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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-63002: REDAXO: Stored XSS in Mediapool Sync Page via Unescaped Filesystem Filenames

mediumCVSS 3.1 4.8GHSA-w998-qmw9-mf4m

Summary The mediapool sync page (sync.php) renders filenames from the /media filesystem directory directly into HTML without applying rexescape() (i.e., htmlspecialchars). Any file placed in the media directory whose filename contains HTML metacharacters will execute JavaScript in the browser of any backend user who views the sync page.

Published Sep 23, 2026

Affected packages

redaxo/source

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
<= 5.21.1
Fixed in
5.21.2
Check
composer show redaxo/source

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The mediapool sync page (sync.php) renders filenames from the /media filesystem directory directly into HTML without applying rex_escape() (i.e., htmlspecialchars). Any file placed in the media directory whose filename contains HTML metacharacters will execute JavaScript in the browser of any backend user who views the sync page.

Details

In redaxo/src/addons/mediapool/pages/sync.php, the variable $diffFiles is populated from actual filesystem filenames (files in /media/ not yet registered in the database). These filenames are then rendered without escaping:

File: redaxo/src/addons/mediapool/pages/sync.php:119-120

foreach ($diffFiles as $file) {
    if (is_writable(rex_path::media($file))) {
        $e = [];
        $e['label'] = '<label>' . $file . '</label>';          // NO rex_escape!
        $e['field'] = '<input type="checkbox" name="sync_files[]" value="' . $file . '" />'; // NO rex_escape!
        $writable[] = $e;
    } else {
        $notWritable[] = $file;
    }
}

File: redaxo/src/addons/mediapool/pages/sync.php:170

$fragment->setVar('body', '<ul><li>' . implode('</li><li>', $notWritable) . '</li></ul>', false);
// $notWritable contains unescaped filenames

By contrast, all other filename displays in the codebase use rex_escape($fname) (e.g., media.detail.php:236, media.list.php). The sync page is accessible to any backend user with the media[sync] permission (not exclusively admins).

PoC

  1. Place a file named .txt into the REDAXO /media/ directory (via backup restore or server access) without adding it to the media database.
  2. Log in as any backend user with media[sync] permission.
  3. Navigate to Mediapool → Sync.
  4. The XSS payload executes immediately, stealing the admin session cookie.

Impact

Stored XSS in the admin panel. An attacker who can place files in the media directory (via admin-level backup restore or server access) can achieve persistent XSS against all users who visit the sync page, including higher-privileged admins. This enables session hijacking, credential theft, and full CMS takeover.

Fix

Apply rex_escape() to all filename variables before inserting into HTML:

$e['label'] = '<label>' . rex_escape($file) . '</label>';
$e['field'] = '<input type="checkbox" name="sync_files[]" value="' . rex_escape($file) . '" />';
// ...
$fragment->setVar('body', '<ul><li>' . implode('</li><li>', array_map('rex_escape', $notWritable)) . '</li></ul>', false);

Credited to de3erve-hunter.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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