as .htaccess can expose other data. The CVSS vector rates integrity and availability high and confidentiality none.
Who is affected
Composer package adminneo-org/adminneo, all versions below 5.5.1, when the SQLite driver is available and a user can log in with it. Check the installed version:
composer show adminneo-org/adminneoSingle-file builds show the version in the page footer.
adminneo-org/adminneo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 5.5.1
- Fixed in
- 5.5.1
- Check
composer show adminneo-org/adminneo
How to fix it
Upgrade to 5.5.1.
composer update adminneo-org/adminneoThe advisory lists no workaround. Reduce exposure by limiting who can reach AdminNeo, not allowing SQLite logins where you do not need them, and running PHP as a user with write access to as few files as possible.
How to tell if you were hit
Look in web server access logs for POST requests to the AdminNeo SQLite entry point (query string containing sqlite=) with a body that has drop=Drop and a db[] value that is a path not ending in .db, .sdb or .sqlite. Check for application or config files that disappeared without a deployment. A failed deletion shows AdminNeo's "File exists." error.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
AdminNeo allows an authenticated SQLite-mode user to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process through the database-list drop action. The SQLite driver validates file extensions when creating or renaming databases, but the database-list drop path passes submitted db[] values directly to unlink().
Originally reported by @slpoiuewalspoid-dotcom in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-6pg3-chwq-wgqc
Impact
An authenticated AdminNeo SQLite user with a valid CSRF token can submit an arbitrary relative file path in the database-list db[] field. If the PHP process can delete that path, AdminNeo unlinks it even when the file is not a SQLite database.
Root Cause
The database-list page accepts selected database names from the POST body and calls drop_databases():
if ($_POST["db"]) {
queries_redirect(substr(ME, 0, -1), lang('Databases have been dropped.'), drop_databases($_POST["db"]));
}In SQLite mode, drop_databases() attaches an in-memory database and unlinks each submitted path directly:
function drop_databases($databases): bool
{
Connection::get()->close(); // to unlock file, doesn't work in PDO on Windows
foreach ($databases as $db) {
if (!@unlink($db)) {
Connection::get()->setError(lang('File exists.'));
return false;
}
}
return true;
}The same SQLite driver protects create and rename operations with check_sqlite_name(), which requires a .db, .sdb, or .sqlite extension:
function check_sqlite_name($name) {
// avoid creating PHP files on unsecured servers
$extensions = "db|sdb|sqlite";
if (!preg_match("~^[^\\0]*\\.($extensions)\$~", $name)) {
Connection::get()->setError(lang('Please use one of the extensions %s.', str_replace("|", ", ", $extensions)));
return false;
}
return true;
}The drop path does not apply an equivalent extension check or bind the submitted path to a known listed SQLite database.
POC
1. Start a complete AdminNeo application
Build and start AdminNeo from the audited source using the official standalone Docker image shape. The validation image copies the audited source tree into /var/www/html and starts Nginx HTTP server.
Log in through the SQLite entry point using a SQLite database path poc.sqlite.
2. Prepare a writable target file
Place a non-database file under a location writable by the AdminNeo PHP process. The validation used:
/var/www/html/poc-delete-target.txtThe same directory also contained a SQLite database:
/var/www/html/poc.sqlite3. Submit the database-list drop request
Use the authenticated session and live CSRF token, but submit the non-database path as the selected database:
POST /?sqlite=&username= HTTP/1.1
Host: <adminer-host>
Cookie: <authenticated-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
db[]=/var/www/html/poc-delete-target.txt&all=&drop=Drop&token=<live-csrf-token>The request reaches drop_databases($_POST["db"]), and SQLite drop_databases() calls unlink() on the submitted non-database path.
After the request, the poc-delete-target.txt was deleted.
Suggested Fix
Apply the same target validation used by SQLite create/rename before deleting database files. At minimum:
- Reject paths whose basename does not end in
.db,.sdb, or.sqlite. - Bind
db[]values to databases returned by AdminNeo's database listing instead of trusting submitted paths. - Resolve paths before deletion and reject traversal outside the expected SQLite database directory.
- Consider requiring the current selected database path for delete operations instead of accepting arbitrary submitted file paths.
Credited to slpoiuewalspoid-dotcom, vrana.
Questions
- Does CVE-2026-96633 need authentication?
Yes. The attacker needs an authenticated SQLite-mode session and a valid CSRF token. The CVSS vector sets PR:L.
- Can it delete files that are not SQLite databases?
Yes. That is the flaw. The drop path has no extension check, so any file the PHP process may delete can be removed. The proof of concept deleted a .txt file.
- What is the fixed version?
5.5.1 for adminneo-org/adminneo. All earlier versions are listed as vulnerable.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesCVE-2026-59978
AdminNeo: version-cache array injection causes persistent denial of service
high7.5Oct 30, 2026CVE-2026-96629
AdminNeo: CSRF Token Secret Recoverable from Single Observed Token, Enabling Cross-Site Request Forgery
medium6.8Oct 30, 2026CVE-2026-96630
AdminNeo: RCE via SQLite VACUUM INTO (ATTACH Blocklist Bypass)
high7.2Oct 30, 2026CVE-2026-96631
AdminNeo has Cookie Attribute Injection via Unsanitized X-Forwarded-Prefix in Set-Cookie Headers
high8.2Oct 30, 2026CVE-2026-96632
AdminNeo Vulnerable to XSS via Rogue MySQL Server Version String (CSP Nonce Bypass)
high8.2Oct 30, 2026CVE-2026-96634
AdminNeo SQLite: multi_query Incorrect Check of Function Return Value RCE
medium6.9Oct 30, 2026
