CVE-2026-53766: chrome-devtools-mcp: validatePath() does not canonicalize symlinks before enforcing roots

McpContext.validatePath() in src/McpContext.ts calls path.resolve(filePath) and checks that the result starts with a configured root. path.resolve() only normalises . and ... It never calls realpath(). A path like /workspace/project/cache/profile passes even if it is a symlink to ~/.aws/credentials. The tools then open the file without O_NOFOLLOW.

Two directions matter. On writes, every tool that takes a filePath (screenshots, heap snapshots, network response saves, snapshots, screencasts, Lighthouse output, performance traces) can overwrite a file outside the root. On reads, upload_file hands the symlink to Puppeteer, which uploads the target to a file input on the currently selected page. A hostile page then receives the file.

The attacker needs a symlink in the workspace and a way to trigger the call. A page that carries prompt injection can drive the tool call while the user has the MCP server connected. The symlink must already exist, or another tool must create it, which is why the reporter rates complexity high. The client must also declare roots. If it does not, the legacy behaviour allows all paths anyway.

The reporter notes the upload path is quiet: the server does not appear to log the canonical path it uploaded.

npm package chrome-devtools-mcp, versions >= 0.24.0, <= 1.0.1. The flaw bypasses roots restrictions, so it matters for clients that declare workspace roots and for workspaces holding symlinks that point outside them. Check the version:

npm ls chrome-devtools-mcp

For npx chrome-devtools-mcp@latest setups, confirm which version your client config resolves.

Upgrade to 1.1.0, the patched version. The fix is in pull request 2127 and commit 176eb695137d9c46a61e2d4d5571880c5145cf46:

npm install [email protected]

The reporter's suggested approach is to run fs.realpath() on the path and on each root before comparing, using the resolved parent directory for files that do not exist yet. Until you upgrade, look for symlinks in your workspace that point outside it and remove them. Avoid pointing the browser at untrusted pages while a sensitive workspace is mounted.

Search the workspace for symlinks that leave it:

find . -type l -exec ls -l {} +

Check whether files outside the workspace changed unexpectedly, especially credentials and dotfiles. Review the MCP client's transcript for upload_file calls and for filePath values that name an in-workspace link. Because the server does not log the canonical upload path, the client transcript is the best record. Beam records agent file access and MCP tool calls, which gives an independent trail of what upload_file was asked to read.

Summary

I originally reported this through Google Bug Hunters. The Google Bug Hunters team said this is in OSS VRP scope but not reward-eligible due to the project tier, and asked me to file an issue or PR directly with this repository. I am reporting it privately here first because it is an unfixed security issue.

McpContext.validatePath() enforces workspace roots by checking whether path.resolve(filePath) textually falls under one of the configured root paths. path.resolve() does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations.

This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the roots capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing roots capability allows all paths.

The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, upload_file can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page.

Details

Affected code:

src/McpContext.ts:178-199

validatePath(filePath?: string): void {
  if (filePath === undefined) {
    return;
  }
  const roots = this.roots();
  if (roots === undefined) {
    return;
  }
  const absolutePath = path.resolve(filePath);
  for (const root of roots) {
    const rootPath = path.resolve(fileURLToPath(root.uri));
    if (
      absolutePath === rootPath ||
      absolutePath.startsWith(rootPath + path.sep)
    ) {
      return;
    }
  }
  throw new Error(
    `Access denied: path ${filePath} is not within any of the workspace roots ${JSON.stringify(roots)}.`,
  );
}

path.resolve() only normalizes path text such as . and ... It does not call realpath() and does not resolve symlinks. Therefore, a path like:

/workspace/project/cache/profile

can textually pass the /workspace prefix check even when cache/profile is a symlink to:

/home/user/.aws/credentials

Downstream consumers then perform real filesystem operations without O_NOFOLLOW:

• src/McpContext.ts:720-738 saveFile() uses fs.mkdir({recursive: true}) and fs.writeFile().
• src/tools/input.ts:454-497 upload_file calls puppeteer.uploadFile(filePath) or fileChooser.accept([filePath]).
• Other filePath-writing tools include screenshots, heap snapshots, network response save paths, snapshots, screencasts, Lighthouse output, and performance trace saves.

This is not a TOCTOU/race condition. The symlink exists before validation and the PoC uses a single process. The issue is a canonicalization bypass / improper link resolution.

Preconditions:

• The MCP client declares roots and supplies at least one workspace root.
• A symlink exists inside the workspace and points outside the workspace.
• For the remote prompt-injection chain, the user processes untrusted page content while chrome-devtools-mcp is connected.

A remote attacker does not need local access if a suitable workspace-internal symlink already exists, or if another trusted tool/workflow can create it. Without such a symlink, the issue is a local/workspace-state-dependent boundary bypass.

PoC

Conceptual exploitation with a configured root:

Configured roots:
  file:///workspace

Workspace path:
  /workspace/project/cache/profile -> /home/user/.aws/credentials

Tool call:
  upload_file({
    filePath: "/workspace/project/cache/profile",
    uid: "<file input element on current page>"
  })

Result:
  validatePath() accepts the path because it textually starts with /workspace.
  Puppeteer follows the symlink and uploads the target file to the page.

Lab-only PoC that replicates the exact validation logic and subsequent write. It writes only inside a fresh temporary directory and touches no system paths:

const path = require('node:path');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const os = require('node:os');
const {pathToFileURL, fileURLToPath} = require('node:url');

const lab = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cdtmcp-lab-'));

try {
  fs.chmodSync(lab, 0o755);

  const workspace = path.join(lab, 'workspace');
  fs.mkdirSync(workspace);

  const outside = path.join(lab, 'outside-secret.txt');
  fs.writeFileSync(outside, 'sensitive outside content\n');

  const symlinkInside = path.join(workspace, 'innocent.txt');
  fs.symlinkSync(outside, symlinkInside);

  function validatePath(filePath, roots) {
    const absolutePath = path.resolve(filePath);
    for (const root of roots) {
      const rootPath = path.resolve(fileURLToPath(root.uri));
      if (
        absolutePath === rootPath ||
        absolutePath.startsWith(rootPath + path.sep)
      ) {
        return true;
      }
    }
    throw new Error(`Access denied: ${filePath}`);
  }

  const roots = [{uri: pathToFileURL(workspace).href, name: 'workspace'}];
  validatePath(symlinkInside, roots);

  fs.writeFileSync(symlinkInside, 'OVERWRITTEN BY MCP\n');

  console.log(fs.readFileSync(outside, 'utf8'));
  // -> "OVERWRITTEN BY MCP"
} finally {
  fs.rmSync(lab, {recursive: true, force: true});
}

Observed result:

validatePath() accepts the in-root symlink path.
The subsequent write follows the symlink and modifies the out-of-root target.

I can provide an end-to-end MCP client reproduction if needed. The lab PoC above demonstrates the root cause using the same validation logic as the server.

Impact

Who can exploit:

• A local process/user or trusted workflow that can create a symlink inside the workspace.
• A remote page/prompt-injection attacker, if a suitable workspace-internal symlink already exists or can be created by another trusted workflow/tool.

Security impact:

• Integrity: tools that write to filePath can overwrite files outside the configured workspace root through an in-root symlink.
• Confidentiality: upload_file can read a file outside the workspace through an in-root symlink and attach it to a file input on the current page.
• Stealth/auditability: the exfiltration path goes through normal page file-upload behavior, and chrome-devtools-mcp does not appear to log the canonical path that was uploaded.

Example sensitive files reachable if symlinked into the workspace:

• Cloud credentials such as ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gcloud/..., or ~/.azure/....
• SSH private keys or .ssh files readable by the user.
• Project secrets such as .env, .npmrc, .netrc, secrets.json, and API tokens.
• Out-of-workspace source files or configuration files.

Severity:

• Suggested GitHub severity: Moderate.
• CVSS v3.1 chain estimate: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N.
• AC:H reflects that a workspace-internal symlink must exist at validation time.

Suggested fix:

Canonicalize paths before comparing against roots. For an existing file, use fs.realpath() on the path. For a new file, resolve the parent directory with fs.realpath() and re-join the basename.

async validatePath(filePath?: string): Promise<void> {
  if (filePath === undefined) return;
  const roots = this.roots();
  if (roots === undefined) return;

  const abs = path.resolve(filePath);
  let canonical;
  try {
    canonical = await fs.realpath(abs);
  } catch (err) {
    if (err.code === 'ENOENT') {
      const parent = await fs.realpath(path.dirname(abs));
      canonical = path.join(parent, path.basename(abs));
    } else {
      throw err;
    }
  }

  for (const root of roots) {
    const canonicalRoot = await fs.realpath(fileURLToPath(root.uri));
    if (
      canonical === canonicalRoot ||
      canonical.startsWith(canonicalRoot + path.sep)
    ) {
      return;
    }
  }

  throw new Error(
    `Access denied: ${filePath} (canonical: ${canonical}) is not within any workspace root.`,
  );
}