CVE-2026-9073: foreman-mcp-server Inserts Sensitive Information into Log File

Two logging paths leak secrets. The first logs session identifiers at the informational level, so they appear in default logs. The server treats a session identifier as a credential, so anyone who reads that line can reuse it. The second path is the HTTP logging middleware with debug enabled. It masked only four header keys (foreman_password, foreman_token, password and token) and logged every other header value, including authorization tokens and API keys.

The attacker does not attack the server directly. They need to read the logs: a local user on the host, someone with access to container logs, or anyone with access to a central platform that receives forwarded logs. Their gain is the Foreman credentials or session of whoever used the MCP server, with the access that grants. Red Hat rates it Moderate, with a CVSS 3.1 score of 6.2: local vector, no privileges, high confidentiality impact only.

The risk grows when logs are shipped to a shared aggregator with broad read access.

The pip package foreman-mcp-server at 0.4.2 and earlier. It also ships inside Red Hat Satellite, so Satellite operators should check their Red Hat advisory. Check the pip version with:

pip show foreman-mcp-server

The session-ID logging occurs in default configurations. The header leak needs debug logging enabled.

The data lists no patched version of foreman-mcp-server, and the Red Hat page I read lists no fixed package or erratum. Red Hat also says it has no mitigation that meets its criteria.

The upstream project has fix commits. One changes header logging from a denylist to an allowlist: only a _SAFE_HEADERS set (such as host, user-agent, content-type, accept and mcp-session-id) is logged in full, and every other header value is replaced with ******. Check the Red Hat CVE page and Bugzilla entry 2480151 for a fixed Satellite build.

Until then, keep debug logging off, restrict who can read the container logs, and review log forwarding. Rotate tokens and API keys that may have been logged.

Search the server's logs and any central log store for authorization tokens, API keys and session identifiers. Debug-level header dumps are the likeliest place. Check the config for debug logging. Check who has read access to the container logs and to the platform where they are forwarded. If you find secrets, rotate them and review Foreman audit logs for use by unfamiliar sources.

A flaw was found in foreman-mcp-server. This component utilizes two distinct logging mechanisms that can expose sensitive session and authentication data. One mechanism logs session identifiers, which are treated as authentication credentials, at an informational level. The other, when debug logging is enabled, incompletely sanitizes HTTP request headers, leading to the cleartext logging of sensitive information such as authorization tokens and API keys. This vulnerability can result in a confidentiality breach, as sensitive authentication data is persisted in plain text within container logs, increasing the risk if logs are forwarded to a centralized platform.