CVE-2026-94619: FileGator: Missing authorization in POST /upload allows cross-user read and deletion of temporary files
Summary POST /upload uses the request-supplied resumableFilename directly as a key into the shared temporary directory, without the character filter it applies to resumableIdentifier and without namespacing it per user. A valid user holding the upload permission can read any file in that directory into their own home directory, append to it, and delete it.
Published Nov 9, 2026
Affected packages
filegator/filegator
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 7.14.4
- Fixed in
- 7.15.0
- Check
composer show filegator/filegator
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
POST /upload uses the request-supplied resumableFilename directly as a key into the shared temporary directory, without the character filter it applies to resumableIdentifier and without namespacing it per user. A valid user holding the upload permission can read any file in that directory into their own home directory, append to it, and delete it.
This reproduces the cross-user batch-archive disclosure of GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4 through a different route — it still works with the fix for that advisory (PR #597) applied — and additionally allows deleting the login rate-limit lockfile.
Reported with explicit preconditions and bounded impact, as before: the primitive is confined to the temporary directory, not the whole filesystem.
Details
backend/Controllers/UploadController.php:61—$file_name = $request->input('resumableFilename', 'file')is not passed through thepreg_replace('/[^0-9a-zA-Z_]/', '', ...)that line 66 applies toresumableIdentifier.- Line 88 builds
$prefixnamespaced by the sanitized username, but$file_namereaches the temporary storage at lines 118, 121 and 125 without that prefix. - Line 115 —
if ($chunks_size >= $total_size)is entered wheneverresumableTotalSizeis0. - Lines 116-119 — the assembly loop
for ($i = 1; $i <= $total_chunks; ++$i)does not execute whenresumableTotalChunksis0, so nothing is written to$file_name. - Line 121 —
readStream($file_name)therefore reads the pre-existing temporary file of that exact name. - Line 122 — its contents are stored into the requester's own home directory.
- Line 125 —
remove($file_name)deletes it.
Path traversal outside the temporary directory is prevented by Tmpfs::sanitizeFilename(), so the primitive is bounded to that directory — but every user's transient objects share it.
PoC
Preconditions: a multi-user deployment with distinct per-user homedirs. The attacker is a valid low-privileged user holding upload (a first-class permission in the admin UI, and present in the shipped users.json.blank admin set).
- Victim creates a batch archive via
POST /batchdownload; the JSON response returns the archive id. - Attacker sends one
POST /uploadwithresumableFilename=<victim's id>,resumableTotalChunks=0,resumableTotalSize=0,resumableRelativePath=/, and any small valid file part. - Response is
{"data":"Stored"}. The victim's archive is now byte-identical in the attacker's home directory, retrievable through the ordinaryGET /download. The victim's temporary archive has been deleted.
Verified end to end with a PHPUnit test against current master; the archive contents matched byte for byte. Test file available on request.
Impact
Missing authorization (CWE-862) on temporary storage objects.
- Cross-user disclosure of any transient object whose name the attacker can learn or predict. This includes batch archives — so GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4's impact remains reachable even with its fix applied — and the plaintext per-file copies that
ZipArchiver::addFileFromStorage()writes while an archive is being built (those still useuniqid(), which is timestamp-derived). - Arbitrary delete within the temporary directory.
AuthController::login()stores the login rate-limit counter asmd5($ip).'.lock'in that same directory (backend/Controllers/AuthController.php:36, checked at line 44, written at line 58). An attacker can compute their own lockfile name and delete it, defeating the lockout. - Arbitrary append: with
resumableTotalChunks >= 1, line 118write($file_name, ..., true)appends attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary existing temporary file.
Remediation
Do not use the request-supplied filename as a storage key. Namespace the assembly file per user — for example reuse the existing $prefix — and carry the display filename separately for the storage->store() call.
Note that simply applying the [^0-9a-zA-Z_] filter to resumableFilename would corrupt legitimate uploads (sample.txt becomes sampletxt), because $final['filename'] is what becomes the stored name. The fix needs the namespacing, not just the filter.
Credited to Yunnn-Yulio, alcalbg.
References
- https://github.com/filegator/filegator/security/advisories/GHSA-44r8-3p76-84mw
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94619
- https://github.com/filegator/filegator/pull/598
- https://github.com/filegator/filegator/commit/cae442a8323fddae7c8cee0924cdbb1aa6eea702
- https://github.com/filegator/filegator/releases/tag/v7.15.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-44r8-3p76-84mw
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
