CVE-2026-52772: YesWiki has stored XSS in Bazar form-field templates via unescaped field.label / field.hint (|raw('html'))
Bazar form-field templates still apply raw('html') to field.label / field.hint in attribute and label-body contexts — stored XSS in form renders (sibling class of commit e6b66aa) CWE: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation, "Cross-site Scripting") via CWE-116 (Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output) — same class as the partial fix at commit e6b66aa CVSS v3.1:…
Published Jul 9, 2026
Affected packages
yeswiki/yeswiki
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 4.6.6
- Fixed in
- 4.6.6
- Check
composer show yeswiki/yeswiki
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Bazar form-field templates still apply |raw('html') to field.label / field.hint in attribute and label-body contexts — stored XSS in form renders (sibling class of commit e6b66aa)
CWE: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation, "Cross-site Scripting") via CWE-116 (Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output) — same class as the partial fix at commit e6b66aa
CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N → 4.7 (Medium)
(Privileges Required = High because writing the field definitions requires saisie_formulaire, which tools/bazar/services/Guard.php:58-61 grants only to admins by default; Scope = Changed because the XSS payload set by a form-editor admin executes in the origin context of arbitrary viewers, including unauthenticated visitors.)
Summary
Commit e6b66aa ("fix(bazar): leave the twig escape placeholder as is", 2026-05-19) recognised that emitting field.label through Twig's raw('html') filter into an HTML attribute is unsafe — Twig's raw marker suppresses the attribute auto-escape, striptags removes <…> tags but not ", so a label containing " can break out of the attribute and inject event-handler attributes. The commit fixed tools/bazar/templates/inputs/text.twig:19 and tools/bazar/templates/inputs/textarea.twig:3.
At least seven additional templates have the same pattern and were not touched by the fix:
tools/bazar/templates/inputs/range.twig:19—placeholder="{{ field.label|raw('html')|striptags }}"tools/bazar/templates/inputs/email.twig:13—placeholder="{{ field.label|raw('html')|striptags }}"tools/bazar/templates/layouts/input.twig:7—title="{{ field.hint|raw('html') }}" alt="{{ field.hint|raw('html') }}"tools/bazar/templates/inputs/textarea.twig:14— sametitle=/alt=pattern (the commit only fixed line 3, line 14 remains)tools/bazar/templates/inputs/user.twig:41, 55— sametools/bazar/templates/inputs/bookmarklet.twig:4— sametools/bazar/templates/layouts/input.twig:9,tools/bazar/templates/layouts/field.twig:5,tools/bazar/templates/inputs/subscribe.twig:16,tools/bazar/templates/inputs/linked-entry.twig:4,tools/bazar/templates/inputs/textarea.twig:16,tools/bazar/templates/inputs/bookmarklet.twig:6—{{ field.label|raw }}*outside* an attribute (label-body), with nostriptagsat all, so direct tag injection (``) executes
The layouts/input.twig and layouts/field.twig files are base layouts inherited by every Bazar field type, so a single malicious field.hint reaches into every form that uses that field.
Affected
- YesWiki
doryphoreat HEAD6c653dd(the audit checkout) - All releases that ship the listed templates with the
|raw('html')/|rawfilter in attribute or label-body context
Vulnerability details
[A] — Source: field.label and field.hint are populated from form definitions
tools/bazar/fields/BazarField.php:46-53:
$this->label = empty($values[self::FIELD_LABEL]) ? '' : html_entity_decode($values[self::FIELD_LABEL]);
$this->size = $values[self::FIELD_SIZE];
$this->maxChars = $values[self::FIELD_MAX_CHARS];
$this->default = $values[self::FIELD_DEFAULT];
$this->required = $values[self::FIELD_REQUIRED] == 1;
$this->searchable = $values[self::FIELD_SEARCHABLE];
$this->hint = $values[self::FIELD_HINT]; // [A] no decoding/escapingfield.label is html_entity_decode($values[FIELD_LABEL]) — the decode actively *turns* HTML-entity-encoded payloads (", ") back into raw ", defeating any entity-encoded mitigation a form author might apply. field.hint is the raw string from the form definition. Both flow into the field's __toString-like context unchanged. Form definitions are written by users with the saisie_formulaire ACL (tools/bazar/services/Guard.php:45-62 — admins by default; the same ACL the audit team chose to gate imported-form POST handling under in commit fe7244b).
[B] — Sink class 1: attribute-context |raw('html')|striptags (placeholder breakout)
tools/bazar/templates/inputs/range.twig:19:
placeholder="{{ field.label|raw('html')|striptags }}"tools/bazar/templates/inputs/email.twig:13:
placeholder="{{ field.label|raw('html')|striptags }}"raw('html') marks the value as a Markup object, which causes Twig's HTML auto-escaper to skip it (Twig\Markup::__toString). striptags removes <…> sequences but does not touch ", ', or =. A field.label of:
hi" onmouseover="alert(document.cookie)" x="passes striptags unchanged, is marked safe by raw('html'), and lands inside the attribute as:
placeholder="hi" onmouseover="alert(document.cookie)" x=""The injected onmouseover fires when a viewer hovers the input. Same vector as the pre-fix text.twig:19.
[C] — Sink class 2: attribute-context |raw('html') *without* striptags (worse)
tools/bazar/templates/layouts/input.twig:7:
{% if field.hint %}
{% endif %}Identical patterns in tools/bazar/templates/inputs/textarea.twig:14, tools/bazar/templates/inputs/user.twig:41, tools/bazar/templates/inputs/user.twig:55, tools/bazar/templates/inputs/bookmarklet.twig:4.
There is no striptags here at all, so the attacker has the full attribute-injection alphabet plus full HTML if the parser desynchronises. Setting field.hint = '"><script>alert(1)</script>' gives:
<script>alert(1)</script>" alt="…" …The <script> runs at page parse time. Because layouts/input.twig is extended by every field-type template, a single malicious field.hint on any field in any form propagates into every form render.
[D] — Sink class 3: label-body |raw (direct DOM injection)
tools/bazar/templates/layouts/input.twig:9:
{{ field.label|raw }}tools/bazar/templates/layouts/field.twig:5:
{%- block label -%}{{ field.label|raw }}{%- endblock -%}Plus subscribe.twig:16, linked-entry.twig:4, textarea.twig:16, bookmarklet.twig:6.
These are outside any attribute, in the body of a <label> element. raw suppresses escaping, there is no striptags. field.label = '' injects an ` tag straight into the label DOM; the onerror` fires the moment the page renders, with no user interaction.
Why the fix at e6b66aa is incomplete
The fix correctly replaced field.label | raw('html') | striptags with field.label | striptags | trim (no raw) in text.twig's placeholder and textarea.twig's textarea placeholder. The fix is the right pattern — drop the raw so Twig's attribute-context autoescaper does its job — but it was applied at two specific call sites instead of being treated as a class-wide replacement. The siblings above use the same |raw('html')|striptags or |raw('html') idiom and are all currently exploitable.
Proof of concept
Setup
- Install YesWiki and log in as admin (or as any user with the
saisie_formulaireACL). - Navigate to *Bazar → Formulaires → Nouveau formulaire* and create a form. Add any field of type
range,email, or any other field type (every field type renders throughlayouts/input.twig, so thetitle=/alt=/ label-body vectors apply universally).
PoC 1 — range.twig placeholder attribute breakout (Sink class [B])
Set the field's label to:
Enter value" onmouseover="alert('XSS via field.label in range.twig')" x="Save the form. Have any visitor (including unauthenticated guests if the form is published) open a page that renders the form. Hovering the range input fires the injected handler.
Rendered HTML:
<input type="range" … placeholder="Enter value" onmouseover="alert('XSS via field.label in range.twig')" x="" required />PoC 2 — layouts/input.twig tooltip injection (Sink class [C])
Set the field's hint (Aide) to:
"><script>alert('XSS via field.hint in layouts/input.twig — fires on EVERY field type')</script>Save. Page render fires the onerror immediately — no hover, no click, no striptags filter in the way.
Impact
Direct
- Stored XSS on every visitor of any Bazar form page — a privileged form editor injects script into a field's label/hint and the script runs in the wiki origin against every viewer of the form, including unauthenticated guests. Cookie theft, session hijack of any admin who visits, full content modification, phishing overlays.
- Universal sink in `layouts/input.twig` — sinks [C] and [D] live in the base layout extended by every field type, so a single field with a malicious hint poisons every form render across the wiki, not just forms using a specific input type.
Indirect / second-order
- Privilege amplification despite `saisie_formulaire` being admin-only by default — many deployments grant
saisie_formulaireto specific user groups (per-deployment ACL configured viaconfig['permissions']['action']['saisie_formulaire']). For those deployments, the bug is exploitable by any user in those groups against any visitor. The audit pattern at commitfe7244b(the same team explicitly gatedimported-formPOST handling onsaisie_formulaire) demonstrates thatsaisie_formulaireis in fact a "trusted-input" boundary — outputs of that boundary should not assume HTML-safety. - Composability with the unpatched POI/CSRF in `BazarImportAction` (reported separately as `01-bazarimport-poi-csrf.md`) — once any XSS exists in the wiki origin, an attacker can fetch a CSRF token (if added as part of the POI fix) and chain XSS → POI → RCE without needing to phish the admin onto a third-party origin.
- The pre-`fe7244b` window — for any deployment still running a build that predates
fe7244b(theimported-formauth fix from 2026-05-12), the source offield.label/field.hintwas reachable from unauthenticated POST to theimported-formhandler, making this finding unauth-stored-XSS on those builds. The current code path closes that source side, but reinforces that the sink-side fix ate6b66aashould be applied class-wide.
Suggested fix
Apply the same transformation e6b66aa applied to text.twig / textarea.twig placeholders, class-wide:
- For attribute contexts (
placeholder=,title=,alt=, etc.) — drop therawfilter. Let Twig's attribute-context autoescape handle the value:
placeholder="{{ field.label|striptags|trim }}"
title="{{ field.hint|striptags|trim }}"
alt="{{ field.hint|striptags|trim }}"striptags is fine to keep if there's a UX reason to strip incidental HTML; the security is in the absence of raw.
- For label-body contexts (
<label>{{ field.label|raw }}</label>) — decide which is the design intent and apply it everywhere: - If labels really need to render bold/italic/links: pass
field.labelthroughHtmlPurifierService::cleanHTML()at the point where the field object is constructed (i.e.BazarField::__construct's$this->label = …line), so any subsequent template emits already-purified HTML andrawbecomes safe. - If labels are plain text: drop the
rawfilter and let{{ field.label }}autoescape.
The label-body case in layouts/input.twig:9, layouts/field.twig:5, and the four inputs/*.twig files is the highest-impact patch target because it's reached by every field type; the attribute-context cases are more surgical.
Sweep target list (all in tools/bazar/templates/):
inputs/range.twig:19inputs/email.twig:13layouts/input.twig:7, 9layouts/field.twig:5inputs/textarea.twig:14, 16inputs/user.twig:41, 55inputs/bookmarklet.twig:4, 6inputs/subscribe.twig:16inputs/linked-entry.twig:4
A grep-driven CI check for |raw('html') and |raw inside Bazar twig templates would surface any future reintroduction.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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