CVE-2026-73088: Browserslist: Uncaught crash / prototype write via untrusted browserslist-stats.json custom stats (normalizeStats)
Vulnerability Details File: node.js Function: normalizeStats() (line ~214), reached from getStat() (called unconditionally on every browserslist() call) and loadStat() Root Cause stats is untrusted: it comes from JSON.parse()-ing a browserslist-stats.json file — auto-discovered by walking up the directory tree from the project root on every browserslist() call, regardless of the query (env.getStat(opts,…
Published Sep 1, 2026
Affected packages
browserslist
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 4.28.6
- Fixed in
- 4.28.7
- Check
npm ls browserslist
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Vulnerability Details
File: node.js Function: normalizeStats() (line ~214), reached from getStat() (called unconditionally on every browserslist() call) and loadStat()
Root Cause
function normalizeStats(data, stats) {
if (!data) { data = {} }
if (stats && 'dataByBrowser' in stats) { stats = stats.dataByBrowser }
if (typeof stats !== 'object') return undefined
var normalized = {}
for (var i in stats) {
var versions = Object.keys(stats[i])
if (versions.length === 1 && data[i] && data[i].versions.length === 1) {
var normal = data[i].versions[0]
normalized[i] = {}
normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]]
} else {
normalized[i] = stats[i]
}
}
return normalized
}stats is untrusted: it comes from JSON.parse()-ing a browserslist-stats.json file — auto-discovered by walking up the directory tree from the project root on every `browserslist()` call, regardless of the query (env.getStat(opts, browserslist.data) runs unconditionally inside browserslist()) — or from opts.stats passed programmatically / via the CLI's --stats= flag. data is browserslist.data, a plain object populated only with real browser names.
Two independent bugs from the same root cause (unguarded for...in over untrusted keys used with plain-object bracket access/assignment):
- Crash:
data[i]has nohasOwnPropertyguard. Ifstatscontains a key that also happens to be an inheritedObject.prototypemember name —"__proto__","toString","valueOf","constructor","hasOwnProperty","isPrototypeOf", etc. —data[i]resolves to that inherited function/object (always truthy), and the code then doesdata[i].versions.length→undefined.length→ uncaught `TypeError`, for any such key whose JSON value has exactly one sub-key, e.g.: ``json { "toString": { "onekey": 5 }, "chrome": { "100": 50 } }`` - Prototype write:
normalized[i] = ...on the freshnormalized = {}— ifiis exactly"__proto__"(andnormalizedhas no own property by that name yet), this computed assignment invokes the realObject.prototype.__proto__setter, changingnormalized's actual[[Prototype]]instead of creating a plain property.
Because this runs on every browserslist() call regardless of the query, simply committing a poisoned browserslist-stats.json anywhere in a project's directory tree breaks every subsequent Browserslist call in that project — including calls made by Autoprefixer, Babel preset-env, Stylelint, or PostCSS internally, for completely unrelated queries.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker submits a PR (or a compromised dependency) adding a
browserslist-stats.jsonfile anywhere between the project root and filesystem root, containing e.g.{"toString": {"onekey": 5}, "chrome": {"100": 50}}. - The victim's build/CI pipeline runs any tool that calls
browserslist()internally, for any query. - The auto-discovered poisoned file crashes the process with an uncaught
TypeErroron the very first call.
Measured Impact
Confirmed crash (real browserslist() call, v4.28.6) with stats keys: __proto__, toString, valueOf, hasOwnProperty, constructor, isPrototypeOf — each paired with a one-key JSON object — for any query, including browserslist('defaults') which never mentions stats.
Recommended Fix (implemented and verified)
var normalized = Object.create(null)
for (var i in stats) {
var versions = Object.keys(stats[i])
var known = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, i) && data[i]
if (versions.length === 1 && known && known.versions.length === 1) {
var normal = known.versions[0]
normalized[i] = Object.create(null)
normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]]
} else {
normalized[i] = stats[i]
}
}
return normalizednormalized uses Object.create(null) so a write to "__proto__" is an ordinary property set, never a [[Prototype]] change; data[i] is replaced with an explicit hasOwnProperty check so it never resolves to an inherited Object.prototype member.
Verification:
NODE_ENV=test npx uvu test .test.js→ 301/301 pass unmodified (test/custom.test.js,test/shareable-stats.test.js,test/cover.test.jsexercise the stats-handling paths).- All 6 previously crash-inducing keys, tested individually, now resolve without error.
- The realistic file-based auto-discovery scenario (poisoned
browserslist-stats.json+ an unrelatedbrowserslist('defaults')call) now returns a normal result instead of crashing.
Impact
- Who is affected: Any project whose build/CI invokes Browserslist (directly or via Autoprefixer/Babel/Stylelint/PostCSS) in a directory tree an attacker can place a file into (external PR, compromised dependency), or any app that passes user-influenced data into
opts.stats. - What an attacker achieves: Immediate DoS — crashes the invoking process on the first Browserslist call after the file is present, for any query, no special syntax needed.
- Conditions required: No authentication — only the ability to add a file to the project's directory tree, or influence
opts.stats.
Verification Environment
browserslist @ HEAD (== v4.28.6, current latest stable release) under local Node.js v20.19.5. Pure JS library — executed directly, no server needed.
Note
Found via a systematic review of prototype-pollution-adjacent patterns in this codebase after confirming two unrelated algorithmic-complexity issues (reported separately as GHSA-rrmg-cfrq-23vv and GHSA-g6p8-hj8g-x889) in the same research pass. A similar for...in + bracket-write pattern in index.js's copyObject() (used by normalizeAndroidData) was already guarded against __proto__/constructor/prototype keys by a prior, unrelated commit — that guard was never applied to this function.
Credited to iaohkut-from-NightWolf-Team.
References
- https://github.com/browserslist/browserslist/security/advisories/GHSA-73wf-gq98-2v4g
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73088
- https://github.com/browserslist/browserslist/commit/f9914ad9effc865ccc27d816255625890b31ca51
- https://github.com/browserslist/browserslist/releases/tag/4.28.7
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-73wf-gq98-2v4g
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
