CVE-2026-63386: js-toml allows uncontrolled recursion in `load()` leading `RangeError` (stack exhaustion) on deeply nested input
Summary load() parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a recursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a maximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting (arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack limit, and load() throws an uncaught RangeError: Maximum call stack size…
Published Nov 20, 2026
Affected packages
js-toml
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 1.1.3
- Fixed in
- 1.1.3
- Check
npm ls js-toml
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
load() parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a recursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a maximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting (arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack limit, and load() throws an uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`.
This is a problem for two reasons:
- Denial of Service. A tiny payload (≈2 KB) reliably aborts parsing. In any service that parses user-supplied TOML, an unhandled
RangeErrorcan crash the worker/process (500 / restart loop). - Error-contract violation. The library signals invalid input via
SyntaxParseError(seesrc/load/exception.ts; the entire test suite assertsSyntaxParseError). Consumers that follow this contract —
try { load(input); }
catch (e) {
if (e instanceof SyntaxParseError) return badRequest();
throw e; // unexpected -> propagates
}— will re-throw the RangeError instead of treating the input as malformed, turning malformed input into an unexpected fatal error.
Impact
- Unauthenticated attacker who can supply a TOML string to an application using
js-tomlcan forceload()to throw a non-SyntaxParseErrorerror. - If the error is not caught by a generic handler, the Node.js process terminates (availability impact).
- Even when caught generically, the documented/expected error type contract is broken, which can bypass input-validation branches that key off
SyntaxParseError.
No confidentiality or integrity impact. The error is thrown synchronously and is catchable, so a consumer that catches *all* exceptions is not crashed — this is why the severity is assessed Low–Medium rather than High.
Affected code / root cause
There is no depth bound anywhere in the parse pipeline. Recursion occurs in (at least) two independent places:
- Parser (recursive descent).
src/load/parser.ts—array/inlineTablerules recurse throughvaluefor each nesting level. - Interpreter (tree walk).
src/load/interpreter.ts—assignValue,createTable,getOrCreateArrayrecurse per dotted-key segment, andcleanInternalPropertiesrecurses per object depth.
Because there is no configurable or hard limit, the recursion depth is bounded only by the V8 stack, and overflow surfaces as a raw RangeError.
Steps to reproduce (PoC)
Environment used: Node.js v20, [email protected].
import { load, SyntaxParseError } from 'js-toml';
function probe(label, toml) {
try {
load(toml);
console.log(`[OK] ${label}`);
} catch (e) {
const expected = e instanceof SyntaxParseError;
console.log(`[${e.constructor.name}${expected ? '' : ' (UNEXPECTED)'}] ${label}: ${String(e.message).split('\n')[0]}`);
}
}
// 1) Deeply nested arrays (~2 KB payload)
probe('nested array depth 1000', 'x = ' + '['.repeat(1000) + ']'.repeat(1000));
// 2) Deeply nested inline tables
let v = '1';
for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) v = `{ a = ${v} }`;
probe('nested inline table depth 1000', 'x = ' + v);
// 3) Deep dotted key (interpreter recursion)
const key = Array.from({ length: 5000 }, (_, i) => 'a' + i).join('.');
probe('dotted key depth 5000', `${key} = 1`);Observed output
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested array depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested inline table depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] dotted key depth 5000: Maximum call stack size exceededEach case throws RangeError, not SyntaxParseError. Overflow occurs in single-digit milliseconds, so it is not a CPU-exhaustion issue — it is an immediate, deterministic abort.
Notes on thresholds (machine-dependent; exact numbers vary by stack size):
- Nested arrays / inline tables overflow at roughly depth ~1000 (parser recursion).
- Dotted keys overflow at roughly depth ~5000 (interpreter recursion); depth 1000 still succeeds.
Suggested remediation
Enforce an explicit, documented maximum nesting/key depth and surface violations as SyntaxParseError (consistent with all other invalid-input handling). For example:
- Track current depth in the parser/interpreter and throw
SyntaxParseError(e.g."Maximum nesting depth exceeded") once a configurable limit (e.g. 100–1000) is reached, before the native stack overflows. - As a defensive backstop, wrap the top-level
load()body so that a thrownRangeErrorfrom stack exhaustion is converted into aSyntaxParseError, guaranteeing the documented error contract holds for all malformed input.
A configurable limit (with a safe default) is preferable so legitimate deep documents can opt into a higher bound.
Disclosure
Reported privately via GitHub Security Advisory. Happy to provide additional reproducers or test against a candidate patch.
Credited to kaimandalic.
References
- https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/security/advisories/GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63386
- https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/commit/4e10acf1f99ff3cb443c58b8f0a57664e41e87c6
- https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/releases/tag/v1.1.3
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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