CVE-2026-74907: Grav: Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in `plugin-asset-map.php` Static Asset Server (`index.php`)
Verified against: getgrav/grav devel branch, GRAVVERSION = "2.0.15", file index.php Title Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in plugin-asset-map.php Static Asset Server (index.php) Product / Affected Versions - Product: getgrav/grav - File: index.php (top-level front controller, runs before Grav itself boots) - Confirmed present in: devel branch, 2.0.15 - Precondition: requires…
Published Sep 17, 2026
Affected packages
getgrav/grav
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 2.0.14
- Fixed in
- 2.0.15
- Check
composer show getgrav/grav
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Verified against: getgrav/grav devel branch, GRAV_VERSION = "2.0.15", file `index.php
Title
Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in plugin-asset-map.php Static Asset Server (index.php)
Product / Affected Versions
- Product:
getgrav/grav - File:
index.php(top-level front controller, runs before Grav itself boots) - Confirmed present in: devel branch, 2.0.15
- Precondition: requires
user/config/plugin-asset-map.phpto exist and contain at least one route-prefix mapping ,this is an opt-in mechanism (per the code comment: "Fast static asset serving for plugins that bundle SPA apps"). No core mechanism generates this file automatically; it's created by a plugin that opts into this fast-path. Not reachable on a stock Grav install with no such plugin. Where reachable, it requires zero authentication.
CWE
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') , specific mechanism: a path-prefix containment check performed with plain string comparison (str_starts_with) instead of a directory-boundary-aware comparison, allowing escape into any sibling path whose name happens to extend the base directory's name as a string.
Description
index.php implements a fast-path static file server that runs *before* Grav's own routing/security stack, gated on the presence of an asset-map file:
$assetMapFile = __DIR__ . '/user/config/plugin-asset-map.php';
if (is_file($assetMapFile)) {
$assetMap = require $assetMapFile;
foreach ($assetMap as $routePrefix => $diskPath) {
if (str_starts_with($path, $routePrefix)) {
$relPath = substr($path, strlen($routePrefix));
$filePath = __DIR__ . '/' . ltrim($diskPath, '/') . $relPath;
$realFile = realpath($filePath);
$realBase = realpath(__DIR__ . '/' . ltrim($diskPath, '/'));
if ($realFile && $realBase && str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase) && is_file($realFile)) {
// ... serves $realFile directly, with Content-Type inferred from extension
readfile($realFile);
exit;
}
}
}
}realpath() correctly resolves .. sequences, so a naive ../../etc/passwd-style traversal that leaves the filesystem entirely is blocked (it wouldn't share the $realBase string prefix). But the containment check itself, `str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase)`, has no directory-boundary awareness it's a plain string-prefix test, not "is $realFile inside the $realBase directory." Any resolved path whose string representation merely *begins with* the same characters as $realBase passes, including sibling directories that extend the base directory's name (assets → assets-secret, assets.bak, assets_old, assets2, etc.) a very common real-world directory-naming pattern (backup dirs, versioned dirs, disabled/legacy dirs sitting alongside the active one).
Live Proof of Concept
Setup: the exact code block above, extracted verbatim from index.php, executed with PHP 8.3.6 against a realistic directory layout (a plugin's active assets/ dir sitting next to an unrelated assets-secret/ dir containing a fake secret):
user/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js <- intended, public
user/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php <- NOT intended to be served
user/config/plugin-asset-map.php:
return ['/myplugin-assets' => 'user/plugins/myplugin/assets'];Legitimate request (/myplugin-assets/app.js):
realFile: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js'
realBase: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets'
>>> WOULD SERVE FILE <<<
>>> Content: public asset contentTraversal request (/myplugin-assets/../assets-secret/config.php):
realFile: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php'
realBase: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets'
>>> WOULD SERVE FILE <<<
>>> Content: SECRET_API_KEY=sk_live_totally_secret_12345str_starts_with('.../assets-secret/config.php', '.../assets') evaluates true because assets-secret literally begins with the characters assets there is no separator-boundary check (e.g. requiring $realBase . '/' as the actual prefix) to prevent this.
Trust-boundary framing (per Grav's own SECURITY.md)
This code path requires no Grav account , it runs before Grav even initializes, directly off the raw request path. Per Grav's own stated criteria: *"An unauthenticated attacker can achieve RCE, exfiltrate site data, or gain admin-equivalent control. No Grav account required"* → this matches the CRITICAL bar exactly, for any deployment where the plugin-asset-map.php mechanism is in active use.
Suggested Fix
Append a trailing directory separator before the prefix comparison, or use a proper containment check:
if ($realFile && $realBase && (
$realFile === $realBase ||
str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)
) && is_file($realFile)) {This is the standard fix for this exact bug class , ensuring the matched prefix ends exactly at a directory boundary, not partway through a longer sibling name.
Credited to alham-rizvi.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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