CVE-2026-58272: Sync-in Server has Username/Login Enumeration via Timing Side-Channel on POST /api/auth/login (incomplete fix of the prior timing-attack advisory)
Summary validateUser() in backend/src/authentication/providers/mysql/auth-provider-mysql.service.ts returns immediately when the supplied login/email does not match any account, without ever calling comparePassword(): async validateUser(loginOrEmail: string, password: string, ip?: string, scope?: AUTHSCOPE): Promise { let user: UserModel try { user = await this.usersManager.findUser(loginOrEmail, false) } catch (e)…
Published Sep 22, 2026
Affected packages
@sync-in/server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 2.4.0
- Fixed in
- 2.4.1
- Check
npm ls @sync-in/server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
validateUser() in backend/src/authentication/providers/mysql/auth-provider-mysql.service.ts returns immediately when the supplied login/email does not match any account, without ever calling comparePassword():
async validateUser(loginOrEmail: string, password: string, ip?: string, scope?: AUTH_SCOPE): Promise { let user: UserModel try { user = await this.usersManager.findUser(loginOrEmail, false) } catch (e) { ... } if (!user) { this.logger.warn(...) return null // <-- comparePassword() is never reached here } return await this.usersManager.logUser(user, password, ip, scope) }
comparePassword() (backend/src/common/functions.ts) already contains a dummy-hash branch that was clearly added to defend against exactly this class of attack:
export async function comparePassword(password: string, hash?: string | null): Promise { if (!hash) { // No hash, waste time for time-based attacks await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH) return false } return await bcrypt.compare(password, hash) }
The problem is that this protection only runs when comparePassword() is actually invoked with a falsy hash. Because validateUser() short-circuits with return null as soon as findUser() comes back empty, the "account doesn't exist" path skips all cryptographic work entirely, while the "account exists, wrong password" path always performs a real bcrypt comparison (cost factor 10, ~100ms+). The two outcomes are trivially distinguishable by response time.
There's already a published advisory in this repo for "Username Enumeration via Timing Attack" - this looks like the same underlying issue surfacing through a different call path (the early return in validateUser()) that the existing fix (the dummy-hash branch in comparePassword()) doesn't actually reach, rather than a brand new vulnerability class.
Impact
Any unauthenticated client can determine whether a given username/email is a valid account on the instance by timing POST /api/auth/login:
- Non-existent login: near-instant rejection (no bcrypt call).
- Existing login (regardless of password correctness): consistently slower due to a real bcrypt comparison.
This enables efficient enumeration of valid accounts, which can then be used to focus credential-stuffing, password-spraying, or phishing against confirmed-valid targets.
Proof of Concept
Verified with the actual comparePassword() logic and the real DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH constant copied verbatim from backend/src/common/functions.ts, using the project's own bcryptjs dependency (no mocking of bcrypt itself):
Avg time for "login does not exist" path (validateUser returns null, no bcrypt call): 0.00 ms Avg time for "login exists, wrong password" path (real bcrypt.compare runs): 114.90 ms Difference: 114.90 ms (ratio: ~58923x)
The "not found" path reproduces validateUser()'s exact early return (no call into comparePassword); the "wrong password" path reproduces logUser()'s real call into comparePassword(password, user.password). The gap is large enough to be trivially observable over a real network, even accounting for jitter.
Reachable endpoint: POST /api/auth/login, guarded only by AuthLocalGuard (Passport local strategy invoking validateUser()), no authentication required.
Suggested fix
Make validateUser() always pass through comparePassword()'s timing-equalized path, even when no user is found, e.g.:
if (!user) { await comparePassword(password, null) // burns the same time as a real comparison return null }
so the "account not found" and "account found, wrong password" branches take statistically indistinguishable time.
Credited to 456789TZ, johaven.
References
- https://github.com/Sync-in/server/security/advisories/GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58272
- https://github.com/Sync-in/server/commit/b80efe04574039a7a302c0e1007f03a7dbe6a633
- https://github.com/Sync-in/server/releases/tag/v2.4.1
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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