CVE-2026-54175: Laravel Backpack CRUD: Unverified password change in MyAccountController via mass assignment
Summary The MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm action bound to POST /admin/edit-account-info calls $this-guard()-user()-update($request-except(['token'])). Because the controller uses except(['token']) rather than $request-validated() or the restricted keys defined in AccountInfoRequest::validationData(), any column present in the user model's $fillable array is mass-assigned from the request, including…
Published Aug 20, 2026
Affected packages
backpack/crud
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 6.8.11
- Fixed in
- 6.8.11
- Check
composer show backpack/crud
backpack/crud
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 7.0.0-alpha.1, < 7.0.34
- Fixed in
- 7.0.34
- Check
composer show backpack/crud
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm action bound to POST /admin/edit-account-info calls $this->guard()->user()->update($request->except(['_token'])). Because the controller uses except(['_token']) rather than $request->validated() or the restricted keys defined in AccountInfoRequest::validationData(), any column present in the user model's `$fillable` array is mass-assigned from the request, including password. Backpack ships a separate POST /admin/change-password route (postChangePasswordForm) that requires old_password verification via ChangePasswordRequest::withValidator. The edit-account-info endpoint silently bypasses that security control.
For the default Laravel 11 App\Models\User model — which Backpack's installer and documentation use as the canonical admin user model — $fillable is ['name','email','password']. The password cast is hashed, so a plaintext password=… form field is automatically hashed and persisted. Any attacker holding an authenticated Backpack session (session theft, stolen cookies, XSS, public-terminal residual session) can permanently take over the account by issuing one POST that includes password=<attacker_value>, with no knowledge of the victim's current password. This converts time-limited, session-bound access into persistent account takeover.
Vulnerable code
src/app/Http/Controllers/MyAccountController.php:38
public function postAccountInfoForm(AccountInfoRequest $request)
{
$result = $this->guard()->user()->update($request->except(['_token']));
...
}src/app/Http/Requests/AccountInfoRequest.php validationData() only narrows what gets validated (name, email column) — it does NOT narrow what is later saved.
Impact
- Persistent account takeover after session theft. An adversary holding any authenticated Backpack session cookie (XSS, malware, stolen device, shared workstation) can rewrite the victim's password and retain access indefinitely, even after the original session expires or the victim logs out. Without this bypass the equivalent action requires
old_password, which the adversary does not have. - Email pivot for full takeover. The same handler permits unverified change of the authentication column (
emailby default). A hijacked session can change the email to one the attacker controls and then use Backpack's password-reset flow as a backup channel. - Mass-assignment of any other `$fillable` attribute. In real deployments where the admin user model carries fields such as
role_id,is_admin,team_id,email_verified_at,two_factor_secret, etc., the same request mass-assigns those fields. This expands the impact to privilege escalation and 2FA disablement on apps that follow standard Laravel patterns of adding such columns to$fillable.
Fix recommendation
Replace $request->except(['_token']) with an explicit allowlist that mirrors AccountInfoRequest::validationData():
public function postAccountInfoForm(AccountInfoRequest $request)
{
$data = $request->only([backpack_authentication_column(), 'name']);
$result = $this->guard()->user()->update($data);
...
}This preserves change-password as the sole path for password mutation (which already enforces old_password).
Coordinates
- Repository: https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD
- Vulnerable file & line:
src/app/Http/Controllers/MyAccountController.php:38(release 6.8.10; mastere7201c5) - Route:
POST /admin/edit-account-info(default admin prefix;setup_my_account_routes=true) - Verified against:
backpack/crud 6.8.10,laravel/framework 11.x, PHP 8.4.7
— therawdev (responsible disclosure)
Reported by AI Agent sechub.dev and Vishal Shukla (@shukla304)
Credited to therawdev, tabacitu.
References
- https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/security/advisories/GHSA-xpv2-hrfc-hw62
- https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/pull/5980
- https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/pull/5981
- https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/6.8.11
- https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/7.0.34
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xpv2-hrfc-hw62
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesCVE-2026-54176
Laravel Backpack CRUD: MyAccountController allows changing the login email without a current-password check
medium6.5Aug 20, 2026CVE-2026-54177
Laravel Backpack CRUD: HasUploadFields keeps the attacker-supplied file extension — public-disk uploads of `shell.php` reach the webserver
medium6.6Aug 20, 2026CVE-2026-54178
Laravel Backpack CRUD: Arbitrary file deletion via attacker-controlled clear_<attr>[] in HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk
high8.1No fixAug 20, 2026CVE-2026-54179
Laravel Backpack CRUD: SingleBase64Image accepts any base64 payload behind a `data:image` prefix — SVG-with-script lands on the public disk
medium4.4Aug 20, 2026CVE-2026-54180
Laravel Backpack CRUD: CRUD panel query scopes are not enforced on Update, Delete, and Reorder (cross-tenant IDOR)
high7.6Aug 20, 2026CVE-2026-54181
Laravel Backpack CRUD: Stored XSS in the color column — the `@if($column['escaped'])` branches are inverted
medium5.4Aug 20, 2026
