CVE-2026-75912: CodeWhale: Argument Injection in `git_blame` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Read Without Approval
Maintainer resolution The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.
Published Sep 4, 2026
Affected packages
deepseek-tui
- Ecosystem
- Rust (crates.io)
- Affected
- >= 0.3.27, <= 0.8.41
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
cargo tree -i deepseek-tui
deepseek-tui
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 0.3.27, < 0.8.41
- Fixed in
- 0.8.41
- Check
npm ls deepseek-tui
codewhale-tui
- Ecosystem
- Rust (crates.io)
- Affected
- >= 0.8.41, < 0.8.64
- Fixed in
- 0.8.64
- Check
cargo tree -i codewhale-tui
codewhale
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 0.8.41, < 0.8.64
- Fixed in
- 0.8.64
- Check
npm ls codewhale
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Maintainer resolution
The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.
Argument Injection in git_blame Tool Allows Arbitrary File Read Without Approval
Overview
The git_blame tool in DeepSeek-TUI passes the model-supplied rev parameter unvalidated into the argv of git blame. git blame accepts --contents=<file>, which causes it to use the file's contents in place of the working tree and echo each line verbatim in the blame output. A rev value of --contents=/path/to/secret therefore exfiltrates the targeted file's contents into the tool result, which is returned to the model and displayed in the chat transcript.
The tool is registered with ApprovalRequirement::Auto and declares ToolCapability::ReadOnly. The read is in-scope for the capability label, but the *target* of the read is not the user expects git_blame to read files inside the workspace, not arbitrary paths on the host.
This is a sibling of the git_show argument-injection vulnerability filed separately, sharing the same root cause (missing --end-of-options sentinel and unvalidated rev).
Impact
Arbitrary file read at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI, via malicious repository content combined with prompt injection (the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311).
Reachable as the invoking user:
~/.ssh/id_rsa,~/.ssh/id_ed25519, and other private keys~/.aws/credentials,~/.config/gh/hosts.yml,~/.netrc.envfiles anywhere in the filesystem- Any project file outside the workspace the tool would normally restrict to
The leaked contents land in the model's context. The same model that obeyed the prompt-injection in step one can be instructed to forward the leak via fetch_url (network-policy permitting), summarize it in chat, or write it into a tool output the attacker can later retrieve.
Technical Details
Root Cause
crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs:
// L314-316
fn approval_requirement(&self) -> ApprovalRequirement {
ApprovalRequirement::Auto
}
// L322-358 (excerpt)
async fn execute(&self, input: Value, context: &ToolContext) -> Result<ToolResult, ToolError> {
let path_str = required_str(&input, "path")?;
let resolved_path = context.resolve_path(path_str)?; // path is bounded to workspace
...
let rev = optional_str(&input, "rev").unwrap_or("HEAD"); // rev is NOT bounded
...
let mut args = vec![
"blame".to_string(),
"--date=iso".to_string(),
format!("-L{start_line},{end_line}"),
];
if porcelain { args.push("--line-porcelain".to_string()); }
args.push(rev.to_string()); // unvalidated, no sentinel
args.push("--".to_string());
args.push(pathspec.display().to_string());
...
}path correctly flows through context.resolve_path, which enforces workspace containment (spec.rs:342). rev does not and the -- separator after rev only ends pathspec parsing, it does not stop option parsing of rev itself.
The JSON schema for rev (L283-285) is {"type": "string"} with no constraints.
Why --contents Works
git blame --contents=<file> -- <pathspec> blames the working tree path *as if its contents were the supplied file*. Each line of the supplied file appears verbatim in the porcelain or human-readable output, prefixed with the attribution marker 00000000 (External file (--contents) <date> N). The full line content is preserved.
Two secondary primitives in the same parser also leak data, with smaller yield:
--ignore-revs-file=<file>: surfaces parse errors that disclose partial content when the file is not a valid revs list.-S <file>,--reverse <rev1>..<rev2>: not directly exploitable for read but expand the option surface that argv injection can reach.
Proof of Concept
Argv assembled by the tool with input {"path": "a.txt", "rev": "--contents=/home/a/.ssh/id_rsa"}:
git blame --date=iso -L1,200 --contents=/home/a/.ssh/id_rsa -- a.txtReproduced against system git as a non-root user:
$ id
uid=1001(a) gid=1001(a) groups=1001(a)
$ echo "PRIVATEKEYDATA" > /home/a/.ssh/id_rsa
$ chmod 600 /home/a/.ssh/id_rsa
$ git blame --date=iso -L1,5 "--contents=/home/a/.ssh/id_rsa" -- a.txt
00000000 (External file (--contents) 2026-05-19 07:05:51 -0400 1) PRIVATEKEYDATAA non-readable target (/etc/shadow, owned by root with mode 0640) returns Permission denied, confirming the read is bounded by uid as expected; this is not a privilege boundary bypass, it is the desktop user's own filesystem view being exposed past the workspace boundary the tool's path argument otherwise enforces.
End-to-end exploitation is identical to the git_show companion: malicious repo → AGENTS.md injection → model calls git_blame with the crafted rev → auto-approval → leaked content returned in tool output and consumed by the model.
Remediation
Same shape as the git_show fix:
args.push("--end-of-options".to_string());
args.push(rev.to_string());
args.push("--".to_string());
args.push(pathspec.display().to_string());Plus a leading-hyphen rejection on rev. A regression test should pin both rev = "--contents=/etc/passwd" and rev = "--ignore-revs-file=/etc/passwd" as rejected inputs.
Credited to 0xEr3n.
References
- https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/security/advisories/GHSA-c6mw-8xh8-gpq6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75912
- https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/commit/9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/codewhale-before-argument-injection-via-git-blame
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c6mw-8xh8-gpq6
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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