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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-53753: Crawl4AI: AST Sandbox Escape via gi_frame.f_back Chain - Pre-Auth RCE in Docker API

criticalCVSS 3.1 9.8GHSA-qxjp-w3pj-48m7

Summary The safeevalexpression() function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (giframe, fback, fbuiltins) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Published Jun 16, 2026 · Updated Jul 20, 2026

Affected packages

crawl4ai

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
<= 0.8.6
Fixed in
0.8.7
Check
pip show crawl4ai

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The _safe_eval_expression() function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (gi_frame, f_back, f_builtins) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution.

The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via POST /crawl with a crafted extraction schema.

Attack Vector

An attacker sends a POST /crawl request with a JsonCssExtractionStrategy schema containing a malicious computed field expression that:

  1. Creates a generator to access gi_frame
  2. Walks the frame chain via f_back
  3. Reaches f_builtins containing the real __import__
  4. Imports os and executes arbitrary commands

Impact

Unauthenticated remote code execution inside the Docker container. An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands, read/write files, and exfiltrate secrets.

Fix Details

  1. Removed eval() from computed field expression path entirely -- expressions now log a warning and return default value
  2. Deleted _safe_eval_expression() function and _SAFE_EVAL_BUILTINS (dead security-sensitive code)
  3. function key with Python callables still works for SDK users
  4. Replaced eval() in /config/dump with JSON-based input validated by Pydantic
  5. Fixed hook_manager sandbox: stripped __builtins__, __loader__, __spec__ from injected modules; removed getattr, setattr, type, __build_class__ from allowed builtins

Workarounds

  1. Upgrade to the patched version (recommended)
  2. Enable JWT authentication via CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN environment variable
  3. Restrict network access to the Docker API

Credits

  • Song Binglin (q1uf3ng) - reported the AST sandbox escape
  • by111 (August829) - reported the hook sandbox __builtins__ escape and hardcoded JWT secret bypass
  • jannahopp - PR #1855 proposing eval removal
  • ntohidi - PR #1886 proposing allowlist approach

Credited to q1uf3ng, August829, ntohidi.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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