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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-55091: flat-to-nested: Prototype pollution in flat-to-nested convert() via __proto__ parent/id key

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-hp36-v28f-w3r4

Summary convert() builds the nested tree by using each flat record's id and parent field values directly as object keys, with no guard against proto / constructor / prototype. A record whose parent is the string "proto" makes temp[parent] resolve to Object.prototype, and the following initPush(...) writes attacker-controlled data onto the global prototype.

Published Jun 19, 2026

Affected packages

flat-to-nested

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 1.1.1
Fixed in
1.1.2
Check
npm ls flat-to-nested

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

convert() builds the nested tree by using each flat record's id and parent field values directly as object keys, with no guard against __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A record whose parent is the string "__proto__" makes temp[parent] resolve to Object.prototype, and the following initPush(...) writes attacker-controlled data onto the global prototype. Any application that passes attacker-influenced records to convert() is affected, and the base prototype methods stay intact so the pollution is stealthy.

Details

In index.js, convert() (FlatToNested.prototype.convert):

  • temp = {} (line 45) and pendingChildOf = {} (line 46) are plain objects, so they inherit from Object.prototype.
  • For each record, parent = flatEl[this.config.parent] (line 51) is taken verbatim from input.
  • Line 57: if (temp[parent] !== undefined) — when parent === "__proto__", temp["__proto__"] resolves via the prototype chain to Object.prototype, which is !== undefined, so the branch is taken.
  • Line 59: initPush(this.config.children, temp[parent], flatEl) → effectively initPush("children", Object.prototype, flatEl).
  • initPush (lines 4-9): Object.prototype["children"] = [] then Object.prototype["children"].push(flatEl) — attacker-controlled data is written onto the global `Object.prototype`.

There is no sanitization of id / parent anywhere; they flow straight into temp[id], temp[parent], and pendingChildOf[parent] as dynamic keys.

PoC

  const FlatToNested = require('flat-to-nested');

  new FlatToNested().convert([
    { id: 1, parent: '__proto__', polluted: 'PWNED' }
  ]);

  console.log(({}).children); // => [ { id: 1, polluted: 'PWNED' } ]
  A freshly-created, unrelated object {} now carries an attacker-controlled children property. ({}).toString === Object.prototype.toString remains true, so existing methods are untouched (stealthy). If the consumer configures a custom children key, that arbitrary prototype property is polluted instead.

Impact

Prototype pollution (CWE-1321). Any service that builds a tree from attacker-influenced flat records (the package's core purpose — e.g. records derived from a DB/REST/user input) can have Object.prototype polluted. Consequences range from application-logic corruption and denial of service to serving as a gadget toward privilege escalation or RCE depending on downstream sinks. No special privileges or user interaction required; the malicious value is ordinary input data.

Suggested fix

Use prototype-less lookup tables so inherited keys like __proto__ cannot be reached: var temp = Object.create(null); var pendingChildOf = Object.create(null); (Optionally also reject id/parent values equal to __proto__, constructor, or prototype.) Verified: with Object.create(null) for both temp and pendingChildOf, the PoC no longer pollutes Object.prototype and normal nesting output is unchanged. A patch with a regression test is ready.

Credited to moizxsec.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology