CVE-2026-55500: 9routers has Exposure of Sensitive Information and Unprotected Database Import/Export, Allowing Complete Credential Theft and Database Takeover

Summary

The /api/settings/database endpoint allows full database export (containing all credentials, API keys, OAuth tokens, and settings) and full database import (complete overwrite) without any authentication requirement beyond the ALWAYS_PROTECTED middleware check, which only validates JWT or CLI token. Combined with other vulnerabilities (e.g., default password, tunnel exposure), this enables complete database takeover.

Description

The endpoint /api/settings/database is listed in ALWAYS_PROTECTED in dashboardGuard.js (line 42), which requires a valid JWT token or CLI token. However, this protection is insufficient because:

1. GET (Export): Returns the complete database including API keys (key field in apiKeys table), OAuth tokens, and all provider credentials. Line 80 in src/lib/db/index.js: apiKeys: db.all("SELECT * FROM apiKeys").map(...) — the key field contains the plaintext API key value.

1. POST (Import): Accepts arbitrary JSON and performs a complete database wipe-and-replace in a transaction (lines 102-163 in src/lib/db/index.js). This replaces all settings including the password hash, effectively allowing an attacker to set their own password.

1. The exported data includes apiKeys with their plaintext key values, providerConnections with all OAuth tokens, and settings with OIDC client secrets.

Evidence

File: src/app/api/settings/database/route.js

export async function GET() {
  const payload = await exportDb();
  return NextResponse.json(payload);
}

export async function POST(request) {
  const payload = await request.json();
  await importDb(payload);
  // ...
}

File: src/lib/db/index.js (lines 96-163)

export async function importDb(payload) {
  db.transaction(() => {
    // Wipe all tables
    db.run(`DELETE FROM settings`);
    db.run(`DELETE FROM providerConnections`);
    db.run(`DELETE FROM providerNodes`);
    db.run(`DELETE FROM proxyPools`);
    db.run(`DELETE FROM apiKeys`);
    db.run(`DELETE FROM combos`);
    db.run(`DELETE FROM kv WHERE scope IN (...)`);
    // Then insert attacker-controlled data
    // ...
  });
}

The exportDb function at line 80 exposes API key plaintext:

apiKeys: db.all(`SELECT * FROM apiKeys`).map((r) => ({ 
  id: r.id, key: r.key, name: r.name, ...
})),

Steps to Reproduce

1. Authenticate with any valid JWT (e.g., using the default password "123456")
2. Export: curl -b auth_token=<jwt> http://localhost:20128/api/settings/database
3. Observe: Full database dump with all credentials in plaintext
4. Import malicious data: curl -X POST -b auth_token=<jwt> -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '<modified-db>' http://localhost:20128/api/settings/database
5. All settings, passwords, API keys are now replaced with attacker-controlled values

Impact

• Confidentiality: Complete exposure of all stored secrets (API keys, OAuth tokens, OIDC client secrets)
• Integrity: Complete database replacement with attacker-controlled data
• Availability: Database wipe is possible by importing an empty database
• Scope Changed: Importing new settings affects all users and downstream services

Recommended Fix

1. Require re-authentication for database export/import (not just an existing session)
2. Mask/redact API keys in export (or require explicit opt-in for key export)
3. Add confirmation step for import (require current password verification)
4. Implement database backup before import
5. Log all export/import operations with audit trail