CVE-2026-75837: Grav: Missing admin.super guard on core group blueprint access field allows admin.users operator to escalate to super-admin
Summary The core Flex group blueprint system/blueprints/user/group.yaml (access field, lines 48-55) omits the security@: admin.super field guard that its sibling account blueprint carries (account.yaml:131/138/150, added by the CVE-2026-42613 fix).
Published Sep 17, 2026
Affected packages
getgrav/grav
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 2.0.14
- Fixed in
- 2.0.14
- Check
composer show getgrav/grav
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The core Flex group blueprint system/blueprints/user/group.yaml (access field, lines 48-55) omits the security@: admin.super field guard that its sibling account blueprint carries (account.yaml:131/138/150, added by the CVE-2026-42613 fix). A delegated non-super operator holding admin.users.update can therefore save a group whose access map contains admin.super: true, which UserGroupObject::authorize then grants to every member of that group, a full privilege escalation to super-admin (scheduler/cron RCE, Twig eval). This is a distinct file, sink, and fix from all four related advisories.
Root Cause
The CVE-2026-42613 fix protected the account access/groups fields with a blueprint-level security@: admin.super gate, which Blueprint::dynamicSecurity() (system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:644-662) uses to mark a field validate.ignore=true for non-super users so BlueprintSchema::filterArray() (BlueprintSchema.php:263-311) drops it. The functionally-identical group access field, a permission map granted to every member of the group, is declared in system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55 with check_authorize: false and NO security@ guard. check_authorize has ZERO PHP enforcement (grep -rn check_authorize across the repo returns 0 PHP consumers; only two YAML blueprints reference it), so security@ is the sole real control. Because the group access field lacks security@, dynamicSecurity never flags it, filterArray retains it, and Validation::filterArray (type: array, value_type: bool) passes the nested admin.super:true leaf through. The core save path (FlexObject::update() then Framework/Flex/FlexObject.php:683 $blueprint->filter($data,true,true) then save()) persists it to user://config/groups.yaml.
Impact
A delegated admin.users operator (strictly below admin.super) escalates to super-admin, gaining the admin panel, the scheduler (cron to RCE) and Twig evaluation. Full read/write/DoS (C:H/I:H/A:H). Even absent self-escalation, arbitrary rewrite of ANY group's ACL is itself a full escalation primitive.
Proof of Concept
As a non-super admin.users operator who is a member of group ops:
POST /admin/accounts/groups/ops (or groups.json task:save)
data[access][admin][super]=1user/config/groups.yaml gains ops: { access: { admin: { super: true } } }, so the operator is super-admin on the next request.
Attack Chain
- Entry: authenticated delegated admin (
admin.users.update, noadmin.super) POSTs the group-edit form for a group they belong to (or a new group), bodyaccess[admin][super]=true. Guard:FlexAuthorizeTrait::isAuthorizedActiontoadmin.users.update. Bypass proof:user-groups.yamlexposes groups atadmin.users:crudl; operator legitimately holds update. - Check (field guard):
Blueprint::dynamicSecuritymarksvalidate.ignoreonly forsecurity@fields. Guard: none on group access (nosecurity@). Bypass proof:group.yaml:48-55has nosecurity@;git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yamlis empty. - Filter:
BlueprintSchema::filterArrayretains the non-ignored field;Validation::filterArray(value_type: bool) passesadmin.super:truethrough. Bypass proof: field not flagged ignore/disabled; nested bool leaf preserved. - Sink (persist):
FlexObject::updatethenfilterthensavewrites touser://config/groups.yaml. Guard: none. Bypass proof: value already survived steps 2/3; storage performs no ACL filtering. - Impact: any member request triggers
UserGroupObject::authorize('admin.super')(.../UserGroups/UserGroupObject.php:75) returning true, so the member is super-admin, enabling scheduler/Twig RCE.
Bypass Evidence
system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55: access block withcheck_authorize: false, nosecurity@(confirmed live on tag 2.0.12).git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yamlis empty (guard never existed; a permanent gap, not a regression).git log 2.0.12..HEAD -- system/blueprints/user/group.yamlis empty (no post-release fix).grep -rn check_authorize(whole repo) returns 0 PHP hits (guard unenforced in PHP).grep -rn "typePermissions|filterPermissions" system/src/Grav/Common/Datareturns 0 (permissions map falls through to array-bool filtering that keeps nested keys).- Guard asymmetry:
account.yaml:131/138/150carrysecurity@: admin.super;group.yamlcarries none. GHSA-h33v-82r9-v8pm's own text confirms the blueprintsecurity@gate is the sole Flex-backend strip for these keys.
Affected Versions
<= 2.0.12 (latest release; the guard never existed on group.yaml, so all 2.x are affected). The missing guard and the strip logic are both in core getgrav/grav; the group-edit UI is provided by the flex-objects/admin plugin, but the fix belongs in core.
Suggested Fix
Add security@: admin.super to the access field in system/blueprints/user/group.yaml (mirroring account.yaml), and/or enforce a super-only strip on group ACL saves in core so all callers are covered.
--- Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
Credited to manus-use.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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