CVE-2026-65899: DOMPurify: Trusted Types policy survives `clearConfig()` and can poison later `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output
Impact A DOMPurify instance that is reused across trust boundaries can stay bound to a previously supplied TRUSTEDTYPESPOLICY even after clearConfig() is called. A later caller that requests RETURNTRUSTEDTYPE receives a TrustedHTML object created by the old policy, not by a clean default configuration.
Published Jun 15, 2026 · Updated Jul 23, 2026
Affected packages
dompurify
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 3.4.9
- Fixed in
- 3.4.9
- Check
npm ls dompurify
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
A DOMPurify instance that is reused across trust boundaries can stay bound to a previously supplied TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY even after clearConfig() is called. A later caller that requests RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE receives a TrustedHTML object created by the old policy, not by a clean default configuration.
If the old policy is unsafe or controlled by a less-trusted integration, this turns a later "default" sanitize call into script execution at a Trusted Types sink. TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null on the later call also does not clear the retained policy. dompurify-trusted-types-policy-survives-clearconfig-poc.js
Affected version
Tested against DOMPurify 3.4.8, repository commit 825e617753ac1169306a542d3174a77f717a0cf6.
Root cause
_parseConfig() overwrites trustedTypesPolicy when cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY is truthy, but the default/null path only initializes the internal policy when trustedTypesPolicy === undefined. Once a custom policy has been set, later default config parsing leaves it in place.
Relevant code:
src/purify.ts:786-812accepts and storescfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.src/purify.ts:813-832does not reset an existing policy when config has no policy or hasTRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null.src/purify.ts:2123-2125signs the final serialized HTML with the retained policy whenRETURN_TRUSTED_TYPEis true.src/purify.ts:2133-2136clearConfig()only clearsCONFIGandSET_CONFIG; it does not resettrustedTypesPolicyoremptyHTML.
Local PoC
Run from the DOMPurify checkout, or set DOMPURIFY_REPO:
node /home/dompurify-trusted-types-policy-survives-clearconfig-poc.jsObserved output:
{
"result": {
"baseline": "baseline",
"duringPolicy": "",
"afterClearString": "",
"afterClearTrustedType": "[object TrustedHTML]",
"afterClearTrusted": "",
"afterNullTrusted": "",
"mountedHTML": ""
},
"dialogs": [
"TT_POLICY_SURVIVED_CLEARCONFIG"
]
}The important part is the split behavior after cleanup:
purify.clearConfig(); purify.sanitize(...);returns a normal sanitized string (``), because the later call is not asking for a Trusted Type.purify.clearConfig(); purify.sanitize(..., { RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE: true });still uses the old policy and returns attacker-controlledTrustedHTML.- Passing
{ TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null, RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE: true }also still returns attacker-controlledTrustedHTML.
Preconditions
This is a shared-instance state contamination issue. It matters when one DOMPurify instance is reused by multiple integrations, plugins, request handlers, or components with different trust levels, and a cleanup step relies on clearConfig() to restore safe defaults.
This is not a default string-input bypass. An attacker must be able to influence a prior TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY on the reused instance, or a less-trusted integration must have installed an unsafe policy.
Severity
impact is XSS at a Trusted Types sink in applications that reuse a DOMPurify instance across trust boundaries. Attack complexity is high because exploitation depends on prior policy injection or a less-trusted integration and a later RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE sink.
Suggested fix
Make clearConfig() reset Trusted Types state as part of restoring defaults, or have _parseConfig() explicitly clear trustedTypesPolicy and emptyHTML when TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null is supplied.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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